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This research aims at exploring how smart grid opportunities can be lever-
aged to ameliorate demand response practices for residential prosumer col-
lectives, while meeting the needs of end-users and power grids.
Electricity has traditionally been generated in centralized plants then trans-
mitted and distributed to end-users, but the increasing cost-effectiveness of
micro-generation (e.g. solar photovoltaics) is resulting in the growth of more
decentralized generation. The term “prosumers” is commonly used to re-
fer to energy users (usually households) who engage in small-scale energy
production. Of particular interest is the relatively new phenomenon of pro-
sumer collectives, which typically involve interactions between small-scale
decentralized generators to optimize their collective energy production and
use through sharing, storing and/or trading energy. Drivers of collective
prosumerism include sustaining community identity, optimizing energy de-
mand and supply across multiple households, and gaining market power
from collective action.
Managing power flows in grids integrating intermittent micro-generation
(e.g. from solar photovoltaics and micro-wind turbines) presents a chal-
lenge for prosumer collectives as well as power grid operators. Smart grid
technologies and capabilities provide opportunities for dynamic demand re-
sponse, where flexible demand can be better matched with variable supply.
Ideally, smart grid opportunities should incentivize prosumers to maximize
their energy self-consumption from local supply while fairly sharing any
income from trading surplus energy, or any loss of utility associated with
altering energy demand patterns.
iii
New businesses are emerging and developing various products and services
around smart grid opportunities to cater for the socio-technical needs of
residential prosumer collectives, where technical energy systems overlap
with social interactions. This research studies how emerging businesses are
using smart grid capabilities to create dynamic demand response solutions
for residential prosumer collectives, and how fairness can be adopted in
solutions targeting those collectives.
This research interweaves social and technical knowledge from literature
to interpret the interactions and objectives of prosumer collectives in new
ways, and create new socio-technical knowledge around those interpreta-
tions.
Conducting this research involved using mixed research methods to draw on
social science, computer science, and power systems. In the social stream
of the research, semi-structured interviews were conducted with executives
in businesses providing current or potential smart grid solutions enabling
dynamic demand response in residential prosumer collectives. In the tech-
nical stream, optimization, computation and game theory concepts were
used to develop software algorithms for integrating fairness in allocating
shared benefits and loss of utility in collective settings.
Interview findings show that new business models and prosumer-oriented
solutions are being developed to support the growth of prosumer collectives.
Solutions are becoming more software-based, and enabling more socially-
conscious user choice. Challenges include dealing with power quality rather
than capacity, developing scalable business models and adequate regulatory
frameworks, and managing social risks. Automated flexibility management
is anticipated to dominate dynamic demand response practices, while the
grid is forecast to become one big prosumer community rather than pockets
of closed communities. Additionally, the research has developed two soft-
ware algorithms for residential collectives, to fairly distribute revenue and
loss of utility among households. The algorithms used game theory, opti-
mization and approximation algorithms to estimate fair shares with high
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This thesis aims at investigating how smart power grid opportunities can be leveraged
to improve energy demand response activities for residential prosumer collectives, while
meeting the needs of end-users and the power grid.
Price drops, improved efficiencies, and the desire to live green are driving households
to increasingly uptake distributed energy generation (e.g. solar photovoltaics (PV) and
wind turbines) and storage systems (e.g. batteries). Consumers are thus transforming
to prosumers, who can produce their own electricity, which they can then consume,
store, sell or trade [1–6].
Evidence suggests that collectives of prosumers exist around the world, ranging
from organically emerging communities integrating rooftop solar PV, to third-party
supported wind farm collectives [7–9]. A prosumer collective is a group of prosumers
on the same power distribution network, who often share values, identity and place.
A prosumer collective may include a group of households within a neighbourhood, a
district, or a municipality [10–13].
A collective of prosumer households can provide increased benefits, including strength-
ening prosumers’ market power (e.g. to sell electricity to the grid) [14, 15], and creating
flexible demand across households to maximize energy self-consumption from the col-
lective’s micro-generation [10, 16].
While energy demand in households is generally highly variable, a collective of
prosumer households adds to that complexity by dominantly integrating intermittent
micro-generation. Demand-side energy management is thus required to create flexible
demand that matches with sporadic supply.
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Current demand-side energy management activities are often categorized into en-
ergy efficiency (EE) and demand response (DR). Energy efficiency is a static resource
for managing demand, where the same service is provided using less energy [17]. Energy
efficiency can neither be dispatched (i.e. turned on or off, or adjusted) nor controlled,
and is often limited to the technical constraints of certain technologies (e.g. efficient
light bulbs) [18]. Demand response is a controllable activity, and is defined as:
the changes in electric usage by end-user customers from their normal con-
sumption patterns in response to changes in the price of electricity over
time, or to incentive payments designed to induce lower electricity use at
times of high wholesale market prices or when system reliability is jeopar-
dized [19, p. 6].
Demand response has characteristics that can enable flexible demand in residential
prosumer collectives. Nevertheless, existing demand response activities lack the capa-
bilities required for accommodating prosumer collectives. The next section explores the
motivation behind investigating how to improve demand response practices in order to
cater for the needs of prosumer collectives.
1.2 Motivation
Today’s demand response practices mostly target consumers, and even though a few of
those practices highly correlate with renewables, they are either scarcely implemented
or are used with consumers rather than prosumers (more details in Section 2.4.3. Addi-
tionally, demand response practices in general lack features for enabling communication
among households in a collective, or between a collective and the grid or the electricity
market, and are thus inadequate for maintaining the complex interactions arising in
and around prosumer collectives.
The various changes occurring in the energy terrain today, and notably the emer-
gence of residential prosumer collectives, necessitate the evolution of demand response
practices to become more dynamic and accommodative of new end-users and their
complex interactions.
The growing technology advancements in metering, communication, and control,
and the increasing economic feasibility of distributed energy generation and storage
technologies are supporting the transition to a “smart grid” [20–25], which should
ideally enable grid stakeholders (households, electricity retailers, grid operators, etc.)
to interact in a reliable, efficient and sustainable way [26].
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The smart grid offers various opportunities for creating dynamic demand response
in residential prosumer collectives, including scheduling energy usage among appliances
and batteries across multiple households, selling the collective’s electricity to the grid,
and storing energy supply from micro-generation in batteries and electric vehicles for
later use during peak demand periods [18, 20, 21, 27].
Most power grids worldwide are not yet smart. Nevertheless, the smart grid con-
cept has the potential to transform such grids in a similar way to how the internet
transformed two-way digital network communication. The smart grid can be viewed as
an idealised integration of the electricity grid and the internet. In its fully developed
form, the smart grid can be seen as a transformation from centralized to distributed
control, and from a generation-oriented model to one that focuses on end-users [28].
For a socio-technical system like a prosumer collective, where technical energy sys-
tems overlap with human objectives and practices, opportunities enabled by the smart
grid should ideally take social concepts (e.g. fairness) into consideration. Such concepts
help in better understanding and assessing the processes and the outcomes of prosumer
collectives and support them in being socially accepted [29–32]. The context governing
a prosumer collective and its maturity may play a role in shaping who decides which
social concepts are important (e.g. regulatory bodies, prosumers, research entities).
With regards to who is using smart grid opportunities to improve demand response
practices, most top actors in power grids (grid operators, distribution companies, etc.)
are unfortunately slow in offering dynamic demand response to rapidly emerging pro-
sumer collectives (i.e. bottom actors). This difference in pace has stirred the rise of
“middle actors”, which can help link top and bottom actors, and enable innovative
smart grid offerings. Ideally, middle actors should help prosumer collectives efficiently
manage their complex power, data and money flows, while providing support to top
actors to notably maintain grid reliability.
Investigating this complex socio-technical problem needs to leverage both quanti-
tative data (e.g. from smart meters and solar PV inverters) and qualitative data (e.g.
prosumers’ energy aspirations and collective-oriented objectives). To tackle such a chal-
lenging piece of interdisciplinary research and create reasoned discussions from both
qualitative and quantitative data, using mixed methods presents a suitable research
pathway. The core benefit of using mixed methods lies in their integrated results,
which combine words and narratives with numerical data [33].
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1.3 Thesis Roadmap
This thesis aims to explore how smart grid capabilities can be used to improve demand
response practices in residential prosumer collectives, by posing four research questions,
as presented below. To tackle this aim, it is important to first review the current status
of energy demand management in general, and explore what new opportunities are
emerging, as presented in the first research question below.
Research Question 1 – What is the current status of energy demand
management and what new opportunities exist?
To address the first research question, I first outline how power grids and electricity
markets work. Then, I introduce the concepts of demand-side energy management,
energy efficiency and demand response, and discuss why demand response is the energy
management approach that is more suited to prosumer collectives. I then highlight the
inadequacy of existing demand response practices to cater for the needs of residential
prosumer collectives, and identify the emerging opportunities, made possible by the
smart grid, for developing more dynamic demand response practices.
Research Question 2 – How do new opportunities offered by the smart
grid support the emergence of residential prosumer collectives?
The second research question investigates how the emergence of prosumer collectives
is being enabled by smart grid technologies, such as distributed energy resources, and
smart metering and controls. I first introduce the concept of energy prosumerism,
for individuals as well as collectives, and discuss the drivers, barriers and enablers
of individual and collective prosumerism. I also review and analyze four residential
prosumer collectives from around the world to inform the research herein.
Based on literature review and example collectives, I identify key aspects to be
considered in prosumer collectives (e.g. fairness), and a lack of enabling solutions for
dynamic demand response by top actors in the electricity system (grid operators, dis-
tribution companies, etc.). This is followed by reasoning on the emergence of new
actors, namely middle actors, and an outline of their role in leveraging smart grid
opportunities to develop dynamic demand response practices for residential prosumer
collectives.
Research Question 3 – How are middle actors shaping smart grid of-
ferings, and what are the implications for dynamic demand response in
residential prosumer collectives?
The third question investigates middle actors and their offerings in more details,
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where I report on semi-structured interviews that I undertook with executives from
businesses specializing in offerings enabling dynamic demand response. I assess how
middle actors and their offerings can enable residential prosumer collectives to create
flexible demand and optimally manage their multi-directional interactions, and learn
about what future trends and challenges middle actors are forecasting for residential
prosumer collectives and energy demand management.
Research Question 4 – How can fairness be fostered in dynamic de-
mand response for residential collectives?
Literature and interview findings revealed that fairness is a key concept to be con-
sidered in dynamic demand response for residential collectives. Using optimization,
computation and game theory concepts, I develop two software algorithms, where one
fairly distributes a collective’s revenue from selling electricity among its prosumers,
and the other fairly allocates loss of utility associated with dynamic demand response
among a collective of consumers.
1.4 Thesis Chapters
Chapter 2 outlines how power grids and electricity markets work, and discusses the
various objectives and mechanisms of demand-side energy management. The chapter
then focuses on demand response, its current approaches, and the inadequacy of such
approaches in meeting the needs of residential prosumer collectives. This is followed
by a discussion about the various opportunities evolving for demand response in light
of smart grids.
Chapter 3 presents a literature review on the emergence of energy prosumers, both
individuals and collectives, then discusses their drivers, barriers and enablers. Further-
more, the initiating entities, physical configurations, and organizational structures of
prosumer collectives are presented. Four example prosumer collectives from around
the world are then reviewed and analyzed to inform the work herein.
In addition, Chapter 3 underpins the lack of enabling solutions offered by top
actors (e.g. grid operators) for dynamic demand response in prosumer collectives, and
highlights the role of emerging middle actors in bridging this gap by leveraging smart
grid opportunities to innovate dynamic demand response offerings.
In Chapter 4, the methodology used to address the third and fourth research ques-
tions of this thesis is presented, with an elaboration on the socio-technical nature of
this research. The chapter also presents why mixed methods are used to address the
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third and fourth research questions, and sets the scene for Chapters 5 and 6.
Chapter 5 presents the findings of the interviews conducted with emerging busi-
nesses acting as middle actors in offering dynamic demand response solutions to resi-
dential prosumer collectives. The chapter illustrates how the slow response from some
of the top actors in the electricity industry to address the needs of rapidly emerging
prosumer collectives is opening up the doors to a wave of new businesses. The chapter
focuses on the characteristics of such new businesses and the smart grid products and
services they develop to cater for the needs of prosumer collectives. In addition, the
chapter discusses the main challenges and future trends expected to arise in residential
prosumer collectives and energy demand management.
In Chapter 6, I investigate new ways to adopt fairness in software solutions for
dynamic demand response targeting collectives of households, where I develop two
software algorithms for collective settings. The first algorithm fairly distributes a
collective’s revenue, from selling its electricity, among its prosumers, and the second
fairly distributes a collective’s loss of utility, associated with a demand response event,
among its households.
Lastly, Chapter 7 concludes this thesis by interweaving the literature review with
the social-technical findings of this research, to underpin linkages, highlight novelty,
and make recommendations for future research on this topic.
1.5 My Perspectives
My interest in demand-side energy management for households started during my inter-
disciplinary master’s degree studies, which mainly included technical, socio-economic
and cultural courses on renewable energy and smart grids. Coming from an engineering
background – where my bachelor’s studies covered topics in electronics, communica-
tions and power engineering – I was particularly interested in smart power grids which
lie at the intersection of those three engineering disciplines. In my master’s thesis, I
investigated the status and potential of demand-side management in the Middle East
and North Africa (MENA) Region, and recommended communication and control tech-
nologies for setting up a regional smart grid environment. Additionally, I developed
a load management algorithm, which reduces peak electricity demand in a household,
and proposed modifications to existing electricity billing schemes to incentivize rational
electricity demand.
During my master’s studies, I was fascinated with renewable energy resources and
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their huge potential, especially as renewable micro-generation can help power grids
become more decentralized, and enable consumers to produce their own electricity.
However, the costs of renewable micro-generation (e.g. solar PV) during my studies
in 2012 were still very high, which made renewable energy projects infeasible in some
cases. Therefore, work conducted in my thesis focused on demand-side management for
consumers rather than prosumers, as the concept of energy prosumerism was still in its
infancy. Nevertheless, as the prices of micro-generation and battery systems dropped
during the past few years, the uptake of distributed energy resources among households
has risen and thus energy prosumers have emerged. This transformation triggered my
curiosity to explore different perspectives of residential demand-side energy manage-
ment – for prosumers rather than consumers; for collectives of households rather than
individual ones; and from a socio-technical lens rather than a purely technical one.
During my PhD journey, I have attended an energy summer school in 2014 at the
University of Groningen in the Netherlands. That year, the school had an interdis-
ciplinary theme – “Smart Grids from a Global Perspective: Bridging Old and New
Energy Systems”. During this 2-week summer school, PhD students researching across
various disciplines had the chance to attend presentations given by specialists in the
field, present their research work, and take part in active discussions and workshops. I
learned from experts, networked and exchanged experiences with fellow PhD students,
and went on informative “new energy excursions” (one of them I discuss in Chapter 3
as an example prosumer collective).
Participating in this summer school was a very interesting and beneficial experi-
ence, which greatly motivated my research and highlighted the significance of interdis-
ciplinary research covering emerging energy transitions in light of smart grids. More
details about my presentation at the summer school, and the other presentations and
publications of my PhD journey, to date, are available in Appendix D.
At the moment, I am experiencing the essence of this research firsthand, as I take up
a software product management role at a new company (i.e. a middle actor) developing
smart grid solutions (both software and hardware) for electric utilities to deal with the





Research Question 1 – What is the current status of energy demand man-
agement and what new opportunities exist?
2.1 Introduction
Demand-side energy management is a cost-effective way to balance electricity supply
and demand while maintaining grid reliability and reducing price volatility [19, 22, 34–
36]. By building on the supply-following concept rather than load-following, demand-
side energy management can cost-effectively mitigate risks (e.g. asset valuation risks)
that come with building new large-scale capital-intensive generation facilities [34, 37,
38]. In case of power grid contingencies (generation shortage, power line faults, etc.),
managing energy demand efficiently can also help maintain power system reliability
[22, 38, 39]. By encouraging consumers to reduce demand during peak periods in
return for incentives, demand-side management can also help reduce electricity price
volatility [19, 40–42].
Current demand-side energy management approaches broadly include energy effi-
ciency and demand response. While energy efficiency focuses on technologies that use
energy efficiently (e.g. efficient light bulbs such as LEDs) [14, 18], demand response
focuses on changing demand patterns in response to incentives, electricity prices, or
control signals [18, 19, 43, 44]. The responsiveness of demand response and its availabil-
ity upon request make it suitable for managing energy in households, and potentially
among households, where demand patterns are highly variable.
Demand response today is often implemented in the form of programs, which tar-
get various consumers (industrial, commercial, residential, etc.). Basically, program
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administrators (e.g. grid operators) request specific changes to demand loads, and con-
sumers make those changes to their demand in return for compensation (lower tariffs,
rebates, etc.).
While evidence indicates that prosumers and prosumer collectives are emerging
[8, 9, 13, 45, 46], existing demand response practices fall short of addressing their needs,
especially around managing the non-consuming attributes of prosumers (production,
storage, etc.), and the interactions among prosumers in a collective, or between a col-
lective and external stakeholders. As collective prosumerism especially grows, demand
response practices need to evolve to address the changing characteristics of end-users,
and how they interact together in new settings (e.g. prosumer collectives).
Smart grid capabilities (advanced metering, controls, etc.) can play an essential
role in enabling the new wave of demand response practices, where energy demand in
prosumer households can be flexibly matched with their intermittent micro-generation,
and where such households interact together and with the grid in new ways (e.g. col-
laborate to achieve energy self-sufficiency from micro-generation).
This chapter presents the literature review conducted on the current approaches
of managing energy demand in power grids, and highlights the drawbacks of current
practices in meeting the needs of the changing energy landscape, and specifically pro-
sumer collectives. The chapter also provides an overview of smart grids opportunities
enabling new options for managing energy in residential prosumer collectives, which
sets the scene for investigating how to leverage such opportunities to evolve demand
response to cater for such collectives, which is the aim of this thesis.
Section 2.2 outlines how power grids and electricity markets operate, then explains
how energy supply and demand are balanced in power grids, and what drives demand-
side energy management practices.
Section 2.3 presents the definitions of demand-side management, broadly introduces
its two approaches, energy efficiency and demand response, and explains why the rest
of the thesis focuses on demand response as the suitable approach for managing energy
demand in prosumer collectives.
In Section 2.4, current demand response mechanisms are discussed in details, and
their inadequacy for residential prosumer collectives is underpinned. The new oppor-
tunities made available by the smart grid are presented in Section 2.5, and Section 2.6
summarizes literature review findings and highlights implications for this work.
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2.2 The Electric Power Grid
This section provides an overview of power grid components, namely generation, trans-
mission and distribution, outlines how electricity markets work, and briefly explains
how power grids balance electricity supply and demand.
2.2.1 Generation, Transmission and Distribution
The first power grids were built more than 140 years ago [47]. Figure 2.1, adopted
from [48], illustrates power grid components used for generation, transmission, and
distribution in the case of consumer loads.
 
Figure 2.1: Generation, transmission and distribution in a power grid
Firstly, generators produce electricity from various sources (e.g. coal-fired power
plants, hydropower plants), which are commonly centrally located in distant areas,
away from consumers. Secondly, to transfer generated electricity with specific power P
to end-users, it is first passed through step-up transformers which increase its voltage V
(thus decreasing its current I, because P = V ∗ I) to reduce transmission power losses
(whose value is equal to I2 ∗ R, where R is the resistance of the transmission lines).
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Thirdly, electricity is transmitted via a network of transmission lines, typically over long
distances, to be distributed to consumers. Then, in the case of small-scale consumers
(e.g. residential buildings), step-down transformers are used to reduce the voltage before
distributing electricity to consumers via low-voltage distribution networks. For large-
scale industrial consumers requiring high voltage levels, voltage may not need to be
stepped down.
In most power networks, electricity is generated using a mix of different types
of power plants covering electricity demand at three scales: base, intermediate, and
peak. Baseload power plants, typically coal-fired and nuclear power plants, cover the
minimum level of demand in a power grid by running at maximum output all the
time [35, 49]. Hydropower is also used in countries like Norway and Canada to cover
baseload, as it is flexible, reliable, clean, cheap and safe [50].
To cover intermediate electricity loads, which is the range of demand between base
and peak loads, intermediate power plants are used; such plants do not run all the
time, but can quickly ramp up and down to meet the rise and decline in demand (e.g.
during morning and evening hours in households) [35]. Gas turbine power plants as
well as combined cycle power plants (those comprising gas and steam turbines) are
commonly used to cover intermediate loads [35, 49]. Hydropower plants are also used
in some countries [51]. In the case of peak loads comprising spikes in demand, often
during heat waves or winter storms, electricity is typically generated by gas turbine
power plants which are expensive to operate but very fast to dispatch [34, 35, 49].
Electricity can be generated from a number of sources, and one way of categoriz-
ing those sources is to group them into renewable and non-renewable sources. Non-
renewable sources for generating electricity include fossil fuels (e.g. petroleum, coal,
natural gas), while renewable sources include solar rays, wind movement, ocean waves
and tides, and biomass [35].
A key difference between renewable and non-renewable sources is the intermittency
of some forms of renewable energies (e.g. solar and wind) which generate variable
amounts of electricity depending on weather conditions and site location [35]. This
variability can be on the scale of seconds or minutes (e.g. a cloud passing over the
sun reducing the solar rays reaching a solar panel); days or weeks (e.g. weather condi-
tions affecting solar and wind resources); seasons (e.g. less sunshine in winter than in
summer); or multi-year (e.g. dry years affecting hydro reservoirs).
Intermittent renewable sources do not provide stable electricity production and
thus cannot be used as baseload power plants. Additionally, such sources are not
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dispatchable like non-renewable sources, and thus cannot be made available on demand
[35, 52].
2.2.2 Electricity Markets
Electric utilities have been traditionally vertically integrated, meaning that a single
organisation or company owns and operates the entire supply chain of delivering elec-
tricity to end-users (i.e. generation, transmission and distribution) [53, 54]. In the US,
the government believed that having a regulated wholesale electricity market where
electric utilities have full control of power industry operations is essential, as it cannot
be guaranteed that external enterprises will act in the public interest and ensure power
supply security [54]. Nevertheless, regulated markets form monopolies, where utilities
may be less concerned about efficient operations and costs. This is less likely to happen
in competitive deregulated markets [53].
The deregulation of electricity wholesale markets received initial attention in the
1970s, when electricity started being perceived as a commodity that can be easily
measured and thus traded [55, 56]. The objective of deregulation is to let market forces
(i.e. commercial participants) establish market segments based on price, technology,
quality, or scale and scope economies1 [57]. Deregulated (i.e. liberalized) electricity
markets function as auctions, where generators propose prices for supplying electricity
for fixed time intervals (e.g. half-hourly), while the grid operator ranks those proposals
and determines the cheapest mix of generation sources that satisfy demand [58].
Electricity markets around the world vary in their degrees of liberalization, meaning
that market structures can range from being fully competitive to being totally or
partially managed by vertically integrated utilities. In some cases, generation may be
liberalized while transmission and distribution may be monopolized. In the US, some of
the states have regulated markets (e.g. Colorado, Florida and Kentucky), while Texas
and most of the states in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic are deregulated. California,
on the other hand, is partially deregulated, while other states have started deregulation
in some capacity which then got suspended [59].
The competitiveness in deregulated markets allows pricing programs and offerings
of service quality to grow into tools for competitive advantage [55], which encourages
businesses to adopt innovative programs and services to gain and retain customers.
1Scale and scope economies are those where average costs are reduced by increasing the scale or
scope of production, respectively [57].
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2.2.3 Balancing Supply and Demand
Electricity is one of the key bases of a developed society, as adequate electricity supply
facilitates technological advancement and stimulates a healthy economy [35]. Electric-
ity is also an ephemeral commodity – meaning that it needs to be consumed directly
after being generated [35]; and although electricity can be stored, large-scale storage
is currently costly [60]. Thus, balancing electricity supply and demand is essential to
maintaining the stability of power grids [35, 61], and such balance is the responsibility
of the grid operator [35], e.g. Transpower in New Zealand, and Independent Electricity
System Operator (IESO) in Ontario, Canada.
Traditionally, grid operators would ensure electricity demand is met by request-
ing more electricity supply from generators. Nevertheless, in the 1980s, power grids
started a major transition by moving away from load-following operations towards
supply-following practices, where energy demand can be tailored to the available supply
capacities [61]. Demand-side energy management is especially useful during seasonal
demand spikes (e.g. during heat waves and cold snaps), and in the case of intermit-
tent supply from utility-scale renewable energy generators (e.g. on-shore and off-shore
wind turbines, concentrated solar power plants), when demand flexibility (i.e. changing
electricity demand) is required to balance supply and demand [62].
Demand-side energy management can postpone or cancel infrastructure expansions,
reduce the use of expensive peak power plants [63], reduce spikes in electricity prices
[56], and reduce losses in transmission and distribution systems [64]. The need to
include demand-side energy management into power systems planning has become
critical [18, 65, 66]. The next section explores demand-side management in more details.
2.3 Demand-Side Management in Power Grids
In 1984, the term “demand-side management” (DSM) was coined in the US by the
Electric Power Research Institute as follows:
DSM activities are those which involve actions on the demand (i.e. cus-
tomer) side of the electric meter, either directly or indirectly stimulated by
the utility. These activities include those commonly called load manage-
ment, strategic conservation, electrification, strategic growth or deliberately
increased market share [66].
Although these definitions focus on managing electricity use, DSM can encompass
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other forms of energy use which may not necessarily be electricity-based [18], such as
co-generation of heat and power, micro-generation of heat, and district heating and
cooling [67]. The following is a more inclusive and recent definition of DSM [67]:
DSM comprises the technologies, actions, and programs on the demand-
side of energy meters that seek to manage or decrease energy consumption,
in order to reduce total energy system expenditures or contribute to the
achievement of policy objectives such as emissions reduction or balancing
supply and demand [67, p. 943].
The next section explains the drivers of demand-side energy management in details.
2.3.1 Drivers of Demand-Side Management
Various motivations, spanning economic, technical, and environmental issues, stimulate
the planning and implementation of demand-side management (DSM) activities in
power grids. The following three sections discuss the main drivers motivating the use
of DSM to balance electricity supply and demand.
Cost-effectiveness
Building new generation facilities to cover mounting demand comes with operational,
financial and asset valuation risks [68], while turning on peaking plants is expensive
[34, 35, 49]. Demand-side energy management can mitigate such risks [22, 34, 36, 37,
69, 70], by providing a cost-effective way to create flexible demand, e.g. by reducing or
shifting demand [19, 37, 38, 40, 71].
Implementing DSM measures can help grid stakeholders (e.g. grid operators, dis-
tribution companies) avoid costs needed to provide capacity, energy, ancillary services,
and transmission and distribution [19, 37, 38, 72, 73], and can help customers save on
electricity bills [74–77]. Additionally, DSM resources provide modularity and flexibil-
ity, as they can be added in batches as required [78], in contrast to power plants which
are often large-scale, capital-intensive and long-term projects.
By participating in DSM activities, end-users help move electricity usage from ex-
pensive on-peak periods to cheaper off-peak periods [79–82]. For example, by agreeing
to have air conditioners or heat pumps regularly cycled on and off during grid contin-
gencies, end-users can receive incentives; and responding to variable electricity prices
throughout the day by reducing or shifting demand can help end-users save on elec-
tricity bills [44, 83].
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In addition, implementing DSM by using efficient technologies (e.g. replacing in-
candescent lamps with light emitting diodes (LEDs)), or new systems and appliances
(e.g. adding a thermal energy storage system to a commercial or residential building)
can help conserve electricity, and save money [38, 82, 84].
Reliability Concerns
The main purpose of electricity grids is to reliably supply end-users with electricity
as economically as possible [85]. To guarantee reliable supply (e.g. absence of voltage
spikes, which may cause appliances to malfunction, or power outages, causing incon-
venience to end-users), the power grid should ideally maintain stable operation within
a set of constraints relating to supply quality either directly (e.g. power frequency and
voltage variations) or indirectly (e.g. system faults and equipment ratings) [85].
If the reliability of power systems is in jeopardy (e.g. generation shortage, power line
faults), DSM can provide demand flexibility (i.e. changing electricity demand from nor-
mal consumption patterns) and fast reaction at a low cost [22] which can help maintain
power system reliability [38, 39]. The role DSM plays in maintaining such reliability is
further underpinned by the increase in intermittent supply from renewable resources
(e.g. solar PV, wind turbines). Intermittent electricity supply causes fluctuations in
network frequency and voltage, which can cause equipment damage [86, 87]; however,
DSM can help mitigate such effects by creating flexible demand [22, 88].
Furthermore, studies have shown that deploying DSM leads to higher system relia-
bility because DSM resources are often distributed, unlike centralized generation units
which often have single points of failure [89, 90].
Price Volatility
In deregulated markets, wholesale electricity prices – often referred to as spot prices –
are volatile [58, 91], and volatility can occasionally reach a risky level [92, 93] where
prices spike with little or no warning, or continue spiking over a long period (e.g. during
a drought) [58]. Spot prices are a function of many parameters, including location, time
(e.g. day, season), weather, temperature, demand variability, and system and market
conditions [91]. For example, electricity spot prices are higher during morning and
evening demand peaks, and lower at night when electricity use is low.
Some customers, such as medium and large industrial and commercial facilities,
can choose to accept the risks associated with volatile spot prices, or mitigate those
risks (e.g. implementing DSM by shifting consumption or relying on back-up generation
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rather than electricity from the grid) [58]. Other customers (e.g. households and small
businesses) transfer price volatility risks to electricity retailers by buying electricity
through fixed price contracts [58, 94]. By encouraging end-users to curb their demand
during periods of peak prices and rewarding them in return, DSM can help reduce price
volatility [19, 40–42].
Demand-side management is often broadly categorized into energy efficiency (EE)
and demand response (DR) [19]. The following two sections describe energy efficiency,
respectively, in more details.
2.3.2 Energy Efficiency
Energy efficiency is a well-established activity of DSM [18, 19, 78], where the same
service is provided using less energy [14]. Inspite of being a static resource that does
not respond to power system signals, e.g. price and control signals [22], energy efficiency
is regarded as a capacity resource which reduces demand loads [22].
Because energy efficiency is a static resource that cannot be dispatched or con-
trolled, its significance as a DSM resource is often limited to certain technologies and
bounded by their constraints. For such reasons, demand response is more suitable for
matching electricity consumption with production in residential prosumer households,
as briefly explained in the next section and further discussed in the following sections.
2.3.3 Demand Response
Demand response is defined as “the changes in electric usage by end-user customers
from their normal consumption patterns in response to changes in the price of electricity
over time, or to incentive payments designed to induce lower electricity use at times of
high wholesale market prices or when system reliability is jeopardized” [19, p. 6].
Demand response is a controllable resource that responds to price and control signals
[22], and can be implemented at different end-user scales and at different levels of the
power grid (e.g. system operation, distribution, retailing).
Demand response is dynamic and event-driven, and commonly includes dynamic
electricity pricing, contractually obligated or voluntary curtailment, and equipment
cycling [44]. It is important to note that demand response can be manual (e.g. by
behaviourally reacting to a request from the grid operator to reduce demand during
specific hours of the day), or automatic (e.g. by having devices that react to signals
received from the grid, such as smart thermostats).
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The following section reviews existing demand response mechanisms, and highlights
their inadequacies for managing energy in residential prosumer collectives.
2.4 Current Demand Response Mechanisms
Demand response is often implemented through programs. The US Energy Information
Administration defines DSM programs as follows:
DSM programs consist of the planning, implementing and monitoring ac-
tivities of electric utilities which are designed to encourage consumers to
modify their level and pattern of electricity usage [95].
From a physical and a transactional point of view, a demand response program in-
volves interactions between the program administrator (e.g. grid operator (GO), trans-
mission system operator (TSO), distribution system operator (DSO)), program partic-
ipants (i.e. consumers), and sometimes an aggregator (an entity that bundles demand
response resources, especially those of small-scale consumers).
Current demand response programs are either enabled by direct communication
between the program administrator and consumers, or indirectly through an aggre-
gator. Figure 2.2, adopted from reference [96], illustrates the connections between
consumers and different program administrators, and the flows of power, communica-
tion and money. As shown, in case of consumers, power flows from the direction of
program administrators to consumers, while communication flows from administrators
where they request consumers to change their demand (often through reduction). As
a result of participating in demand response, money flows from administrators to con-
sumers; however, money also flows from consumers to administrators when paying for
electricity bills, thus making money flow bi-directional.
An example illustrating a DR program enabled by direct communication between
a grid operator and a consumer is that of Alcoa Inc. – a world leading producer
of aluminium. Alcoa Inc. participates in a demand response program directly with
Midwest Independent System Operator (a GO and TSO serving parts of the US and
Canada) to optimize the electricity demand of its aluminium smelters [97].
An example program enabled by an aggregator is that of REstore, a leading demand
response aggregator in Belgium and the UK. In December 2014, REstore successfully
bid a demand response portfolio totalling 22 MW of sheddable load drawn from the 50















































Figure 2.2: Participation of consumers in demand response programs
directly or through an aggregator
Demand response programs can be categorized based on their economic or market
triggers (e.g. high spot prices) and physical emergency triggers (i.e. grid status and
reliability signals) [99]; or based on the services offered (e.g. energy, capacity or ancil-
lary services [71]). Demand response programs can also be categorized based on the
objectives they achieve for program administrators (e.g. load shaping and congestion
management) or based on the compensation they offer to program participants (e.g.
rebates, cheaper tariffs).
The following two sections investigates the details of demand response programs
based on administrators’ objectives at different levels of the power grid, and on com-
pensations offered participants, respectively. This investigation helps identify the gaps
in current demand response programs, which shape the improvements needed to ade-
quately accommodate prosumer collectives and their growth, and hence feed into the
overall aim of this thesis.
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2.4.1 For Program Administrator
The design and implementation of a demand response program are typically managed
by a program administrator, either directly or through contracting external parties
(e.g. consulting firms). A program administrator is often a GO, a TSO, a DSO, or an
electricity retailer. In this section, demand response mechanisms are presented based
on their objectives at three power grid levels [22]: (1) system operation, (2) generation,
transmission, and distribution, and (3) retail. Figure 2.3 illustrates these mechanisms
for industrial, commercial and residential end-users. Mechanisms with bold dashed
borders indicate that an aggregator is required for residential end-users to participate.
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System Operation Generation Transmission Distribution Retail
Residential Demand Response
Figure 2.3: Demand response mechanisms for industrial, commercial
and residential end-users at the different power grid levels based on
the objectives of program administrators
Although this overview gathers currently common trends in DR mechanisms and
programs around the world, there may be exceptions in some countries. More details
on the objective of each mechanism and example programs are included in Appendix A.
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System Operation
Demand response mechanisms implemented at the system operation level [22, 37, 38,
92, 100, 101], by the grid operator or in the wholesale market, can achieve several objec-
tives for program administrators including enhancing power system reliability, provid-
ing capacity, and improving electricity market efficiency for industrial and commercial
consumers. For residential consumers, demand response at the system operation level
mainly focuses on enhancing market efficiency, and as DR programs at this level com-
monly require large amounts of DR resources, an aggregator is needed to collect such
resources from households. Tables A.1–A.3 in Appendix A present the objectives of
DR at the system operation level, and example mechanisms and programs in more
details.
Generation, transmission and distribution
The implementation of demand response follows electricity from generation plants,
through transmission networks, to be distributed to consumers via low-voltage net-
works. Currently, load shaping is available at the generation level only for industrial
and commercial consumers, as it is uncommon for generators to directly deal with
small-scale consumers [22, 35, 102–104]. If this mechanism becomes available to house-
holds, it would most likely require aggregating DR resources.
At the transmission level, congestion management is available for industrial, com-
mercial, and residential consumers; however, in the case of residential consumers an
aggregator is required to collect DR resources [22, 105–107]. At the distribution level,
system reliability enhancement is commonly available to the three types of consumers
[22, 101, 108, 109]. For residential consumers, reliability enhancement programs mainly
include contractually obliged and voluntary curtailment. Such programs mostly use fre-
quency changes to control relays in specific household devices (e.g. hot water cylinder,
night storage heater), or involve behavioural response (e.g. by shifting or shedding load)
to DR events requesting demand reduction. Tables A.4–A.6 in Appendix A detail the
objectives of DR at the generation, transmission and distribution levels, and provide
example mechanisms and programs.
Retail
Demand response is used by retailers to enhance electricity procurement, shape demand
loads and manage power capacity. Programs aiming to provide capacity are available
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directly to industrial and commercial consumers, but require aggregators for residential
consumers [110–112]. In the case of procurement enhancement, which is available
to the three types of consumers, programs largely target controlling space and water
heating devices (e.g. frequency-controlled hot water cylinder) or voluntary participation
especially by households [113–115]. Load shaping at the retail level remains scarce, as
the ability of DR to maintain load increases is limited [22]. In Tables A.7–A.9 in
Appendix A, the objectives and mechanisms of DR at the retail level are presented in
more details, in addition to example programs.
This overview highlights the inadequacy of current DR mechanisms, based on pro-
gram administrator’s objectives at different levels of the power grid. The next section
presents current demand response mechanisms from the perspective of program par-
ticipants, and highlights untapped potentials. The overall inadequacy of current DR
mechanisms is recapped in Section 2.4.3.
2.4.2 For Program Participant
From the perspective of a program participant, DR programs can be price-based or
incentive-based when compensating program participants for inconvenience or loss of
utility (i.e. service) as a result of changing their electricity demand [18, 19, 21].
Price-based DR
Mechanisms triggering program participants to make demand changes based on variable
prices over time are referred to as price-based DR, where both static and dynamic
pricing are used to bill participants [18, 19, 21, 38]. A time-of-use (TOU) scheme is an
example of static pricing, where different fixed prices are used during different times of
the day [18, 19, 21]. Example dynamic pricing schemes include real-time prices (RTP)
and critical peak prices (CPP) which depend on electricity spot prices [116, 117].
Many studies and pilot projects have been conducted over the past 40 years to
explore the impact of TOU pricing on consumer demand, with varying results. During
the 1970s and 80s, a study was conducted to test the impact of TOU pricing on peak
demand in households in two locations in Germany. The TOU tariffs had three prices on
weekdays and two prices on weekends, with a ratio of 2.5:1.5:1 between peak, shoulder,
and off-peak prices, respectively. The study involving 1500 households in Saarland and
450 households in Freiburg found a 10% and a 3% reduction in peak demand as a result
of using TOU prices, respectively [118].
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The Visible Energy Trial conducted between 2008 and 2010 across eastern England,
which recruited 275 households to try three smart energy monitors with different levels
of complexity for at least 12 months, concluded that manually responding to TOU
declines with time [116]. When residential consumers receive real-time feedback via
energy monitors, although they do respond to differential prices by making changes
to their demand, there is a limit to making further changes. Explanations for this
limitation include an unwillingness to change certain domestic activities and appliance
usage, a difficulty in negotiating demand changes among household members, and a
lack of policy and market support for change [116].
As for dynamic pricing, a review examining evidence from 15 experiments in the
US and Canada concluded that using CPP reduces household electricity demand by
13-20%, which rises to 27-44% when enabling technologies (e.g. programmable ther-
mostats) are used [119].
Incentive-based DR
Rewarding program participants with incentives for changing their demand is referred
to as incentive-based DR, which includes direct load control and interruptible load
programs [18, 19, 21, 38].
A study evaluating the impacts of DR programs offered by US grid operators showed
that more than 90% of load reductions were induced by incentive-based programs,
whereas price-based programs accounted for less than 10% [120]. This can be at-
tributed to the dispatchable and proactive features of incentive-based events, where
a participant (or their device) is requested by the program administrator to reduce
demand (sometimes by specific amounts) at specific times, and is compensated ac-
cordingly. In price-based programs, a participant (or their device) reacts to varying
electricity prices throughout the day and week, which in turn requires a more proactive
role compared to incentive-based programs.
Although incentive-based programs are more common, they seem more static than
price-based programs especially in terms of required capacity and offered compensation.
Such programs are more suitable for consumers with large and predictable electricity
demand, such as production factories. Conversely, the variable prices offered by price-
based programs are more suitable for the dynamic electricity demand of residential
consumers. However, to get the most benefits out of price-based DR, especially if dis-
tributed generation and storage is available in households, more dynamic management
of household electricity demand is required.
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The next section recaps how current demand response practices fall short of ad-
dressing the needs of prosumer collectives.
2.4.3 Inadequate Demand Response for Prosumer Collectives
At the moment, DR practices fall short of accommodating prosumers and prosumer
collectives for several reasons. Current DR mechanisms are designed for consumers,
and especially tend to focus on large-scale consumers because most programs require
large demand reduction quotas which in most cases can be easily achievable by large
consumers. For residential consumers, such programs are mostly done at scale, where
participation is through an aggregator whose role is to guarantee aggregating the min-
imum quota of demand reduction requested by the program administrator. This high-
lights the importance of having an aggregator to assemble DR resources in households
in general, in order to achieve the objectives of DR mechanisms and associated pro-
grams. Additionally, it underpins the need to expand aggregation practices beyond
changing the energy demand of consumers, in order to serve the energy production
aspects of prosumers.
Some residential DR mechanisms are done at scale and do not require aggregators;
these are mainly focused on enhancing system reliability at the distribution level or
enhancing electricity procurement at the retail level. Some programs implementing
such mechanisms target devices used for space or water heating (e.g. thermostats,
hot water cylinders), which are triggered to cycle during peak demand periods or use
cheaper electricity during night hours. With the rise in electrification and appliance
ownership, such programs need to support a broader range of appliances and energy
equipment (e.g. EVs and EV chargers).
Demand response programs based on voluntary participation often require con-
sumers to manually change their demand in response to DR events, which may create
difficulties for consumers to strategically choose which loads to reduce or curtail, and
for program administrators to forecast the level of consumer participation. Therefore,
it is important to develop new DR practices which leverage smart grid capabilities
to help both consumers and prosumers make more strategic decisions with minimal
manual intervention and inconvenience to energy activities in households.
Investigating the correlation of each DR mechanism with renewable energy genera-
tion (available in Tables A.1–A.9 in Appendix A) indicates that current residential DR
mechanisms mostly have low to medium correlation with renewables, with the excep-
tion of those for enhancing system reliability and load shaping which tend to have high
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to very high correlation with renewables. Reliability enhancement programs are cur-
rently implemented for residential consumers, but lack support for prosumers, whereas
retail-level load shaping for households is still in its infancy, even for consumers, be-
cause of its limited ability to maintain load increases (e.g. when the retailer serves new
consumers). Thus, to accommodate the rise of prosumers, mechanisms having high
correlation with renewables need to leverage new strategies and technologies to serve
prosumers, and be scaled based on the growth of prosumers and prosumer collectives.
Mechanisms having low correlation with renewables should ideally be redesigned to
accommodate prosumers; otherwise, new mechanisms should be developed.
Price-based DR remains limited although its dynamic pricing components, which
match with the highly dynamic demand patterns in households, may play a potential
role in creating various financial benefits for prosumers, especially around optimizing
decision-making in consuming, storing, selling and trading electricity generation from
distributed generation technologies.
Demand response programs now tend to focus on communicating with individual
consumers, and lack features for communicating with a collective of households, and
managing interactions among such households.
The aforementioned shortcomings of current DR approaches necessitate innovating
new ways for managing variable demand and intermittent supply in collective settings
integrating distributed generation and storage, and various household energy practices
and preferences. Smart grids can play a significant role in enabling more dynamic
demand response practices which are more encompassing of prosumers and prosumer
collectives.
The next sections introduce the smart grid concept, present the key features of smart
grids, and discuss how smart grids can enable more active management of complex
power flows and prosumer interactions in prosumer collectives.
2.5 New Opportunities in the Smart Grid
More recently, power grids have been undergoing various changes to revitalize their
operations, technologies and offerings. The power grid is becoming smarter and more
decentralized, by integrating new information and communication technologies (e.g. ad-
vanced metering infrastructure) and internet-like concepts (e.g. networking, distributed
controls) especially at the distribution level.
The core quality of a smart grid lies in its advanced metering infrastructure, which
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records real-time electricity use and provides bi-directional communication for sending
information and control signals between end-users and the grid [21, 121]. Rolling out
smart meters and integrating distributed energy resources are opening the doors for
designing and implementing new DR practices for prosumers and prosumer collectives
in many countries [18, 19, 27, 122, 123].
The next two sections respectively present the key features of a smart grid, and
how it can enable advanced options for managing energy in prosumer collectives.
2.5.1 Smart Grid Features
Smart grids should ideally accommodate all generation and storage options, enable new
markets, products and services, and actively engage customers while providing them
with more choices [124]. Studies indicate that ubiquitous technologies (e.g. smart-
phones), coupled with personalization [125–127], and financial, social and environmentally-
driven incentives can encourage end-users to be more engaged and flexible in managing
their household electricity activities [128–131].
A smart grid connects elements of the electricity grid in an analogous way to how
the internet connects information and processing resources. Smart grids are a transition
away from centralized power grids to a more distributed infrastructure [28].
An integral part of the smart grid is the concept of the Internet of Things (IoT) [123,
132, 133], where interconnected physical and virtual “things” (e.g. sensors, actuators,
wireless technologies, cloud computers, solar panels, EVs, batteries) use and exchange
data to enable advanced services [134]. Therefore, the smart grid can be perceived as
a cyber-physical system which is described as follows,
A cyber-physical system is an integration of computation with physical pro-
cesses whose behaviour is defined by both cyber and physical parts of the
system. Embedded computers and networks monitor and control the phys-
ical processes, usually with feedback loops where physical processes affect
computations and vice versa [135, p. 1].
Smart grid architectures typically include three layers: hardware, communication
and software [136]. The hardware layer comprises traditional transmission and dis-
tribution components (e.g. lines and poles) and smart sensors (e.g. in distribution
transformers) that collect data about grid operations and status (e.g. fault locations,
power quality). The communication layer enables data gathering and transfer (e.g. by
smart meters which monitor power consumption and production at regular intervals
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and communicate such data to retailers for billing purposes). The software layer allows
collected data to be aggregated and analyzed. Those three layers need to be integrated
to ensure the power grid system works seamlessly [136].
When developing a smart grid implementation plan, various solutions are generally
considered, including advanced metering infrastructure, distributed energy resources,
customer-side systems (e.g. smart appliances), demand response, distribution manage-
ment and automation, transmission enhancement, and asset optimization [124].
According to the National Energy Technology Laboratory in the US, the following
characteristics ideally differentiate smart grids from conventional power grids [124].
• A smart grid ideally accommodates all generation and storage options, including
new opportunities for more efficient and cleaner energy generation,
• Enables new markets, products and services, by driving inefficiencies and waste
out of the market, reducing transmission congestion, and offering more green
products to end-users,
• Optimizes asset utilization and operation, by minimizing costs for desired func-
tionalities and efficiently maintaining grid equipment and operations,
• Enables active participation of customers, by increasing their interactions with
grid stakeholders and offering them more choices,
• Provides high power quality for the digital economy, to avoid losses in production
and productivity,
• Detects and responds to system disturbances, by performing self-assessment and
healing to restore grid components and operations, and
• Operates resiliently in the event of cyber or physical attacks.
While some of those characteristics have already been incorporated in various power
grids around the world (e.g. installing smart meters, using home energy management
systems, and integrating wireless sensors in transmission and distribution components),
the deployment of certain characteristics is still limited and largely in the research and
development phase (e.g. self-healing and attack-resilient grids, which are implemented
at the level of the transmission network operator).
The deployment of smart grid solutions that achieve such characteristics is expected
to create benefits in six key areas, namely reliability, efficiency, economics, environmen-
tal, safety and security [124].
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Reliability benefits in the smart grid include improved levels of service, by hav-
ing fewer outages and power quality issues. Efficiency benefits focus on reducing the
costs paid to generate, transmit, distribute and consume electricity, while benefits in
economics include downward pressure on electricity prices and customer bills, oppor-
tunities to sell electricity from distributed energy resources to neighbours and the grid,
and job creation.
The increasing integration of renewable micro-generation and higher efficiency in
consuming energy create environmental benefits in smart grids by reducing carbon
emissions and supporting the shift to a green economy. Additionally, the smart grid
creates security and safety benefits in terms of mitigating the effects of hazards (e.g.
natural disasters, cyber attacks), and reducing associated losses and injuries [124].
The smart grid concept has been under discussion for many years [137]. Since
2001, a number of developed countries started establishing dedicated entities to drive
the change to a smart power grid [138]. The transition from a conventional electricity
grid to a smart one faces many challenges (e.g. technical integration, regulatory reforms,
economic returns, and social acceptance) which may take between 20 to 40 years to
address [139].
In spite of the challenges, smart grids bring various opportunities. The next section
explores the new options for dynamically managing energy in prosumer collectives.
2.5.2 Demand Response in the Smart Grid
The advanced technologies and characteristics of smart grids can help expand demand
response to include prosumers and prosumer collectives [140, 141]. With the rise in
residential prosumerism, the definition of demand response presented in Section 2.3.3
becomes narrow as this definition lacks incorporating prosumers. Demand response
for prosumers is not merely about changing electricity demand in response to mon-
etary incentives to induce lower electricity use at times of high electricity prices or
system instabilities. The definition of demand response in general should ideally go
beyond currently available mechanisms targeting consumers, by describing a more holis-
tic perspective on balancing highly variable demand with intermittent supply in light
of battery storage and innovative products and offerings.
The smart grid can help create new practices for active demand response in pro-
sumer collectives, including optimizing electricity use among appliances and storage
devices in multiple households, trading electricity among prosumers in the collec-
tive or selling it to the grid, and storing electricity in batteries or EVs for later
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use [18, 20, 21, 27]. Such opportunities may involve managing dynamic and multi-
directional flows of electricity, data, and money within households, among households
in a collective, between collectives, or between a collective and grid stakeholders or
market players involved in energy management or aggregation.
2.6 Summary
Literature findings presented in this chapter have indicated that current demand re-
sponse practices are not suitable for accommodating residential prosumer collectives.
Current demand response mechanisms and programs focus on individual consumers
rather than prosumers or collectives of prosumers, and often require an external party
(i.e. aggregator) to collect the required quota of demand response resources from con-
sumers.
Demand response mechanisms that highly correlate with renewables are either set
up to be used with consumers rather than prosumers, which is quite inefficient, or
are scarcely implemented due to limitations around supplying load increases while
lacking energy storage. In addition, demand response programs lack features enabling
communication among households (whether consumers or prosumers), or between grid
stakeholders and a collective of households.
With the changes occurring in the energy terrain, and the rise of residential pro-
sumer collectives, limitations of current demand response practices call for the devel-
opment of new and dynamic demand response approaches, to efficiently manage the
complex power flows and interactions in and around prosumer collectives. As presented
in this chapter, smart grids offer various possibilities (technologies, features, etc.) to
capacitate new practices for innovative demand response aimed at serving prosumer
collectives.
Identifying the current practices of demand response and what new opportunities
are enabled by smart grids informs the overall research aim of this thesis, which is how
smart grid opportunities can be leveraged to evolve demand response approaches for
residential prosumer collectives.
The next chapter investigates how smart grid opportunities support the emergence
of residential prosumer collectives, and can potentially help create dynamic demand




Emergence of Residential Prosumer
Collectives
Research Question 2 – How do new opportunities offered by the smart grid
support the emergence of residential prosumer collectives?
3.1 Introduction
Evidence indicates that a range of prosumer collectives are either in proven operation
or pilot phase [8, 9, 13, 45, 46]. Nevertheless, prosumer collectives bring challenges,
notably around efficiently managing power flows between units of electricity production,
consumption and storage, and optimizing stakeholder interactions relating to selling
and trading electricity.
As presented in Chapter 2, smart grids enable a range of new technologies and
features, which can help improve demand response practices (e.g. create flexible demand
to match with intermittent micro-generation) in prosumer collectives [18, 20, 21, 27,
140, 141]. This chapter discusses how those smart grid opportunities are generally
supporting the rise of prosumer collectives, and potentially creating dynamic demand
response for those collectives, which informs the overarching research aim of this thesis.
In Section 3.2, I discuss the transition of an energy consumer to a prosumer, explain
distributed energy resources in detail, and introduce the types of prosumers. This is
followed by a brief discussion on the drivers, barriers and enablers of individual pro-
sumers. Reviewing the underlying technologies and concepts of individual prosumers
helps inform later investigations on prosumer collectives, and especially supports the
drivers and benefits of the prosumerism component of prosumer collectives.
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Section 3.3 introduces the concept of a prosumer collective and explains its purpose,
and provides an overview of the drivers, barriers and enablers of prosumer collectives.
The initiating entities, physical configurations and organizational structures of pro-
sumer collectives are then investigated, and four residential prosumer collectives from
around the world are reviewed and analyzed to inform the work herein.
By reviewing the emergence of prosumer collectives and example collectives, the
role played by the smart grid in their emergence is generally highlighted, and specific
issues to consider are underpinned.
In Section 3.5, I briefly introduce the emergence of middle actors, which play a
catalyzing role between top actors and prosumer collectives, and outline their potential
role in leveraging smart grid capabilities to develop dynamic demand response solutions
for prosumer collectives.
Novelty in this chapter includes: (1) proposing a definition for a prosumer collective;
and (2) proposing a new definition for an energy prosumer; where both definitions focus
on value rather than specific physical configurations or goals.
3.2 The Energy Prosumer
The “prosumer” concept dates back to the 1980s, when it was first defined by Toffler; a
prosumer is someone creating services, goods or experiences for their own satisfaction
and use [142]. This concept has evolved over time, and in 2008, Tapscott and Williams
argued that prosumers are creating value for everyone, not merely for themselves [143].
Applying the prosumer concept to energy is relatively new. Residential energy
consumers are becoming prosumers, who are changing the way they use and value
energy. A number of definitions exist for an energy prosumer, both generic and specific.
Several authors generically define an energy prosumer as a consumer who produces
electricity and sells its excess to the power grid [1–4]. Another definition describes an
energy prosumer as “a consumer who also produces energy to provide for their needs,
and who in the instance of their production exceeding their requirements, will sell,
store or trade the surplus energy” [5].
A more specific definition describes an energy prosumer as “an economically mo-
tivated entity that (1) consumes, produces and stores electricity, (2) operates or owns
a small or large power grid, and hence transports electricity, and (3) optimizes the
economic decisions regarding its energy utilization” [6, p. 2].
Most definitions in the literature describe an energy prosumer as a consumer who
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primarily produces energy to meet their own needs, and merely sells surplus energy.
In line with the evolved definition of a prosumer around creating value for everyone,
as described by Tapscott and Williams [143], I argue that individual prosumerism can
be more encompassing than the definitions available in the literature.
An energy prosumer may choose to sell or trade all the energy they produce, or to
partially consume (i.e. by using or storing) this energy and sell or trade the remainder.
The decision of whether to consume, sell, trade, or store energy with the objective
of maximizing value for involved stakeholders can often be based on objectives set
by prosumers and/or relevant stakeholders, and bound by constraints dictated by the
surroundings. Such decision-making can be enabled by the advanced products and
services made possible by the smart grid.
In this thesis, I propose the following definition for an energy prosumer, as it ac-
commodates a broader sense of value creation beyond individualistic behaviour,
An energy prosumer produces energy and can totally or partially consume,
sell, store or trade this energy.
Prosumers are consumers producing their own energy. Having prosumers meet their
own energy needs from distributed generation creates an increased sense of autonomy
for those prosumers, as they do not need to solely rely on the grid for power supply.
A prosumer can alternatively choose to sell their (surplus) energy to the power grid or
trade it with other households in return for incentives (e.g. money, discounts, benefits),
which in turn can help create value for the prosumer and involved stakeholders. A
prosumer can also use storage technologies, e.g. lithium-ion batteries, to store their
energy for later use during periods of high electricity tariffs or supply shortage.
Prosumers can exist individually or collectively. Figure 3.1 illustrates a grid-
connected residential prosumer with solar PV and an EV (symbolized by an EV charg-
ing station), at the bottom left, and a prosumer collective, comprising a group of
households, a wind turbine and battery storage, at the bottom right. Section 3.3
investigates prosumer collectives in more details.
To better understand the emergence of prosumers, it is important to first learn
about distributed energy resources, which comprise the main differentiator between




Figure 3.1: Generation, transmission and distribution in a power grid
hosting prosumers and consumers
3.2.1 Distributed Energy Resources
The term “distributed energy resources” (DER) has no uniform definition, although it
is commonly used in the energy industry [144]. The Electric Power Research Institute
(EPRI) defines distributed energy resources (DER) as “smaller power sources that can
be aggregated to provide power necessary to meet regular demand” [145].
Broader definitions are proposed by the North American Electric Reliability Cor-
poration (NERC) [146] and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) [144],
where distributed energy resources are defined to include distributed generation, bat-
tery storage, electric vehicles, demand response, energy efficiency, and co-generation of
electricity and power.
On the one hand, the definition by EPRI describes DER as power sources but
does not explicitly mention whether such sources come from generation or storage, and
whether they are on- or off-grid. On the other hand, the definitions by NERC and
FERC are too broad for the purpose of this research. Thus, I propose the following
working definition to describe distributed energy resources,
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Distributed energy resources are small-scale modular systems which produce
or store electrical or thermal energy, and which are geographically close to
end-users in an on-grid connection, or an off-grid stand-alone setting.
As such, distributed energy resources comprise distributed generation and storage.
Distributed generation commonly provides less than 10 MW of power, is sized based on
the purpose of generation, and may either be connected to the grid or remote in an off-
grid location [147–149]. Distributed storage, such as lithium-ion batteries, commonly
complements distributed generation especially intermittent renewable generation which
is highly weather-dependent (e.g. solar PV, micro-wind turbines). The following two
sections explain distributed generation and storage, respectively, in more details.
Distributed Generation
Distributed generation is defined as “a generating plant serving a customer on-site or
providing support to a distribution network connected to the grid at distribution-level
voltages” [150, p. 19]. Distributed generation has been largely associated with renew-
able generation, due to the small size, modularity and sustainability of distributed
renewables [151]. Examples of distributed generation include rooftop solar PV, com-
munity solar PV, micro-wind turbines, micro-combined heat and power (micro-CHP),
and backup generators [27, 35, 147–149, 151–156].
The interest in distributed generation, notably distributed renewables, has grown
in recent years, mainly due to a mixture of technological advancement, price drops,
and regulatory support for renewables [157–161]. Solar photovoltaics have become
dominant in harnessing solar energy to produce electricity, with the highest growth
rate in renewable energy technologies [162]. Over the past decade, the global uptake
of solar PV has annually grown by more than 40% [163], and over the last 40 years,
PV module prices have dropped by 22.8% for each doubling in cumulative production
capacity [164].
Distributed generation from solar PV can be categorized into rooftop solar and
community solar [156]. While rooftop solar comprises PV panels installed on the roofs
of buildings, community solar comprises PV systems installed in a focal site [165]. Ad-
vocates of community solar are motivated by the better options a community instal-
lation provides to houses with limited rooftop areas or shaded roofs, as only 22-27%
of residential rooftops can be used to install solar PV [165]. In 2017, in the large
metropolitan areas of the US, the price of electric energy generated from community
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solar, at $113/MWh, was almost half that generated from rooftop solar, at $253/MWh
[156].
The global trend indicates that doubling the total installed PV capacity can result
in a 23% reduction in price [166]. By 2040, Bloomberg New Energy Finance expects
rooftop PV to account for 24% of electricity generation in Australia, 20% in Brazil,
15% in Germany, 12% in Japan, and 5% in the US and India [167]. Although cost dis-
crepancies exist due to differences in locations, market conditions, resource availability,
and regulations, there is generally a clear trend of cost declines especially in solar PV
[157, 161].
Distributed Storage
Solar energy and wind energy are intermittent, and their electricity production may
not necessarily overlap with household energy demands. Distributed storage makes it
possible for residential prosumers to store energy for later use (e.g. during power out-
ages or periods with high electricity prices) [168–172]. With advances in technologies,
materials science, and economies of scale, small-scale batteries are becoming cheaper
and more efficient [173].
Electric energy storage involves converting electrical energy to a form of storable
energy (e.g. mechanical, potential, thermal, electrochemical), then converting it back
to electrical energy when needed [168, 169, 172]. Battery technologies like lead-acid,
nickel-metal hybrid, nickel-cadmium and lithium-ion are examples of distributed stor-
age [174]. Electric vehicles can also be considered distributed storage, as they use
batteries [39, 175–177].
The next two sections provide an overview of prosumers’ technology adoption, and
highlight the drivers, barriers and enablers of individual prosumerism, respectively.
3.2.2 Prosumers and Technology Adoption
The bell-shaped technology adoption curve, referred to as Roger’s diffusion of inno-
vation curve, is a good approach to describe the adoption process of new disruptive
technologies [178]. As shown in Figure 3.2, adopted from [178], when a new technology
enters the market, the first 2.5% to adopt the technology are the innovators, while the
next 13.5% are the early adopters. Those referred to as majorities, both early and
late, are the next 34% of adopters each, whereas the last 16% trailing behind others in













Figure 3.2: The diffusion of innovation curve
Early prosumers are typically well-informed innovators and early technology adopters
with a passion for trying new technologies and taking risks in trialling new products
[178–180], such as installing rooftop PV, driving electric vehicles, or using home en-
ergy management systems. Early prosumers are commonly aware of energy efficient
practices, are advocates of sustainability, and do not wait for incentives to take up new
technologies [10, 181]. Peer pressure from such prosumers can help boost the adoption
of new technologies by their less energy-savvy circles of family, friends, acquaintances
and neighbours [45].
Early and late majority prosumers are more careful, tend to avoid risks, and com-
monly become prosumers based on recommendations from early prosumers or due to
external influence (e.g. incentives) [16, 157]. Laggards tend to resist change and may
not adopt new technologies until traditional counterparts cease to exist [178].
To understand more about prosumers, it is essential to identify the motivations
driving individuals to take action, the barriers that hinder this action, and the factors
enabling prosumers to overcome such barriers. The next section introduces the drivers,
barriers and enablers of individual prosumerism.
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3.2.3 Drivers, Barriers and Enablers of Individual Prosumerism
Various drivers motivate individuals to become prosumers. A key driver is the aspira-
tion to live a green lifestyle and have a lower carbon footprint, by generating energy
from low-carbon and renewable energy sources (e.g. solar, wind, biogas) [182–185].
Another driver of prosumerism is autonomy, where a prosumer can use distributed
generation to meet his energy needs [88, 185]. In this way, a prosumer can become
partially or totally independent of the power grid, and can thus avoid issues like in-
crements in electricity tariffs. There is a financial driver behind prosumerism, because
self-generation is becoming more affordable as distributed generation costs drop and
energy costs from retailers rise [5].
Despite the drivers of prosumerism, a number of barriers exist. The lack of supply
flexibility, from intermittent generation from solar and wind energy, presents a barrier
to prosumerism [151]. The non-dispatchability of intermittent generation raises con-
cerns over its availability and reliability in meeting prosumers’ demand for electricity.
The lack of finding appropriate information about prosumerism is also a barrier
to adoption, e.g. trying to find neutral information on solar micro-generation from an
entity that is not selling solar modules [186–188]. Finding information about companies
willing to purchase electricity from prosumers, and at what price, is also an obstacle
to households wanting to become prosumers [188].
Despite the barriers facing prosumerism, various enablers are becoming available
to help households overcome those barriers. Smart grids are enabling new products
and services for actively managing energy in prosumer households especially in light
of intermittent supply from distributed renewables [62, 189, 190]. Financial incentives
(e.g. feed-in tariffs) [191–193] and innovative business models (see Section 5.5.2) are
also emerging to support the growth of prosumers.
In general, the emergence of prosumers creates new prospects around using and ben-
efiting from energy which significantly differ from those of consumers. Those prospects
are further extended when looking at collectives of prosumers, whose attributes, objec-
tives, and benefits differ from individual prosumers. The next section investigates the
emergence of residential prosumer collectives.
3.3 Prosumer Collectives
Thousands of prosumer collectives exist around the world [7–9], from community-owned
wind farms in Scotland and Denmark, to rooftop solar panels in residential complexes
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in Germany and Australia. Prosumer collectives use a range of technologies, operate
in different policy and regulatory contexts, involve several stakeholders and have a
diversity of physical configurations and initiating entities. Such heterogeneity, in turn,
may help prosumer collectives be resilient and adaptable to local conditions [8, 9, 194].
3.3.1 What is a Prosumer Collective?
Several terms are used to refer to a collection of loads (mainly households), distributed
energy resources, and smart grid technologies. Boundaries are often indistinct and
varying for different contexts as to what an energy project in a residential community
is, and what community energy means [7]. The term “community renewable energy”,
for example, is described in some literature as vague and elastic [194–196].
Table 3.1 lists some of the terms used to describe a group of houses integrating
distributed energy and smart grid technologies. Example terms include prosumer
community group, community energy system, integrated community energy system,
community micro-grid and virtual power plant.
Although those definitions have differences, they predominatly overlap. I prefer
to use the term prosumer collective as I see it more inclusive of heterogeneity. To
the knowledge of the author, no definition currently exists for the term “prosumer
collective”. Therefore, I propose the following definition, which revolves around value
creation, to describe a prosumer collective,
A prosumer collective comprises a group of consumers producing and/or
storing electricity through multi- or focal-site distributed energy resources,
and leveraging information and communication technologies to create value
for the collective and its external stakeholders.
A prosumer collective is often a geographic entity with a sense of identity and shared
aspirations at the neighbourhood, district or city level [10–13]. A prosumer collective
can be initiated by local community efforts or by a third-party; it can be multi-site,
where its distributed energy resources are installed on multiple sites, or focal-site with
shared resources [5].
It is important to note that under this working definition, “prosumer” is used to
refer to each member belonging to a prosumer collective, irrespective of whether the
member individually installs DER or not. For example, in a focal-site collective where
members share ownership and operation of a wind turbine, members are referred to as
prosumers although their households are not individually producing electricity.
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Table 3.1: Definitions of terms used to describe entities comprising
loads, distributed energy resources, and smart grid technologies
Entity Description
Prosumer Community Group A network of prosumers that share energy behaviour, pursue a mu-
tual goal (e.g. achieve energy self-sufficiency), and cooperatively
compete in the energy market[180, 197].
Community Energy System A local and small-scale electricity and/or heat production system
that provides members of a local community with direct benefits
including economic returns from selling energy to the grid, car-
bon mitigation from using clean renewable sources, and greater
community cohesion [10, 198].
Integrated Community Energy
System
A system comprising local generation (e.g. from combined heat
and power or renewable energy resources), energy storage,
and demand-side management, to help increase energy self-
consumption, and match supply and demand, while cutting costs
and reducing environmental impact [199, 200].
Community Micro-grid A group of distributed energy resources and demand response
technologies that are locally controlled, seen as a single demand or
supply entity from a technical or a market perspective, and used to
improve distribution system efficiency. In case of grid emergencies
(e.g. generation shortage, scheduled maintenance), the micro-grid
may disconnect from the grid and go into island-mode to maintain
its reliability [10, 201].
Virtual Power Plant A group of distributed generating units, flexible loads, and possi-
bly storage systems, aggregated to form flexible capacity – similar
to that of a power plant – which can be used to provide grid
support, and access to energy markets [10, 202].
In the context of this working definition, the “value” created by the collective may
take various forms, often creating win-win scenarios for the collective’s prosumers and
external stakeholders. A prosumer collective may create value for its members by
(1) generating income from selling its locally generated electricity on the wholesale
electricity market, and (2) producing clean and cheap electricity for its households.
The corresponding value to external stakeholders (e.g. grid operator, electricity mar-
ket) in this case may include (1) reducing generation capacity needs from conventional
centrally-located power plants and thus lowering generation, transmission and distri-
bution costs; and (2) buying clean electricity from collectives at potentially cheaper
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prices than electricity produced in conventional generation plants. By reviewing the
terms and definitions of the entities listed in Table 3.1, which can be considered pro-
sumer collectives, a number of similar values can be identified. The following example
prosumer collectives provide more clarification.
The Findhorn Ecovillage in Scotland is a prosumer collective comprising 500 perma-
nent residents and four wind turbines with a total capacity of 750 kW. On windy days,
electricity production from the turbines covers the collective’s electricity demand, thus
achieving self-sufficiency for the collective, and surplus electricity is sold to the grid,
thus reducing generation capacity needs and costs for the grid operator. When local
production is not enough, the collective partially meets its electricity demand from its
wind turbines, and buys electricity from the grid to meet the remaining demand, thus
creating revenue for the respective retailer [203].
Brooklyn Micro-grid, located in New York, is a prosumer collective enabling pro-
sumers to trade their electricity production with consumers in their community through
a mobile application, thus creating income for prosumers and allowing consumers
to have the option to buy clean and locally generated electricity from neighbouring
prosumers [204]. Other example prosumer collectives are presented in detail in Sec-
tion 3.3.6.
This thesis focuses on grid-connected prosumers and collectives, and how smart grid
technologies and middle actors are supporting the emergence of those collectives and
their associated dynamic demand response activities. Off-grid prosumers have different
problems, which are not addressed in the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, there
may be potential overlaps between grid-connected and off-grid prosumer collectives,
especially in issues relating to energy self-sufficiency and initiating entities.
3.3.2 Purpose of Prosumer Collectives
For prosumers, the main objectives of collectives include [7, 13, 205–207]: (1) meeting
prosumers’ total electricity demand (i.e. be a self-sufficient collective) or a part of their
demand, to be less vulnerable to electricity price increases; (2) exporting electricity,
to increase and diversify the collective’s income; (3) using sustainable energy, to re-
duce their carbon footprint; (4) promoting community development and cohesion; (5)
creating local jobs; (6) and helping achieve wider societal change towards sustainability.
Because prosumer collectives operate in various contexts, and can be physically
configured in a number of ways, they can achieve their objectives in multiple man-
ners. In one collective, prosumers can trade electricity amongst themselves to generate
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income based on their individual goals. Alternatively, a collective can sell energy re-
gionally at the main-grid level, and optimize its profits based on the collective’s goals
[207]. In countries like the US and Germany, prosumer collectives contribute to regional
economies, and to fossil fuel-free development [208, 209].
For grid stakeholders (grid operator, distribution system operator, electricity re-
tailer, etc.) and third-parties (renewable energy project developers, research institutes,
etc.), the primary objectives of prosumer collectives include: (1) reducing transmission
and distribution losses and associated costs [19, 64, 72, 73]; (2) reducing uncertainty in
the collective’s power flows and improving demand forecast [210, 211]; (3) creating local
grids with lower capacity demand than grids without collectives [212]; (4) developing
the renewable energy industry [7]; and (5) testing scale and local siting of distributed
energy and storage technologies [7].
More objectives for collectives and stakeholders involved in collectives can be found
in Section 5.5.1. The next section presents the main drivers, barriers and enablers of
prosumer collectives.
3.3.3 Drivers, Barriers and Enablers of Collective Prosumerism
Prosumerism has a number of drivers, barriers and enablers of action that exist whether
at an individual level or a collective level. The aggregation of prosumers adds a new
set of features that can sometimes stimulate and support collective action, but other
times can obstruct efforts. This section reviews the factors motivating, hindering, and
facilitating collective prosumerism.
Drivers
Prosumer collectives, especially community-initiated ones, are driven by a desire to
be autonomous and sometimes self-empowered by securing local electricity supply in-
dependent of the grid [10, 16]. In the first independent survey on community energy
projects across the UK, which investigated the objectives and development of com-
munity energy groups and their activities, Seyfang et al.[8] found that 60% of the
respondents indicated that improving local energy independence was one of their mo-
tivations for partaking action. According to several community energy groups in Scot-
land, which have been interviewed as part of case studies conducted by Bomberg et
al.[16] to explain why and how community energy groups mobilize, community wind
farm development is seen as a visible and powerful sign of “community taking power”.
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Creating resiliency and relevant actors in a future that is potentially full of re-
newable energy is another motivator for prosumer collectives. In a study by Hicks and
Ison [7], which involved analyzing interviews and documents for 25 prosumer collectives
in the UK, US, Canada, Denmark, Austria, Germany, and Australia, future proofing
and creating relevant actors in a renewable energy-powered world was identified as a
motivator for prosumer collectives, as well as a benefit in some cases.
Another driver for collective action, for prosumers and consumers alike, is demand
variability, which basically stems from the diversity of end-users’ household appliances
and energy activities (e.g. space and water heating, lighting, cooking) [70, 213]. In
general, managing energy demand at the aggregate level attenuates the impacts of de-
mand variability, by reducing uncertainty in power flows and making demand forecasts
easier [210, 211].
Additionally, the declining costs of certain clean energy technologies, notably solar
PV and wind turbines, are driving the uptake of distributed generation [35, 157, 158,
161, 214–216]. This may be especially beneficial for grassroots communities to develop
prosumer collectives, where community members (i.e. prosumers) share investment and
ownership of the collective’s distributed energy resources.
Another strong driver of prosumerism in collectives is the desire to create financial
gains from locally producing electricity. In contrast with individual prosumers, a pro-
sumer collective has enhanced potential and stronger market power to create financial
benefits by aggregating resources for market participation (provide collective demand
response, sell the collective’s energy to the grid, etc.) [46].
Sustaining community identity is another motivator for collective prosumer action
[10, 16]. The “identity” notion is a profound and rich concept encompassing various
context-based interpretations and definitions [217]. Community identity can arise from
shared geographic location, history, facilities, or sense of belonging [45], and can be
reflected by the coherence and stability presented to external entities [218, 219].
In community-initiated prosumer collectives, identity can also arise from a shared
history of grassroots efforts to develop the community. The village of Fintry, Scotland,
which encompasses the Smart Fintry prosumer collective, is a good example of a grass-
roots community with a strong identity. Prior to launching the collective, the Fintry
Development Trust was awarded a number of grants which were, and still are, used
to develop Fintry into a low-carbon community with sustainable energy and transport
resources [220]. The Trust believes the 10 years of engagement experience, gained
through building community trust, relationships, and sustainability projects in Fintry,
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have played a significant role in strengthening the community’s sense of identity and
pride, which served as an asset in developing the Smart Fintry prosumer collective
[220, 221]. A strong community identity can thus help a prosumer collective build its
public image as a sustainable and green entity, and trigger the support of external
stakeholders [16].
The social cohesion created by prosumer collectives is another motivator of collective
prosumerism. The local proximity of electricity generation in prosumer collectives
plays a role in driving community involvement, as the spatially distant generation in
centralized power grids create a psychological barrier where end-users do not necessarily
see or directly interact with electricity production [222].
Barriers
Although many drivers motivate the development of prosumer collectives, a number
of barriers hinder the collective action of prosumers. As with individual prosumers,
the intermittency of solar and wind energy presents a barrier to the uptake of their
distributed technologies harnessing this energy. Such intermittency creates a disruptive
and frequent temporal mismatching between supply and demand [88], and thus reduces
the reliability and flexibility of supply [151].
Another barrier to the growth of prosumer collectives is the limited (or lack of)
representation of community energy advocates and representatives in policy-making
networks. In the UK, for example, it is difficult for advocates and representatives of
community energy to influence policy-making networks relating to energy investment,
transmission, and access, as such networks are dominated and greatly influenced by a
few large energy companies with close ties to decision makers [16].
Prosumer collectives that own and self-manage their distributed energy resources
can sometimes be difficult to maintain if the prosumers’ levels of commitment to drive
the collective forward do not align, or if prosumers lack certain skills (negotiation,
planning, etc.). This is underpinned by a survey conducted by Seyfang et al.[8] on
energy communities in the UK, where 48% of survey respondents thought that group
qualities, such as group characteristics and prosumer skills, are critical strengths for
the success of communities.
Maintaining continuity, attracting new prosumers, retaining existing ones, and hav-
ing effective leadership all present challenges to collective prosumerism [13]. Addition-
ally, a lack of a proper legal structure for prosumer collectives may be a barrier in some
cases, especially those seeking funding, where accountability is required [205].
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In some countries, prosumer collectives may face market barriers – due to scale
or regulatory contexts – to sell electricity to the grid, including high costs of trading,
lack of incentives for grid operators to regulate integrating micro-generation, and com-
plexity of obtaining green energy certification [223]. In prosumer collectives already
selling electricity, a barrier may arise if the operational and maintenance costs of the
collective’s distributed resources present a burden [46].
Another barrier that may affect the social acceptance for prosumer collectives is the
lack of fairness and equity [31, 32], e.g. in distributing the collective’s shared income
among prosumers. This highlights the need to address social notions, such as fairness,
in prosumer collectives.
Despite the aforementioned barriers, various enablers drive the development of pro-
sumer collectives, as presented in the next section.
Enablers
It is challenging to manage the various interactions within a prosumer collective and
between collectives and external stakeholders (power grid, electricity market, etc.).
Nevertheless, the smart grid is playing a core role in supporting those interactions by
smart controls and enhanced engagement tools, and enabling new products and market
models [224].
The smart grid offers prosumers a variety of robust and secure platforms for ac-
cessing and visualizing energy data (energy consumption and production, electricity
buy and sell prices, etc.) [26, 28]. The Smart Fintry prosumer collective provides its
prosumers, and the public, with an energy dashboard detailing the collective’s wind
and solar energy production, and the amount of electricity imported and exported by
the collective [225].
In prosumer collectives where distributed energy resources are locally owned by
prosumers (not third-parties), local ownership can act as an enabler to collective pro-
sumerism [13, 226, 227]. Locally-owned energy projects have shown a greater impact in
terms of economic value and job creation when compared with absentee-owned projects
(i.e. owned by third party) [226, 228].
3.3.4 Initiating Entity versus Physical Configuration
A prosumer collective is commonly initiated either by a local community or a third-
party (private company, government body, etc.), and can be developed either on mul-
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tiple sites or a single focal site [5]. Figure 3.3, adopted from [5], illustrates four models
of prosumer collectives, based on initiating entity and configuration.
 















Figure 3.3: Models of prosumer collectives based on initiating entity
and configuration
A community-initiated multi-site collective often comprises individual prosumers
eventually coming together as a community as they realize the benefits of collective
efforts. If the collective shares distributed energy resources in a focal site among its
prosumers, this is referred to as a community-initiated focal-site collective. Third-party
initiated multi-site collectives and third-party initiated focal-site collectives are initiated
by third-parties, and are located on multiple sites or a single site, respectively [5].
3.3.5 Organizational Structures of Prosumer Collectives
Residential prosumer collectives can be commonly set up under one of three orga-
nizational structures: informal working groups; cooperatives; or commercial entities
[13, 205, 206, 229, 230]. Such structures vary in scope and activities, depending on the
collective’s size and prosumers’ characteristics (e.g. skills, priorities, aspired degree of
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autonomy) [10, 16]. Depending on the scale, legalities and regulatory context governing
a prosumer collective, its members may or may not be its shareholders. However, this
is not covered in the scope of this thesis.
The common organizational structures of prosumer collectives are identified in the
following subsections.
Informal Working Group
An informal working group works closely with the prosumer collective, and is often
set up to promote the collective, or may be attached to a political party or another
group in the local community. Informal working groups are dynamic, and in case
of committed members and strong leadership with multiple activities, they may go
through formalization six months to two years after their formation [13, 230].
Cooperative Group
A cooperative is an organization whose members collectively own an energy company
which often aligns itself to a large energy company with similar sustainable energy
objectives [13, 205, 206]. Prosumer collectives aiming to meet their electricity demand
and export surplus electricity for financial benefits commonly form cooperatives. More
recently, regional energy cooperatives have been formed in a number of countries to
enable local cooperatives to aggregate their efforts at a regional level, and have their
voices heard more broadly while keeping their autonomy and profits locally bound in
their communities [13].
Commercial Organization
A prosumer collective may choose to operate as a commercial organization. The main
objective of this commercial venture is generating income and sustaining business rela-
tionships with energy customers [13, 205]. While an energy cooperative is more oriented
towards meeting the objectives of the local community, a commercial organization is
more customer-oriented and income-driven. Such commercial organizations, however,
may suffer from a lack of trust from community members if community objectives are
marginalized against commercial interests [45].
The next section investigates example prosumer collectives from around the world,
to highlight their current status, the challenges they are facing, and how smart grid
opportunities are supporting their development.
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3.3.6 Example Prosumer Collectives
Thousands of residential prosumer collectives exist around the world today [7–9, 13,
45, 46], integrating a wide mix of distributed generation and storage, and smart grid
capabilities. Some of those collectives use solar PV and battery storage, while others
share wind turbines and biomass resources. Some are merely equipped with smart
meters, while others use advanced energy management platforms and control technolo-
gies. In this section, four example prosumer collectives from the Netherlands, Scotland,
Canada, and Australia are presented.
PowerMatching City
PowerMatching City is a residential community in Groningen, Netherlands. It is a
third-party initiated European pilot project with multi-site DER. The project, which
started in 2007, investigates smart ways to manage electricity and heat supply and
demand in a residential community. Unlike average Dutch families, the residents of
PowerMatching City are sustainability advocates and early adopters of clean technolo-
gies with a motivation to collectively contribute to a sustainable and smart energy
transition in residential communities [212].
The collective comprises 42 households equipped with smart meters, smart home
appliances, heat pumps, rooftop solar PV, micro combined heat and power (micro-
CHP) systems, and batteries. The collective has a smart transformer station, which
detects demand peaks for potential reductions, thus enabling lower capacity [212].
The houses are also virtually connected to electric vehicles (via software tools for
simulation purposes), to add the scenario of charging electric vehicles to the collective
in case homeowners do not have any. Additionally, electric scooters used by prosumers
are equipped with smart chips to allow them to be charged intelligently using locally
generated clean energy at the most optimum times [212, 231].
Each house is equipped with an energy monitor, installed on a tablet, displaying
real-time power flows and historical household energy use, and the collective’s energy
consumption and production. The energy monitor can be used to adjust the thermo-
stat, and recommend the best times to use certain appliances (e.g. dishwasher, dryer,
and vacuum cleaner) [212].
The core control system of the collective is PowerMatcher – a smart energy man-
agement software system that optimally balances energy supply and demand in the
collective, by leveraging electricity tariffs, prosumer priorities, micro-generation, and
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transformer status. The software achieves this in two ways: by automatically shifting
the operation of certain smart appliances (e.g. smart washing machine) to cheaper off-
peak periods or periods with abundant micro-generation; and by buying/selling energy
from/to the grid at optimal prices for prosumers [231].
Some houses are equipped with PowerRouter, which is similar to PowerMatcher.
PowerRouter intelligently decides whether to use micro-generation from solar PV and
micro CHP straight away, feed it into the grid, or store it in batteries for later use,
especially to charge electric vehicles, so as to maximize self-consumption and financial
benefits [212, 231].
This project has been implemented in two phases. The first phase investigated
the technical viability and real-life conditions of flexibly using and exchanging power
flows and heat across the collective, whereas the second phase studied the market
mechanisms under a smart grid infrastructure offering flexibility [231].
The principal outcome of the project is that smart energy systems are technically
feasible, and can provide energy demand flexibility to create strong economic values.
Flexible demand in the community benefited all stakeholders: energy providers, the
grid operator, and prosumers. The grid operator avoided investment and maintenance
costs for the grid infrastructure, while energy providers purchased energy at more
competitive market prices as they were able to efficiently balance energy demand with
micro-generation, and reduce peak loads. Prosumers achieved cost savings in return for
their flexible energy practices and collaborated to maintain a sustainable community
with a reduced carbon footprint [212, 231].
The foremost recommendation that came out of this project is the vital need for
demonstrating fair distribution of flexibility among prosumer collective stakeholders
[212]. In turn, this informs the work conducted herein, and highlights the need to
further investigate issues around fairness and flexibility in prosumer collectives.
Smart Fintry Community
The Smart Fintry pilot project, launched in 2016 in Fintry, Scotland, demonstrates
electricity trading, where consumers can buy electricity from neighbouring prosumers
via a peer-to-peer trading platform. This community-initiated prosumer collective with
multi-site DER comprises 100 households, 3 wind turbines with a total capacity of 80
kW, solar PV panels totalling 50 kW, and a biogas plant of 1.1 MWe, and aims to
create a replicable local energy economy to be adopted across communities in the UK
[225, 232]. Prosumers in this collective are mostly innovators and early adopters, as the
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community builds upon a history of engagement and involvement in local sustainability
projects by the Fintry Development Trust [220].
The village of Fintry suffers from high energy costs due to its remote location, and
from old infrastructure and inefficient energy consumption. The Smart Fintry Com-
munity is tackling such challenges by installing smart meters, wireless communications
and distributed energy resources, and aiming to balance local energy supply and de-
mand. The objectives of the community include: (1) reducing energy costs and carbon
emissions; (2) alleviating fuel poverty; (3) overcoming contractual barriers preventing
direct linkages between prosumers and consumers; (4) enhancing economic resilience
and local value; and (5) developing a policy framework for demand-side energy man-
agement in prosumer collectives [225, 232, 233].
To achieve its objectives, the community is developing a number of deliverables and
investigating various issues under the assumption that a local energy market will seek
to optimally balance local energy supply and demand. In 2016, Smart Fintry launched
Fintry Local – a bespoke tariff providing cheaper unit rates to community residents
for each kWh used from the collective’s 100% renewable electricity, which can help an
average household annually save up to £100. Residents also get to access an energy
dashboard to see how much energy they are using, when, and by which household
appliances and systems [225].
The collective is collaborating with the distribution system operator to develop a
measurement and control system to provide real-time data relating to network oper-
ation. Furthermore, the community is focusing on investigating four aspects around
how to reduce peak demand, forecast local supply and demand, characterize demand
flexibility, and become a community energy supplier and trade electricity to the grid
[225, 233].
Drake Landing Solar Community
The Drake Landing Solar Community is a purpose-built residential neighbourhood of
52 homes in Alberta, Canada, which was completed in August 2007 [234] in one of the
sunniest places in Canada [235]. It is a third-party initiated prosumer collective with
focal-site DER. This collective’s prosumers can be considered early majority, as houses
were sold at competitive prices comparable to conventional houses, which may have
attracted homebuyers that may not be sustainability enthusiasts.
The collective uses solar thermal energy generated from an 800-panel garage-mounted
array for space and water heating in community households. During a typical summer
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day, the panels generate a peak of 1.5 MW of thermal power. The abundant heat gen-
erated from the panels during summer months is stored underground for heating needs
during winter months, by means of a district heating system comprising a combination
of short-term and long-term seasonal thermal energy storage [234]. The homeowners
can monitor the thermal power flow in the district heating system via an app [235].
Houses in Drake Landing are 30% more efficient than conventional homes, and have
yearly greenhouse gas emissions that are approximately 5 tonnes lower than those of
conventional homes [234]. The collective is considered a world pioneer in providing
over 90% of its space heating and 50% of its water heating from solar thermal energy.
The collective’s surplus heating needs are met by natural gas supplies [234].
Prosumers in Drake Landing pay a fixed monthly rate, around $70, to maintain
the solar system infrastructure, and the collective itself is revenue neutral [235]. This
raises a question around whether it is fair to equally distribute monthly heating fees
among prosumers, although their energy usage may be relatively different. Issues
around implementing fairness in prosumer collectives need investigation, especially
with regards to distributing fees/rewards.
Hepburn Wind Community
Hepburn Wind is the first community wind park in Australia. Built in Leonards Hill,
north-west of Melbourne, the collective began generating electricity in 2011, using
two turbines totalling 4.1 MW, which is enough to power 2,300 homes [236]. It is a
community-initiated prosumer collective with a focal-site wind farm, where prosumers
are regarded as innovators and early adopters, as this unique project is the first of its
kind in Australia.
The collective began as an informal working group then turned into a cooperative,
the Hepburn Wind Cooperative, which manages the farm, funds community projects,
and distributes financial returns to prosumers [236]. Electricity produced in the Hep-
burn Wind prosumer collective is fed into the grid and sold at the National Electricity
Market price to the collective’s electricity retail partner, Powershop [237, 238]. Before
the wind turbines were installed, electricity consumed in the community was mostly
generated more than 400 km away in coal-fired power plants. As local electricity pro-
duction reduces power losses in transmission networks, every kWh produced by the
prosumer collective displaces 1.1 kWh produced elsewhere [237, 238].
In 2016, the collective became a certified B Corp – a for-profit company certified
to meet rigorous standards in environmental and social transparency, accountability
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and performance. A B Corp is to business like fair trade is to coffee [239, 240]. The
collective provides a benefit sharing model to its prosumers and the wider community,
and makes the collective’s reports freely available online [237]. The collective’s efforts to
create a benefit sharing model and provide fair access to information highlight the need
for investigating issues around fair distribution and transparency, which are crucial in
collective settings.
As shown in the example collectives presented, although many drivers support the
growth of prosumer collectives, several challenges still persist, such as characterizing
demand flexibility, deploying fairness in distributing fees and flexibility, and gener-
ally meeting standards of social and environmental transparency. The next section
underpins the need to incorporate demand flexibility and fairness measures in pro-
sumer collectives, and generally enable more dynamic demand response in prosumers
collectives.
3.4 Managing Energy in Prosumer Collectives
Collectively implementing demand response, whether for consumers or prosumers, helps
scale participation to achieve demand reduction quotas and strengthen market power,
and helps optimize energy demand among multiple household appliances and systems to
reduce demand variability and improve forecast. Prosumerism offers increased benefits,
compared to consumerism, e.g. by helping create additional income from trading/selling
electricity, and achieve autonomy and energy self-sufficiency.
Although balancing electricity demand with intermittent supply from renewables
presents a challenge for prosumers, collectively balancing demand with supply – in
prosumer collectives – can enable an improved balance between supply and demand
especially in light of flexible demand and smart grid capabilities.
After investigating example prosumer collectives and reviewing the literature, stim-
ulating demand flexibility and fairness has been identified as key to creating dynamic
demand response for prosumer collectives, as highlighted in the next two sections,
respectively.
3.4.1 Need for Flexible Demand
Prosumers largely adopt intermittent generation, using wind turbines and rooftop and
community solar, whose supply is variable, thus raising reliability concerns from dis-
tribution companies and grid operators (as presented in Section 2.3.1) such as creating
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grid stresses and safety hazards [241–243]. Experiences from countries integrating
variable renewable energy resources (e.g. Germany) indicate several challenges with
the technical integration and associated market mechanisms of intermittent DER [62],
especially issues around overvoltage and thermal limits in the distribution network
[244–246].
To mitigate the effects of intermittent electricity supply in prosumer collectives,
means of enabling flexibility are becoming available with varying complexities and un-
derlying technologies [62]. One notable way of dealing with variable supply is creating
flexible demand to match this supply [62, 88].
Based on existing literature, creating flexible demand in prosumer collectives may
take various shapes, including shifting demand to coincide with the collective’s micro-
generation, trading electricity between production and consumption units within the
collective or between collectives, drawing energy from neighbours’ batteries, and selling
electricity to the grid or to other collectives [18, 20, 21, 27]. Such interactions are
complicated on many levels, and thus require new business models and offerings to
readily accommodate the layers added by both prosumerism and collectivism [88, 189,
201, 247, 248].
Such findings inform the overall research aim of this thesis, by underpinning the
need to consider flexible demand when developing improved demand response offerings
for prosumer collectives in light of a smart grid infrastructure.
3.4.2 Need for Fairness
Concepts from ethics, philosophy and justice can play a crucial role in informing en-
ergy decision-making by consumers and prosumers [30, 249, 250]. Energy justice can
be used to comprehend how values get shaped into energy systems, and help inform
energy decision-making [30], by applying principles of justice to energy consumption,
production, policy, activism, and security, and to climate change [251].
Sovacool et al.[30, p. 436] define the concept of energy justice as “a global energy
system that fairly disseminates both the benefits and costs of energy services, and one
that has representative and impartial energy decision-making.” Energy justice inte-
grates aspects from procedural justice and distributive justice [30]. Procedural justice
deals with the processes of decision-making (e.g. equitable access to information, the
right to participate), while distributive justice is concerned with the distribution of
decision-making outcomes (fair distribution of energy costs, subsidies, profits, etc.)
[29, 30, 250, 251]. Both aspects of justice can help in comprehending and assessing the
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processes and outcomes of low-carbon energy transitions in collective settings [29].
The notion of justice in many modern systems focuses on the concept of fairness
[30]. The literature underlines that failure to disseminate fairness and equity may cause
a lack of social acceptance in prosumer collectives [31, 32]. Exploring the concept of
fairness, from the lens of procedural and distributive justice, can therefore assist in
understanding and evaluating the processes and outcomes of prosumer collectives.
The concept of fairness has been investigated broadly in residential energy man-
agement [252–260]. However, limited literature exists around fairness for prosumer
collectives, where fairness often is only a part of research investigations and is poorly
explained and/or formulated.
Cornelusse et al. propose a mathematical model to fairly allocate profits among
prosumers in a community micro-grid where costs and revenues come from different
streams [261]. Moret and Pinson assess fairness in prosumer collectives where indi-
vidual prosumers share energy at the collective-level, to demonstrate that fairness in
a collective can be included in distributed negotiations to prevent strategic behaviour
[262]. Wang and Huang design an incentive mechanism to encourage energy trading
between interconnected micro-grids and fair sharing of benefits [263].
Such findings inform the overall research goal of this thesis, by highlighting the
need to consider aspects of fairness in dynamic demand response offerings. Current
demand response practices target individual consumers not collectives of prosumers,
and tend to focus on technicalities like resource response time, availability, trigger,
compensation, performance, etc. [18, 22, 63, 264], rather than social considerations.
Interweaving technical and social aspects in demand response can play a crucial role
in developing collective socio-technical settings, e.g. prosumer collectives.
Enabling dynamic demand response practices should ideally be conducted by grid
stakeholders, such as grid operators, electricity retailers, etc. Nevertheless, such en-
tities do not necessarily have the capabilities required to develop those practices and
disseminate them among prosumer collectives. The next section outlines the lack of
enabling solutions provided by top actors to prosumer collectives.
3.4.3 Lack of Enabling Solutions by Top Actors
In the context of the electricity sector, the term “top actors” is used to refer to es-
tablished actors such as grid operators, distribution system operators, and electricity
retailers. In contrast, “bottom actors” are electricity end-users. In the context of this
thesis, the term bottom actors is used to refer to residential prosumers.
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The transformative capacity of established actors in a sector is often low, as their
ability to create variety is generally limited and their resources tend to be deployed to
stabilize their existing structures [136].
The dominant business model in the electricity sector is the traditional corporate
utility model, where electric utilities profit from relying on increasing the energy units
sold to end-users [265]. As this business model is driven by unit volume, it pushes the
energy value chain towards increasing throughput and locks stakeholders into unsus-
tainable approaches [266].
Literature on innovative business models in the energy sector has been largely fo-
cusing on approaches used to market new technologies (e.g. energy storage and electric
vehicles) [267, 268]. There is generally a lack, however, in innovative business models
and solutions offered or enabled by top actors to accommodate distributed renewable
generation [136, 269–271].
Some top actors do deal with individual prosumers despite the distributed nature
of those prosumers. However, the processes such prosumers go through, e.g. to install
DER, is often long and inefficient, which creates not only a burden for top actors but
also delays for prosumers, especially as the number of prosumers grows. The inefficiency
of such processes rather than the distributed nature of prosumers may be one of the
factors behind the slowness of top actors. Streamlining processes targeting prosumers
(e.g. applying for DER interconnection requests online, automating the processing
of those requests) may play a role in improving top actor products and services to
prosumers and collectives.
Demand response programs are currently structured with top actors on one side and
consumers on the other side, and are not well set up to support prosumers, particularly
around managing prosumers’ interactions and associated flows of power, data and
money. For top actors to accommodate such interactions and flows, they need to
leverage smart grid capabilities and innovative business models to create value for
bottom actors and themselves [269].
Although the majority of top actors are slow in catering for prosumerism and col-
lectivism, very few top actors are trying to stay relevant, by launching new products
and services to serve prosumers and collectives (e.g. Veridian Connections in Canada,
and Vector Limited in New Zealand, which are both electricity distribution companies).
Yet, those top actors are mainly providing new offerings in collaboration with middle
actors. For example, Vector Limited is partnering with Tesla to provide battery stor-
age solutions to its residential customers, and Veridian Connections is collaborating
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with Opus One Solutions, a smart grid software company, to use its software solutions
to optimize power flows in a local residential prosumer community integrating solar
panels and batteries.
The lack of enabling digital solutions provided by top actors to prosumer collectives
has played a vital role in the emergence of new actors that facilitate dynamic demand
response for such collectives. Those catalysts of change, referred to herein as “middle
actors”, are needed to better link top and bottom actors in prosumer collectives, and
enable change towards more dynamic demand response. Middle actors should ideally
help collectives efficiently manage their power flows and associated data exchanges and
money transactions, while supporting top actors in maintaining grid reliability and
customer satisfaction.
The next section investigates the rise of middle actors serving prosumer collectives,
and shows how this has implications for our work in terms of enabling new products
and services in light of a smart grid infrastructure.
3.5 The Rise of Middle Actors
Change catalysts are generally needed to help with transitions to new systems. The
emergence of distributed energy resources and smart grid technologies for households
propose value that can be captured by actors sitting between top and bottom actors in
prosumer collectives. Middle actors can help prosumers overcome barriers (intermittent
supply, lack of fairness within a collective, etc.) by leveraging enablers (smart grid
metering and controls, innovative models for fair distribution, etc.).
3.5.1 Middle Actors Serving Collectives
Despite being highly complicated, energy systems are often simplified into energy sup-
ply and demand, or top and bottom actors [272, 273]. This oversimplified division often
neglects the various interactions and actors in “the middle”, as it assumes that top and
bottom actors merely meet in a middle point that sits in between them [274]. This
division additionally assumes that once the tools enabling change in energy systems
are available (smart technologies, incentives, etc.), change will occur, which in turn
overlooks the need for actors that mediate and aggregate efforts [274].
The terms middle actors and intermediaries are both used in the literature. Middle
actors have three functions: mediating, enabling and aggregating, where they play
a vital change catalyst role [9, 116, 274]. A middle actor can have a wide range of
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agency and capacity, and can be responsible for a single function or multiple ones
[9, 116, 207, 275]. Intermediaries, in contrast, are mainly assumed to lack independent
agency and capacity of their own, and have priorities shaped by surrounding factors
[276, 277] but no priorities of their own [274, 276]. The term and role of “middle actors”
is thus preferred and used in this thesis, as it reflects a more active and integrative role
between top and bottom actors.
In the transition to collective prosumerism, a lot of change is occurring bottom-up
very rapidly (such as the rise of prosumers). Yet, top actors are mostly not responding
to this change at the same pace, because of their slow processes and limited capacities.
In turn, this mismatch has made room for emerging middle actors to put innovative
thinking and tools into use by developing new offerings needed to support the growth
of prosumer collectives.
The rise of middle actors and their smart grid offerings to prosumer collectives is
happening so fast that there is very little literature in this area. Based on review-
ing the available literature and pilot projects, middle actors are most likely to offer
products and services that enable dynamic demand response in one or more of the
following areas: (1) virtual power plant, (2) technology for optimized resource use, (3)
dynamic electricity pricing, (4) peer-to-peer transactions within a community, and (5)
aggregation [9, 207, 275, 278, 279].
Example middle actors that may act in some capacity in relation to prosumers and
prosumer collectives include: energy service companies, energy software and hardware
providers, non-governmental organizations, governmental energy agencies, research and
development centres, industry associations, and innovation centres. Middle actors may
serve prosumer collectives directly (e.g. by giving them tools to enable selling or trad-
ing electricity), or may collaborate with top actors to strengthen their offerings to
prosumers and prosumer collectives [279].
3.6 Summary
The emergence of residential prosumer collectives, which dominantly integrate inter-
mittent micro-generation, brings challenges around creating flexible demand to match
with intermittent supply. Yet, smart grids offer various technologies and features, which
can enable demand flexibility in prosumer collectives. This chapter has discussed how
smart grids are generally supporting the rise of prosumer collectives, and has identi-
fied key points to inform how smart grid opportunities (e.g. scheduling energy demand
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between home appliances and batteries, trading electricity between households) can be
leveraged to create dynamic demand response for residential prosumer collectives.
Reviewing the emergence of prosumer collectives and four example collectives has
identified demand flexibility and fairness as key aspects to be taken into account in
dynamic demand response solutions for prosumer collectives. The lack of innovative
solutions provided by top actors has been also identified, which has, in turn, ignited
a new wave of middle actors for catalyzing the interactions between top actors and
prosumer collectives, and developing enabling solutions for dynamic demand response.
The findings of this chapter, in addition to those presented in Chapter 2, inform the
overall research aim of this thesis around how smart grid opportunities can be leveraged
to improve demand response for residential prosumer collectives. The remainder of this
thesis investigates how middle actors are shaping innovative solutions in this space, and
focuses on issues around fairness and demand flexibility.
Chapter 4 outlines the methodology based on which the third and fourth research
questions of this thesis are addressed. Chapter 5 addresses the third question by
investigating the emergence of middle actors and their offerings in detail, identifying
the challenges they face and the associated implications for dynamic demand response,
and exploring how the future may unfold for such actors. Chapter 6 addresses the
fourth question around how to foster fairness in software solutions enabling dynamic





The first two research questions posed by this thesis have been addressed by litera-
ture review, as presented in Chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 2 includes a review on the
current status of energy demand management and the opportunities enabled by smart
grids notably for improving demand response practices to meet the needs of prosumer
collectives. In Chapter 3, a review is presented on how smart grid opportunities are
generally supporting the emergence of prosumer collectives, which has identified the
need to further investigate key aspects, namely fairness and demand flexibility, and
middle actors, which are helping develop innovative smart grid offerings for residential
prosumer collectives.
By building on the literature review and to address the overall aim of this thesis, two
additional research questions have been posed. The third research question investigates
how middle actors are shaping smart grid offerings for residential prosumer collectives
and how this implicates dynamic demand response. The fourth research question in-
vestigates how to incorporate fairness in dynamic demand response solutions targeting
residential collectives.
This chapter elaborates on the socio-technical nature of this research, and presents
the rationale for the methodological approach taken to investigate the third and fourth
research questions. The chapter also discusses the methods used to conduct the social
and technical work streams of the research, and sets the scene for the next chapters.
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4.2 Approach Taken to Perceive Research Topic
This research takes a position that sees the world as physically measurable and as inter-
preted through people’s eyes. The power grid is a multifaceted socio-technical system
comprising a social network of organizational players which build, operate, maintain,
and use its technical infrastructure [280], in addition to individual and collective end-
users whose electricity usage is mainly driven by their needs, behaviours, preferences,
choices, and appliances [281, 282].
The power grid is progressively incorporating distributed energy technologies in
households, due to their increasing affordability, modularity, and high technical effi-
ciency. Such an evolving adoption creates new relationships between people and tech-
nologies, and gives rise to prosumerism where energy can be produced and stored at
the demand side and not solely at the supply side. Not only are individual households
adopting prosumerism, but prosumer collectives are also forming due to the various
benefits of collectively managing energy supply and demand.
Managing power flows in prosumer collectives is challenging when intermittent
micro-generation is used. Innovative demand response approaches are needed to bal-
ance such intermittent supply with the highly variable demand patterns of households
[157, 280, 283].
In residential prosumer collectives, new complex interactions and relationships are
developing among individuals, households and communities [284, 285]. The growth of
such intricate interactions in a socio-technical context raises expectations. A successful
transition from individual consumers to prosumer collectives is expected to demonstrate
social concepts, such as fairness.
Conventional electricity system incumbents may not necessarily cope with the rapid
changes and new interactions occurring at the demand side of the grid, especially in
prosumer collectives. The market is seeing a rise in innovative businesses developing of-
ferings for prosumer collectives, to enable improved and active management of energy in
such collectives. As modern society increasingly demands user- and application-centric
solutions to emerging problems, which may not have previously existed, integrating
knowledge from various disciplines becomes essential [286].
Conducting research on dynamic demand response in residential prosumer collec-
tives requires more than one disciplinary approach: it needs to draw from both technical
and social understandings of the situation [287]. The next section presents the episte-
mology underlying this research, and explains the reasoning behind leveraging social
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and technical knowledge to answer the research questions.
4.3 Research Approach
Amid the rise of prosumerism in the residential sector, dynamic management of power
flows in prosumer collectives presents a challenge as it may not necessarily leverage
much knowledge and practices from well-established demand response activities. Such
activities are mainly static (e.g. time-of-use pricing), and primarily serve the consuming
side of individual households. Similarly, knowledge leveraged from demand response
activities used by industrial and commercial end-users is inadequate, as the demand
patterns of such users are quite predictable, as opposed to the dynamic patterns in
residential prosumer collectives.
Designing dynamic demand response for residential prosumer collectives needs to
leverage new knowledge to tackle the dynamic interactions between prosumers’ energy
practices, social norms, and material cultures [288]. New understandings are needed
to grasp the prosumerism element and collectivism of such collectives. Building such
a broad range of understandings requires drawing from social and technical knowledge
of the situation [287].
A socio-technical system is the most relevant concept relating to energy [289]. Thus,
the transition to more distributed energy systems requires a thorough assessment of
their evolution in the social and the technical dimensions [157]. Unfortunately, the
effect of the dynamics of new energy technologies and their associated social response
on locally distributed energy systems is often overlooked [157, 281, 290].
Existing literature on distributed energy systems mainly takes a technocratic ap-
proach, which investigates integrating them into existing infrastructure in optimal ways
[291, 292]. A review of 4,444 full-length articles on energy studies published in three
leading energy journals between 1999 and 2013 showed a general lack of using social
science methods and interdisciplinarity, with only 12.6% of articles relying, fully or
partially, on methods and tools from social science [281].
To have a more holistic understanding of and create new knowledge about such a
new and multi-faceted topic, it is essential to use multiple disciplines to conduct re-
search. Combining more than one discipline can take a number of forms, one of which
is interdisciplinary research. Undertaking interdisciplinary studies helps researchers
investigate broad topics and answer complex questions, by drawing knowledge from
more than one discipline to inform research methods and find solutions [293]. Inter-
61
disciplinary research creates its own conceptual understanding of a topic, and thus
provides more coherent results [286], by integrating knowledge and methods rather
than adding them together [293] [294].
A number of definitions can be used to describe interdisciplinary research. The
definition given by the US National Research Council is referenced herein, as it provides
a clear and comprehensive description of interdisciplinary research,
Interdisciplinary research is a mode of research by teams or individuals
that integrates information, data, techniques, tools, perspectives, concepts,
and/or theories from two or more disciplines or bodies of specialized knowl-
edge to advance fundamental understanding or to solve problems whose so-
lutions are beyond the scope of a single discipline or field of research practice
[294].
To better address the questions posed by the thesis, an interdisciplinary approach
is used, where knowledge is drawn from social science, computer science and power sys-
tems engineering. A socio-technical approach is chosen to integrate social and technical
knowledge from these three disciplines.
Knowledge stemming from a socio-technical system, such as the smart power grid or
a residential prosumer collective, can take the form of either qualitative or quantitative
data. For example, data from smart meters or solar PV inverters is quantitative, while
data about middle actors’ aspirations and the challenges facing collective prosumerism
is qualitative. To tackle challenging interdisciplinary research questions, create coher-
ent discussions, and leverage both qualitative and quantitative data, mixed methods
research presents an appropriate pathway.
Mixed methods “involve the collection, analysis, and integration of quantitative and
qualitative data in a single or multiphase study” [295, p. 224], and are used to tackle
challenging questions by pushing the boundaries of long believed assumptions about
ways to scope and build knowledge [33]. The richness of using mixed methods lies
in the integrated and generalized results they produce through combining qualitative
data (e.g. words and narratives) with qualitative data (e.g. numerical data) [33].
Commonly, researchers consider using mixed methods for five reasons: (1) trian-
gulation, (2) complementarity, (3) development, (4) initiation, and (5) expansion [33].
In triangulation, the researcher uses more than one method to examine the same di-
mension of a problem, while in complementarity, mixed methods help develop a fuller
understanding of the problem in hand. Both approaches are used to cross-validate
research findings when multiple methods produce comparable data.
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Mixed methods can also be used to create synergy in the development of a research
project, where the results from one method help inform the other method. Initiation
is another reason for using mixed methods, whereby the findings of one study may
trigger further questions and additional explanations requiring the initiation of a new
study. In expansion, the researcher broadens the study and continuously pursues new
research questions.
In this work, mixed methods are used to provide complementarity, by developing
an understanding of the emergence of middle actors and their offerings to prosumer
collectives, and the challenges facing them. Mixed methods are also used herein to
provide development, where the social findings are used to inform the technical stream
of work. The next section presents the methodological approach to addressing the
research questions.
4.4 Methodological Approach to Addressing Research
Questions
The first two questions posed by this research have been addressed in the previous
chapters, while the other two are yet to be tackled. This section presents the method-
ological approach taken to investigate the third and fourth questions.
Addressing the first two questions in Chapters 2 and 3 has set the scene for the
remaining research questions. The third question explores the role of middle actors
in shaping smart grid offerings and the implications for dynamic demand response in
residential prosumer collectives. The fourth question investigates how to technically
foster fairness in dynamic demand response offerings in such collectives. The two
questions undertake different inquiry pathways, and thus they each invite a different
research method. The third research question asks:
How are middle actors shaping smart grid offerings, and what are the
implications for dynamic demand response in residential prosumer
collectives?
New players are emerging in the smart power grid arena, to fill the gap left by
existing incumbents who do not offer appropriate solutions for groups of prosumers.
Middle actors are emerging, and playing a role in catalyzing the link and progress
between top and bottom actors in prosumer collectives.
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Investigating the role of middle actors in shaping smart grid offerings for residential
prosumer collectives and the underlying implications for dynamic demand response
is a new topic that has not been previously explored. To answer the third research
question, an investigation is conducted through a social science lens to explore (1)
what smart grid products and services are being developed by middle actors to serve
prosumer collectives, and (2) what this means for dynamic demand response for such
collectives.
This investigation draws from social and socio-technical knowledge and uses a qual-
itative method to gather and analyze data from interviews conducted with “actual”
middle actors serving “virtual” prosumers and prosumer collectives (virtual in the sense
that no interviews have been conducted with them, as the focus herein is on middle
actors). The findings are also social and socio-technical, and they feed into the con-
cluding chapter of the thesis. The findings additionally inform the fourth research
question, which is more technically oriented and is given as follows,
How can fairness be fostered in dynamic demand response for residential
collectives?
As previously mentioned, the literature review underpinned the need to deploy
social concepts such as fairness in dynamic demand response for households adopting
new energy technologies and wishing to collectivize their resources. Applying fairness,
especially in distributing responsibilities or benefits, supports and encourages the sense
of collaboration in such collectives.
Integrating social dimensions in power systems presents a challenge. The fourth re-
search question seeks ways to adopt fairness in demand response activities designed for
prosumer collectives. This study draws from technical and socio-technical knowledge
and uses a quantitative method to analyze data to include socially inspired reasoning
into automated decision-making for demand response. The findings of this piece of
work are both technical and socio-technical, and they feed into the concluding chapter
of the thesis.
As discussed, qualitative and quantitative methods are used to gather and analyze
data in order to answer the third and fourth research questions, respectively. The next
section details the methods used.
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4.5 Methods
This research uses mixed methods to gather and analyze knowledge from three dis-
ciplines: social science, computer science and power systems engineering. In such
socio-technical research, it is important to have a conceptual start by creating a model
to theorize the expected connections between the social and technical elements of the
research [296]. Figure 4.1, adopted from reference [296], illustrates the links between
the different knowledge, methods and data used.
 
Figure 4.1: A conceptual model for the socio-technical research con-
ducted
After addressing the first two research questions in a literature review, the thesis
is principally structured as two streams. Social and socio-technical knowledge inform
the qualitative research, which produces social and socio-technical findings. Similarly,
technical and socio-technical knowledge as well as findings from the qualitative research
inform the quantitative research, to produce technical and socio-technical findings. The
literature review and research findings are intertwined in the concluding chapter, to
highlight links, novelty and how the future may unfold for this research topic.
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The next two sections present the qualitative and quantitative methods used in the
social and technical streams, respectively.
4.5.1 Qualitative Method
The third research question investigates the ways in which middle actors shape smart
grid offerings and the implications on dynamic demand response in residential prosumer
collectives. To answer this question, a qualitative research method will be used. Data
will be gathered through semi-structured interviews conducted with executives working
at companies providing current and potential offerings for dynamic demand response
in residential prosumer collectives.
The aim of the interviews is to learn more about the companies, their offerings
and the values they help create, and their executives’ personal thoughts on the future
trends and challenges emerging in this space. Interview questions can be found in
Appendix B.
Interview participants are executives (founders, managers, etc.) working in new
businesses – middle actors – with potential or existing products or services in five
categories that can enable dynamic demand response: (1) virtual power plant, (2)
technology for optimized resource use, (3) dynamic electricity pricing, (4) peer-to-peer
transactions within a community, and (5) aggregation.
A total of 15 new businesses will be recruited from around the world based on their
existing or potential role in developing smart grid offerings enabling dynamic demand
response in prosumer collectives. Investigating new middle actors from around the
world can help provide a fuller understanding of how such businesses operate in different
regulatory, technical and socio-economic environments, compared with an investigation
that focuses on a specific country and context.
In addition to interviewing executives from those new businesses, an interview will
be conducted with an executive working in a top actor entity, e.g. a distribution system
operator, to understand how such an actor may perceive and interact with emerging
middle actors. Additionally, an interview will be conducted with an executive from a
well-established and long-running business specializing in traditional demand response
practices, in order to explore how this business may be catering for prosumerism in
contrast with what new middle actors are developing.
Professional networking websites (e.g. Linkedin) offer a good starting point to find
potential interview participants, who will then be contacted directly through such
websites, via email, or on social media (e.g. Twitter). Participants will be asked to
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have an interview in person where possible, or an individual phone/Skype interview if
a face to face interview is not possible.
Each participant will be asked to answer questions about their company, and its
solutions and values; the ways in which company solutions provide value (enable de-
mand flexibility, fairness, etc.); and their personal views on how the future is unfolding
for dynamic demand response in residential prosumer collectives.
All the interviews will be recorded in audio format, with explicit permission pro-
vided by the participants. Before starting the interview, each participant will be asked
to sign a consent form for in-person interviews, or to agree to the terms laid out in
the consent form for phone/Skype interviews. Where data from the interviews is used,
every attempt will be made to preserve the anonymity of companies and participants.
The collected data will be analyzed using NVivo software, by conducting thematic
analysis to induce common themes from interview transcripts. After familiarizing my-
self with the transcripts, I will cluster the important features of the data – with the
research question(s) in mind – and identify each feature with a code. Then, I will
search within each set of coded data and between codes to identify potential patterns
of meaning which address the research question(s) and provide comprehensive analysis
through a coherent story. Interview findings and analysis are presented in Chapter 5.
4.5.2 Quantitative Method
To tackle the social questions in a technical context, various frameworks, systems,
and methods are becoming available to help adopt social understandings in technical
systems, and spawn interdisciplinary socio-technical work.
The last decade has witnessed a growing body of work on optimization methods
relating to distributed generation from renewable energy sources [297]. Optimization
typically involves the maximization or minimization of a specific objective, the objective
function, within specific limits, the design constraints. The parameters that can be
adjusted to achieve that objective within those constraints are referred to as design
variables [298].
In the case of prosumer collectives, optimization can be used to solve several prob-
lems, e.g. scheduling prosumers’ home appliances and batteries among a collective so
as to maximize self-sufficiency from distributed generation, or specifying the best times
to sell electricity from distributed generation while maximizing the collective’s profit.
To focus on strategic interactions among stakeholders of prosumer collectives, game
theory – a conceptual and formal analytical framework – can be used to study such
67
complex interactions [299, 300]. To address the fairness notion in prosumer collectives,
a solution concept from game theory, namely the Shapley value [301], can be used to
provide a conceptual basis for distributing a reward (or penalty) among a number of
prosumers.
In the quantitative and more technical work stream of this research, two software
mechanisms will be developed using computer modelling. The first is a fair share alloca-
tor for distributing the income of the collective from selling electricity among prosumers
based on their contribution in reaching the quota of electricity to be exported. The
second mechanism aims at trading off the minimum loss of utility experienced by a
collective of households in order to achieve fairness in distributing loss of utility among
a collective of households.
The technical data required for the two mechanisms will be collected from case stud-
ies, recommendations from pilot projects, retailers’ websites, and free online datasets.
Example data includes smart meter electricity use, electricity tariffs, etc. Each of
the two software mechanisms represents a specific quantitative approach to manage
numerical data from households, communities, and the power grid.
4.6 Discussion
Applying social innovations to the electricity sector is indispensable. Social innova-
tions create revolutionary ideas and strategies that establish new interdisciplinary re-
lationships between previously separate entities, with the aim of meeting social needs.
Engaged end-users whose needs are socially catered for may interact efficiently and
reliably in the electric power system.
By looking at the big picture, the power grid is a multi-faceted socio-technical
system. As an integral part of the power grid, a collective of residential prosumers is
equally a socio-technical system, with various supply and demand profiles. Such profiles
are driven by a myriad of needs, behaviours and technicalities spanning prosumers, their
community, the grid, and the ecosystem governing their interactions.
Incorporating social user-centric features in the design of many technologies today
helps meet users’ aspirations and needs. Emerging energy technologies are no excep-
tion, especially those needed in highly social settings such as residential collectives.
Bringing social dimensions to such a technical system, however, is a complicated task
that can either reinforce the system or weaken it if inappropriately addressed.
This chapter explored the socio-technical nature of this research, and presented
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the basis for the mixed research methods approach taken to investigate the third and
fourth research questions. The detailed qualitative and quantitative methods used to
conduct the social and technical work streams of the research were presented, which
sets the scene for the next chapters.
A wave of new businesses and products is helping prosumers and prosumer collec-
tives better meet their dynamic demand response needs, and pushing more innovation
into top electricity system actors’ offerings. The qualitative method helps address the
social dimension of the research by conducting interviews with executives from com-
panies with existing offerings or potential solutions targeting prosumer collectives.
Understanding how the business around such offerings is growing, and how social
factors are being taken into account in those offerings helps address the third research
question, by identifying the role of middle actors and the associated repercussions
on dynamic demand response for such collectives. Additionally, interview findings
help shape the social orientation of the technicalities of dynamic demand response
solutions, and thus feed into the investigation of the fourth research question and help
in understanding how the future is unfolding in this area.
In investigating the fourth research question, which looks into how to integrate
fairness in dynamic demand response for residential collectives, the focus becomes
more quantitative and technical. The question explores how to implement fairness
in distributing revenue and loss of utility among prosumer and consumer collectives,
respectively.
This thesis provides a novel socio-technical investigation on the new layer of middle
actors catering for the needs of top electricity actors and residential prosumer collec-
tives. The work herein looks into the smart grid offerings provided by those middle
actors and the implications for dynamic demand response in such collectives.
The next two chapters address the third and fourth research questions, which
present the social and technical work streams, respectively. Chapter 5 presents and
discusses the findings of the interview questions regarding middle actors’ smart grid
offerings and associated implications for dynamic demand response in residential pro-
sumer collectives. Chapter 6 investigates improved software mechanisms to adopt




Interview Findings and Analysis
Research Question 3 – How are middle actors shaping smart grid offerings,
and what are the implications for dynamic demand response in residential
prosumer collectives?
5.1 Introduction
The third research question investigates the ways in which new businesses (i.e. middle
actors) are developing offerings to enable dynamic demand response which may be
suitable for use by residential prosumer collectives (i.e. bottom actors), and explores
resulting implications. This question is addressed through the social research conducted
in this thesis. Tackling this research question helps address the overall aim of this
thesis, which focuses on how smart grid offerings can be leveraged to improve dynamic
demand response for residential prosumer collectives.
To help answer this question, data was gathered via 15 semi-structured interviews
conducted with executives (e.g. founders, senior employees) working in new companies
with potential or existing products or services in five categories enabling dynamic
demand response: (1) virtual power plant, (2) technology for optimized resource use,
(3) dynamic electricity pricing, (4) peer-to-peer transactions within a community, and
(5) aggregation.
Two additional interviews have been conducted, one with an executive working
in a distribution system operator, and another with an executive working in a well-
established company specializing in providing traditional demand response solutions
and aggregation services. These additional interviews are important in understanding
how a top actor (grid operator, etc.) may perceive and deal with new middle actors,
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and how an established business specializing in traditional demand response caters for
prosumerism in contrast with new businesses.
The profiles of the interviewed companies are listed in Section 5.2. More details
about the interview process are available in Section 4.5.1, and the interview questions
are listed in Appendix B. Those questions have been selected such that to fill the gaps
identified in the literature review findings.
This chapter presents the interview findings based on the themes inferred from
interview transcripts, following the process introduced in the Methodology chapter.
Based on the findings, the chapter presents how demand-side changes and the slow
response of top actors to changing customer expectations are resulting in new businesses
with innovative products and services to serve prosumers. The chapter also discusses
the future challenges facing dynamic demand response targeting prosumer collectives,
such as the lack of scalable business models, adequate regulatory mechanisms, and
collaborative efforts between involved stakeholders.
Drawing from the interviews, this chapter starts by briefly presenting the new
products and services made available by the interviewed executives from middle actor
companies to prosumers, both individuals and collectives. After discussing the slow
pace of top actors that has driven the emergence of new middle actors, the chapter
moves on to elaborate on the bottlenecks being resolved by middle actors and presents
their main business models and company principles. Then, a section is dedicated to
elaborating on the innovative offerings and customer-centric values (e.g. fairness and
flexibility) the companies are integrating into the solutions they provide to prosumers.
Lastly, the chapter discusses how offerings are expected to evolve for the manage-
ment of energy supply and demand, especially in relation to prosumer collectives, and
what challenges lie ahead in this area. A summary of concluding remarks is available
at the end of the chapter.
Novelty in this chapter includes: (1) investigating the emergence of new businesses
(middle actors) who are catalyzing the interactions between top actors and prosumer
collectives; (2) exploring how smart grid opportunities are creating a new wave of
dynamic demand response offerings; (3) identifying the main categories of dynamic
demand response solutions being developed today; and (4) extending the literature




In the interviews, 17 executives from 17 companies have been interviewed. The fol-
lowing subsections briefly list the profiles of those companies, including company ID
(used throughout this chapter to maintain anonymity), description, selection category,
location(s), and date founded.
Company A is an electricity retailer that provides access to wholesale electricity
prices to households and small businesses through online software tools. Customers
need to have smart meters, but are not bound by fixed term contracts. Through on-
line tools, customers can access real-time electricity prices, a 4-hour price forecast and
energy savings tips, and can thus change their energy usage accordingly. The company
objective comprises providing a fair and transparent service for its customers and help-
ing end energy poverty in New Zealand. More recently, the company started offering
a service to help prosumer households sell their surplus electricity to the grid.
Category – Dynamic Electricity Pricing
Country – New Zealand
Founded – 2014
Company B is an electricity retailer that provides access to wholesale electricity
prices and flat rate subscriptions to households and small businesses. The company
offers to upgrade customer meters to smart meters, to help them view their energy
usage in real-time via online software tools. It also provides customers with weekly
insights into their energy usage and energy saving tips, to help them gain control of
their electricity bills. More recently, the company started offering a solar feed-in tariff
to prosumers, where they can sell their electricity to the grid.
Category – Dynamic Electricity Pricing
Country – Australia
Founded – 2015
Company C is a provider of distributed energy storage systems and energy man-
agement tools for residential and business customers with solar PV. The company also
provides energy management solutions for electric utilities needing to gain visibility
and control over the distributed energy resources of their prosumer customers. Surplus
energy from the company’s prosumer customers is aggregated in a virtual pool, where
73
it can be sold upon request to electric utilities or third-parties.
Category – Virtual Power Plant
Country – USA and Australia
Founded – 2009
Company D is a provider of distributed energy storage systems to households and
small businesses with solar PV. The company also manages a virtual online commu-
nity of its battery owners, where they can share their surplus energy with each other at
lower prices from the grid. Selling excess energy from the community is handled by the
company for its community members. Monthly fees are paid by community members
to the company in return for managing the metering infrastructure and energy man-
agement software. Since 2016, community members pay a flat rate for their electricity
from the community.
Category – Virtual Power Plant
Country – USA and Europe
Founded – 2010
Company E is a well-established and long-running company specializing in de-
mand response, billing and energy procurement solutions for electric utilities, and com-
mercial and industrial customers. More recently, the company merged with a solution
provider (founded in 2008) specializing in managing distributed energy generation and
storage resources, in order to be inclusive of prosumers.
Category – Aggregation
Country – North America, Europe and Asia Pacific
Founded – 2001
Company F provides software solutions and services to electric utilities, and res-
idential, commercial and industrial customers to help them manage and aggregate
distributed energy resources for optimum network operations and market access.
Category – Virtual Power Plant
Country – Australia and Singapore
Founded – 2010
Company G provides hardware and software solutions and services to integrate
and manage Internet of Things (IoT) devices (e.g. sensors and actuators) used in resi-
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dential, commercial and industrial premises integrating distributed energy generation
and storage resources.
Category – Optimized Resource Use
Country – Germany and France
Founded – 2010
Company H helps electric utilities offer energy management software solutions to
households and small businesses integrating solar PV and battery storage. Such solu-
tions help manage customers’ distributed energy production and consumption units so
as to optimize network operations and create virtual power plants. The company also
provides solutions directly to prosumers, to help them manage their solar and battery
resources.
Category – Virtual Power Plant
Country – Australia
Founded – 2014
Company I offers software solutions to electric utilities to help them balance their
customers’ distributed energy production with consumption and aggregate resources
to optimize network operations and create virtual power plants. The company also
provides electric utilities with customer engagement software to help their customers
control their assets (e.g. smart thermostats, energy storage).
Category – Virtual Power Plant
Country – USA, Europe and Asia Pacific
Founded – 2011
Company J provides customer engagement solutions to electric utilities to help
them build strong relationships with their customers and educate those customers with
energy usage and cost insights. The company also provides electric utilities with a be-
havioral demand response solution that personalizes energy saving goals and can be
configured for both incentive and non-incentive based demand response programs.
Category – Optimized Resource Use
Country – USA and Asia Pacific
Founded – 2011
Company K helps communities develop renewable energy solutions by providing
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them with a set of products and services. One of their products is a hardware and
software system for solar energy providers to monitor, control and provide payment
options to their customers. Examples of their services include renewable energy sys-
tem design, community business plan development, and landscape and visual impact
assessment.
Category – Optimized Resource Use
Country – Scotland
Founded – 2011
Company L provides various solutions for direct use by prosumers, or through
retailers. One of their applications enables prosumers to trade their electricity with
consumers and receive real-time payments in return, where consumers can choose their
clean energy source. Another application allows collectives of prosumers that share
ownership of renewable energy assets to buy and sell their electricity to the wholesale
electricity market and distribute income to prosumers.
Category – Peer-to-peer Trading
Country – Australia
Founded – 2016
Company M provides a software and hardware platform that connects prosumers
with batteries and consumers with prosumers generating electricity from solar PV,
wind turbines, and biogas, by matching energy demand with supply and balancing
grid frequency fluctuations. The company can also aggregate and sell surplus electric-
ity from prosumers to the wholesale electricity market.
Category – Virtual Power Plant
Country – Europe
Founded – 2009
Company N is an electricity retailer providing residential consumers and pro-
sumers with software tools that can help them change their energy usage so as to
benefit from more local and renewable energy. The company also helps solar pro-
sumers sell their excess electricity to the grid.
Category – Peer-to-peer Trading
Country – New Zealand
Founded – 2012
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Company O offers electric utilities and prosumer collectives a software platform
to enable prosumers and consumers to sell, buy, and gift clean energy within local
communities. The company aims to eventually enable electric vehicles charging with
local energy and provide energy analytics to network companies to support improved
electricity pricing structures.
Category – Peer-to-peer Trading
Country – New Zealand
Founded – 2015
Company P provides solar PV-based hot water systems to residential customers,
where they can harness solar energy to heat their domestic water and save on electricity
bills.
Category – Optimized Resource Use
Country – New Zealand
Founded – 2011
Company Q owns and operates the electricity distribution network in specific parts
of New Zealand. More recently, the company started supporting the installation and
use of distributed energy resources, such as solar PV and electric vehicles. The company
is responsible for approving installations of distributed generation (e.g. solar PV, wind
turbines, and micro-hydro) for both small and large customers, and it maintains a
number of electric vehicle charging stations and uses electric vehicles in its fleet.
Category – Distribution System Operator
Country – New Zealand
Founded – 1998
5.3 New Offerings
The emergence of prosumers and prosumer collectives is creating new expectations
around balancing energy demand and supply, and new opportunities for building in-
novative businesses and offerings. This section briefly overviews the new offerings pro-
vided by the interviewed companies to individual prosumers and prosumer collectives,
respectively.
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5.3.1 Offerings for Individual Prosumers
Most interviewed businesses have installed their solutions at individual prosumer premises,
either for demonstration purposes in partnership with electric utilities or for everyday
usage at prosumers’ premises. The remaining businesses are still either in the pro-
cess of developing solutions for individual prosumers, or principally target prosumer
collectives. Below are the main types of offerings provided to individual prosumers.
Battery Storage
The emergence of battery systems is trending as a key solution to prosumers needing
to store electricity for later use or trade. Company D, which provides integrated solu-
tions for distributed energy storage and solar PV, has thousands of installed batteries
worldwide, as mentioned by their executive,
We have installed more than 13,000 batteries worldwide in the last 6 years.
We are the market leader in Europe at least (Company D).
As further explained by the following quote, the battery system their company provides
is modular and scalable, to meet the various demand needs of prosumers,
Our system is a scalable storage unit. It starts with 2 kWh and can be ex-
tended till 16 kWh, in 8 incremental steps. Why do we do this? Because we
realized that there are different energy demand requirements in households,
different numbers of people, and of course different appliance usages. For
example, some people use oil or gas as a heating source; others may use
electric heating, which means they need a bigger storage unit to supply their
energy demand (Company D).
Prosumers are turning to modular battery solutions to meet their needs for storing elec-
tricity, and sizing for those batteries is mainly based on household electricity demand,
number of inhabitants, and appliance usage.
Another offering built by middle actors is providing real-time feedback to battery
owners. Company C is a US market leader specializing in solar batteries and virtual
power plant software. This company’s executive mentioned that more than 650 of their
battery storage systems have been installed in the field, mostly in households. This
company expects the number of installed systems to double after orders are installed
for a couple of utility programs in New York and Australia.
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This executive elaborates on prosumers’ ability to access the metrics of their battery
systems as follows,
Prosumers that have the battery now can access a mobile application that
shows them how much power is in the battery, what is happening, where is
the power going, is it going into the battery or serving the home or going
out to the grid. The app shows those metrics; the technology that underlines
those kind of metrics is in customers’ hands (Company C).
Using this company’s offering, prosumers can access the metrics of their installed
battery systems (e.g. battery power level) via a mobile application.
It is not only battery manufacturers that are involved in trialling and installing
battery systems for prosumers; Company B, which provides dynamic electricity prices
to customers in Australia, is engaged in a trial with businesses in Victoria to install
battery systems in residential households.
Based on the interviews, battery storage systems are becoming increasingly avail-
able in the market for households to store electricity, and maximize associated benefits
(e.g. use stored energy for household demand in case of high electricity prices or grid
emergencies). Batteries are becoming more modular and scalable, while they are in-
creasingly integrating with feedback systems to satisfy prosumers’ awareness. Using
smart devices (smartphones, tablets, etc.), prosumers can easily access information
about their battery system performance.
Distributed Energy Control and Optimization
Company F provides software solutions for controlling and optimizing distributed en-
ergy generation and storage. This company serves prosumers at various scales, and is
pairing with distribution networks in Australia to run trials in residential areas with
solar rooftops. The following is quoted from their executive’s interview,
Examples of prosumers we are serving are places like Melbourne airport,
right down to the individual households. We have projects in residential
households which are run by distribution companies as part of a trial pro-
gram for solar rooftops (Company F).
This company and similar businesses are developing advanced software platforms to
help major electricity retailers and distribution companies run trial projects for solar
rooftops in Australian households.
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On the other side of the world, Company G has worked with utilities, like British
Gas in the UK and City Power in South Africa, on pilot projects supporting controls
for optimizing energy usage across prosumers’ household appliances and distributed
energy resources (heat pumps, washing machines, solar panels, battery storage, etc.).
Currently, the company is running a similar pilot with EDP which is a leading electric
utility in Portugal.
Automated Demand Response
The underlying concept of automated demand response (ADR) is the same as demand
response, where end-users are requested to change their demand from normal consump-
tion patterns. However, in ADR, there is no human intervention – automated signals
are sent to end-users’ devices, which enact based on a preprogrammed plan for demand
reduction and demand response event specifics. Using ADR, the following systems can
be controlled: lighting, heating, air conditioning, motors, pumps, fans, air compressors,
and process equipment.
Automated demand response is a reliable and cost-effective demand-side manage-
ment mechanism used by network operators in grid situations requiring real-time re-
sponsiveness and no human intervention (e.g. power shortages). It is becoming increas-
ingly preferred to using backup generators, mostly those using natural gas, especially
with the growing numbers of prosumers at the distribution level.
Using smart meters in ADR enables accurate compensations for households, be-
cause it allows more elaborate comparisons between baseline demand use with the
performance of a household during a demand response event. Although ADR may
be implemented for consumers as well as prosumers, engaging in ADR may sometimes
make more sense for prosumers with batteries, as energy may be drawn from prosumers’
batteries during demand response events without inconveniences for prosumers.
The interviews revealed that ADR is provided by some of the companies being in-
terviewed. The offerings provided by Company I, for example, help households achieve
demand flexibility by equipping their households with the “energy internet” (within
the home) where various smart devices and distributed energy resources (smart ther-
mostats, solar PV, batteries, etc.) are interconnected to serve the objectives of house-
holds in participating in demand response events.
This company is providing their solution to the New Hampshire Electricity Coop-
erative – a large member-owned electric distribution company in New England. The
software solution enables the cooperative to implement four automated demand re-
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sponse programs, which help reduce the capacity and transmission charges paid by the
cooperative. In one of the programs, the “Peak Plus”, the software controls internet-
connected space and water heating devices and window air conditioners in households,
so as to lower their energy use during demand response events.
This company is also supporting Oklahoma Gas and Electric in their “Bring Your
Own Thermostat” program. This electric utility had previously offered a program
providing only one thermostat model to their customers, but the program proved to be
unsustainable due to continuous technology improvements. Thus, this new program,
in collaboration with Company I, provides more choice to customers by offering a wide
range of smart thermostats for them to choose from.
Furthermore, the company is enabling Portland General Electric to roll out a pro-
gram, which sends notifications for demand response events to 70,000 customers, fol-
lowed by measurement and verification processes to allocate rewards to participants
accordingly.
Although both programs do not uniquely target prosumers, they reflect a new
trend in managing demand flexibility by actively implementing ADR controls to serve
consumers as well as prosumers. Such programs can be seen as a step towards enabling
demand flexibility amongst residential dwellings via the interconnectivity, controls and
optimizations of the energy internet.
Energy Disaggregation
The process of identifying loads or appliances in operation from aggregated energy
consumption data is referred to as energy disaggregation. Company J provides appli-
ance energy disaggregation software to households; this software can be used by both
prosumers and consumers to gain insight into their appliance-level electricity usage
patterns. In an offering that uniquely serves prosumers, the company provides a soft-
ware platform for disaggregating solar PV power in households. The software identifies
how much solar power is being generated by the arrays, and how much of that power
is being consumed in the household. The company executive elaborates on the solar
disaggregation solution, as follows,
In Australia, almost every retailer is trying to sell solar because it is one
way they can make extra money other than selling electricity. Solar will be
sold anyway so they may as well be a part of that. Our app will work on
top of it. For battery storage and electric vehicles, we are currently working
on integrating them in our software applications (Company J).
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Enabling prosumers to know how much of their solar array is actually being used
to power their households can help them assess the value of their micro-generation,
and make decisions around trading their energy with others or selling it to the grid. In
addition to appliance and solar disaggregation, this company is expanding its offerings
to integrate battery storage and electric vehicles, which may be attributed to the
growing interest in distributed storage.
Dynamic Electricity Pricing
Another stream of offerings that empowers households in general, whether prosumers or
consumers, individuals or collectives, is dynamic electricity pricing. Generally, dynamic
electricity tariffs provide an incentive to residential consumers to change their electricity
demand to cheaper off-peak hours. Prosumers benefit in a similar way to consumers,
but have additional flexibility where they may use their micro-generation or storage
during peak demand hours instead of changing their demand patterns. Companies A
and B provide dynamic tariffs to customers in New Zealand and Australia, respectively,
and more recently, they have both started enabling their prosumers to export their
electricity to the grid.
Online Electricity Trading
Trading electricity is changing from conventional trading between generators or re-
tailers on one side and residential consumers on the other side, to software-enabled
trading amongst a wider range of stakeholders (e.g. between residential prosumers and
consumers). Electricity trading platforms enable prosumers and consumers to sell and
buy electricity using online tools, respectively. Such platforms basically work by match-
ing electricity demand with supply at fixed points in time, e.g. every half an hour. Via
online tools (website, mobile app, etc.), a consumer is shown a list of prosumers within
proximity and given the options to choose and prioritize prosumers and electricity
prices of interest. Prosumers set their selling price and can visualize and control who
buys electricity from them.
Based on location and preferences, online trading platforms (also referred to as
marketplace) matches demand and supply for the trading prosumers and consumers
within a local distribution network, and communicates accordingly with the controls
of prosumers’ distributed energy resources to feed a specific amount of electricity into
the grid. The consumer uses electricity from the grid based on the matched price in
the trading platform until their metered usage reaches the amount purchased.
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Company L in Australia and Company N in New Zealand provide online trading
platforms to prosumers wanting to sell electricity to the grid or directly to consumers.
Company L provides a blockchain-based peer-to-peer online electricity marketplace
in Australia. In an unregulated environment, this marketplace enables prosumers to
directly trade power generated from their micro-generation with consumers, without
needing an energy retailer as an intermediary, and receive real-time payments in return.
In a regulated environment, the company enables retailers to empower their customers
to sell electricity to the grid.
The company has integrated its platform at a local sustainable and affordable hous-
ing project, and is looking to expand its reach to New Zealand, by working on a trial
project comprising 500 sites nationwide (potentially including residential communities
and schools).
5.3.2 Offerings for Prosumer Collectives
Although offerings for individual prosumers are also relevant to collectives, some offer-
ings uniquely target collectives. The interviews show that while many of the offerings
serving individual prosumers have gone beyond the pilot phase, and are being rolled out
to households, offerings targeting prosumer collectives remain largely in the concept
phase or are operating as pilot projects.
Solutions for individual prosumers tend to be based on household-level systems,
such as home battery storage, interconnected home appliances, and micro-generation
controls. Solutions for prosumer collectives, however, are fundamentally set up to
optimize power flows between supply and demand points among households at a more
aggregate level, to deliver maximum benefits, e.g. reach energy self-sufficiency, or sell
electricity at the best price.
Virtual Power Plant
A virtual power plant (VPP) basically aggregates a network of distributed generation
and storage, and flexible loads (i.e. have a potential to be used at different times and
levels of operation). In a VPP, the goal is to allocate power flows between supply and
demand loads so as to alleviate demand peaks in the grid, enable flexibility management
and trade electricity in the market on behalf of prosumers.
Company H provides software that controls and optimizes power flows for prosumer
collectives, and is involved in a pilot project in a prosumer collective in Australia, as
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described below,
We are about to do an embedded network in a grid-connected multi-residential
with solar PV and batteries, and we also have an off-grid micro-grid pi-
lot consisting of 35 houses. We develop solutions to optimize power flows
within a community. One house has PV and another has batteries and
another has particular consumption patterns. We can optimize the flow of
energy between them to deliver maximum benefits, however that is defined
(Company H).
An embedded network, also referred to as a secondary network, is a physical elec-
tricity distribution network that is not owned by a distribution company but rather by
a third-party (i.e. one that manages a residential community, an airport, a commercial
building, etc.). Control points around embedded networks are managed by the network
owner.
Company C is working on a pilot, comprising 34 homes in downtown Sacremento,
California. As described by the executive, prosumer homeowners in the pilot received
solar PV, battery storage systems, smart thermostats and smart plugs as part-paid by
their mortgage. Payback for those installations is in the form of savings on electricity
bills.
This pilot setup enables prosumers to schedule demand to match with supply, and
get value from dynamic prices by using electricity at cheaper periods. The executive be-
lieves that new energy aggregation trends are currently transforming the market, where
energy produced from micro-generation or stored in batteries in prosumer households
can collectively be traded in an organized market, particularly in California.
Aggregating storage capacities is another method of localized optimization. The
executive from Company I mentioned that they are finalizing an agreement around
delivering a storage aggregation platform, which manages clusters of residential battery
storage.
Company B is sourcing batteries within 50-km areas in Australia, to control them
during certain times of the day to reduce network congestion; their executive expects
this arrangement to grow into a peer-to-peer marketplace to facilitate trading between
prosumers and simultaneously reduce network stresses.
Although most prosumer collectives discussed in the interviews were physical com-
munities of households that are geographically co-located, a couple of companies fo-
cused on virtual collectives, i.e. dispersed prosumers collectivized through the com-
pany’s offerings. A virtual collective can be considered a subset of a virtual power
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plant. Company D created a virtual collective consisting of battery storage owners of
its intelligent battery systems, comprising more than 3000 households. As explained
by their executive, there are two main sides to evolving their virtual community:
On one hand, there is everything about electricity, so sharing electricity
and accessing the trading market. On the other hand, we are working on
smart home appliances. This takes a while to develop so for now we have
smart plugs to control certain appliances and connect them to the battery.
Now, those plugs also integrate with smart heaters connected to the battery
to optimize the use of electricity in the household (Company D).
The executive expanded on community members, saying:
You can think of community members as one step closer to having a smart
home than non-members. Everyone can be a producer and a consumer. You
do not sign a direct contract with a specific person; you sign a contract with
us and get electricity from the big pool (Company D).
Members of virtual communities can exist anywhere around the grid, unlike co-
located members of physical communities. A prosumer that is part of the virtual
community and wishes to trade his surplus electricity feeds it into one point of the
grid, where it goes into a “virtual pool” of electricity. A consumer that is part of the
collective buys from the virtual pool by purchasing electricity from that prosumer and
drawing it from the grid. Virtual communities connect individual prosumers around the
grid and use software solutions to automatically handle electricity trading transactions.
Another instance of virtual communities was discussed by the executive of Company
G. His company is developing a virtual community to provide flexibility services for
the grid, where demand response volumes aggregated from community members can
be traded in the market, in return for a flat rate guaranteed for 20 years. Expanding
further, but on geographically co-located communities, the executive said:
The same principle with virtual communities can be applied to more geo-
graphically located or limited communities. There is a concrete project we
are working on with a large real estate development company in Germany.
These guys want to have independent energy resources, with the grid be-
ing the secondary supply, so that production and management can be done
locally. It is an interesting project (Company G).
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Automated Demand Response
As explained in Section 5.3.1, automated demand response helps customers reduce the
efforts required to participate in DR programs and achieve set load reductions, while
still earning rewards in return for DR participation. For network operators, ADR
helps reduce the operating costs of DR programs while maintaining the reliability of
DR resources and guaranteeing real-time responsiveness without human intervention
during periods of peak demand.
Participating in ADR may be easier for collectives of prosumers rather than indi-
vidual ones (who would mainly draw from stored energy), as they can integrate the
preprogrammed demand reduction plan of ADR with a plan to optimize power flows
amongst themselves during DR events to each achieve demand reductions. Such col-
lective action can also open the doors for prosumer collectives to participate in DR
programs requiring bigger demand reductions by aggregating their DR resources and
benefiting from additional rewards.
In Australia, a substation upgrade deferral program is being run by a distribution
company in cooperation with Company F. As described by the company executive,
households get paid for dispatching their assets:
We are paying households up to $10/kWh to dispatch assets, and the main
share of the benefits in this regard is driven by the network benefits which
can be realized (Company F).
In this context, dispatching an asset (i.e. load) means to turn it off or use less
electricity to power it. Dispatch requests are basically sent to large numbers of end-
users by a distribution company or a grid operator in certain times of the day, based
on grid status and needs. Signals from such requests can switch the load off or reduce
its power usage. Network benefits resulting from dispatching assets include flexibly
matching grid supply and demand, avoiding grid frequency disturbances which affect
power quality, and meeting demand in case of generation shortage.
In this project, deferring a substation upgrade is assisted by having dispatchable
loads within that substation, reflecting a collective of end-users, whether prosumers
and/or consumers. However, prosumers, especially those with battery storage or non-
intermittent micro-generation, have the advantage of being able to be more flexible
than consumers in providing dispatchability as requested, because they can flexibly
turn to their local electricity supply, rather than grid supply, to meet their demand.
For prosumer collectives, it even makes more sense to provide load dispatchability, by
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collaborating in turning off or reducing their loads in return for monetary incentives.
In this case, prosumer collectives may experience less inconvenience than consumer
collectives or individual prosumers, as they can better balance their supply and demand
power flows amongst themselves.
The interview discussions about offerings to prosumers, both individuals and col-
lectives, have shown that businesses primarily focusing on developing offerings to in-
dividual prosumers are also interested in prosumer collectives. Such businesses see
collectives as a normal extension to individual pockets of prosumers, and either have
current or prospective plans to expand their offerings to collectives. For example, when
asked about their involvement in prosumer collectives, the executive of Company N,
which offers an online electricity trading platform, said:
We are definitely looking into it. We might put batteries in a street on a
distribution network or in communities with embedded networks. But at
this stage, it is only for individuals (Company N).
Similarly, Company P is eager to expand offerings to serve prosumer collectives via
supporting respective utility programs. At the moment, the system developed by the
company uses solar PV to heat water, and surplus energy generated from the panels can
either be fed into the grid or used in-house. The surplus generated from current array
sizes may not be enough to meet household energy needs other than water heating,
therefore the company aims at upgrading its systems to serve at an aggregate level
such that power flows are optimally managed across prosumers.
Additionally, the executive from Company J talked about his encounter with a
professor from the National University of Singapore in a utility show in Bangkok, and
how this professor's research team is trialling a prosumer community on an island in
Singapore to study its cost effectiveness in powering islands with no electricity access in
Indonesia. Although this company is not currently targeting collectives, its executive
talked about the growing opportunities arising in collective prosumerism, which are
encouraging the company to consider serving communities.
Having outlined various solutions being offered to prosumers, both individuals and
collectives, the next section sheds light on the slow pace of top actors in serving rapidly
emerging prosumers, which has created opportunities for these middle actors to provide
innovative offerings to prosumers.
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Online Electricity Trading
Trading electricity online is also available to prosumer collectives. Company O offers
electric utilities and prosumer collectives an online electricity marketplace which can
enable prosumers and consumers to sell, buy or gift clean electricity within local com-
munities. The company supports prosumer collectives with solar PV, micro-hydro and
micro-wind installations in New Zealand. The company is building relationships with
prosumer collectives interested in using its platform, as described below:
We are in touch with a number of communities who are interested in in-
vesting or have already invested in micro-generation technologies, and are
interested in what the marketplace overlay might be (Company O).
Company L in Australia provides a software application enabling prosumer collec-
tives sharing ownership of distributed generation assets to buy and sell their electricity
to the wholesale electricity market and distribute shared income among prosumers.
5.4 Top Actors Are Slow
As elaborated in Section 3.4.3, top actors of the electricity sector are traditional supply-
side stakeholders who provide offerings to serve electricity end-users (both consumers
and prosumers). Example top actors include grid operators, distribution system op-
erators, electricity retailers, and aggregators. As with the literature (see references
[136, 269–271, 279]), the interviews show that top actors of the electricity sector com-
monly lag in terms of enabling prosumers with innovative offerings to meet their energy
demand management needs.
This difference in the pace of change between top actors and prosumers has ger-
minated new companies, collaborations, and solutions to cater for the growing needs
of prosumers, as presented in previous sections. The results of the interviews suggest
that four main reasons are behind the slowness of top actors to respond to changing
needs and opportunities.
5.4.1 Lack of Knowledge
Some top actors lack knowledge of their prosumers and do not fully understand their
needs. For example, while the founders of Company C were working with a distribution
company and a utility switchgear company to make and install a quick vent for the
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distribution grid, they noticed that both companies lacked knowledge about electricity
end-users of the power grid. As the company executive said:
The company founders saw an emerging problem on the grid, specifically
in California and other states along the West Coast. As the number of
solar customers increased, especially residential customers, the volume of
electricity moving back to the grid was increasing. They saw that this would
put more stress on utility distribution equipment, and utilities would need to
spend more money on operating costs to maintain and replace distribution-
level equipment. At the same time, they also recognized that utilities really
did not have any way to see or understand or evaluate what was happening
at the customer-side of the meter (Company C).
When top actors lack knowledge and data about how their customers are changing,
this leaves a gap of potentially unfulfilled needs and creates opportunities for new actors
to meet those needs.
5.4.2 Lack of Appropriate Pricing Mechanisms
Another reason behind the tardiness of top actors is the lack of appropriate pricing
mechanisms. The executive from Company H believes that networks and retailers
are unprepared to provide appropriate electricity pricing schemes that enable scalable
prosumerism. As quoted from that executive:
We have sites running for households, but we are a little bit ahead of the
curve than networks and retailers; I do not think they are ready to provide
pricing mechanisms that make this scalable (Company H).
The need for new robust pricing structures is further highlighted by the executive
from Company B, who thinks that the rapid changes in regulations and the high uptake
of distributed generation need new pricing mechanisms:
The core of the pricing structure needs to be resilient in a world that has
high amounts of distributed energy and changing regulations. That is why we
were funded by three big entities and a Chinese bank, to operate in the space
of developing a business model around distributed generation (Company B).
While an Australian dynamic pricing retailer like Company B is being funded to
work towards a new business model around distributed generation, Company A (a New
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Zealand retailer that also offers dynamic tariffs) thinks that prosumerism is interesting
but presents a tiny market in New Zealand because the majority of the market is still
only buying electricity. Interestingly, a few months after the interview, this retailer
started offering a service enabling prosumers to sell their excess electricity to the grid.
Slow Markets and Processes
Another reason behind the weak engagement of top actors with prosumers is the tar-
diness (and sometimes resistance) of certain electricity markets to adopt new technolo-
gies, and accommodate process changes and new market actors. As the executive from
Company G expressed, his company initially started operating in France. However,
the slowness of that market and its processes pushed the company to create a service
company in Germany, where the market is more developed, with three other parties to
leverage faster market processes and promote its value proposition.
The executive further compared between utilities and a large real estate developer
his company is working with, to highlight the lag of top actors in this rapidly changing
space:
Those guys of the real estate developer are turning faster than the utilities
into the new energy technologies world and they want to expand the service
and control the cost of operation and ownership. So, they are really get-
ting towards PV production and battery storage, making it as autonomous
as possible. And the surplus can be stored, managed, or traded elsewhere
(Company G).
The executive from Company K thinks that intermediaries are needed to handhold
local prosumer projects and lobby for them at the government because it is difficult
for those projects to be doing all what they need to do in addition to lobbying:
We now have local authorities that are finally stepping in, and they are
also in a great position to be lobbying for and hand holding those little local
projects. It is impossible for those projects to do lobbying as well as the
other stuff they are meant to be doing. An intermediary step is needed; they
need intermediaries or local authorities to be doing that for them (Company
K).
The executive from Company Q, which is an electricity distribution company, be-
lieves that prosumerism will evolve regardless of whether they want it to happen or
not, and thinks that distribution companies need to adapt:
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It is going to happen, regardless if we wanted it to happen or not. We cannot
tell customers what to do; even though solar power is more expensive than
grid power at the moment. Regardless of what we do, customers will end
up supplying their energy through alternative means. We have to adapt
(Company Q).
This quote from an executive working in a distribution company reflects a relatively
passive role, where such companies see themselves as adapting to customers’ choices
to supply their energy through alternative resources (e.g. solar PV).
Careful with Revenue Streams
In addition to the aforementioned reasons, top actors are slow because they tend to be
cautious in the approaches they take to generate revenue, as further expressed by the
same executive:
Utilities are a bit slow; dinosaurs. They know there is a need to do some-
thing because they know that only moving electrons will not make money for
them anymore and that revenue shares will drop. But they are extremely
cautious in whatever they do (Company G).
Interviewees generally thought that electricity market incumbents lack the means to
fully understand and support prosumers in order to provide them with viable solutions
that meet their needs. However, it is important to mention that not all top actors are
slow in responding to the needs of prosumers (as described in Section 3.4.3).
The next section focuses on the rise of middle actors and the innovative models and
solutions they are bringing to fulfill the needs of prosumers, while safeguarding grid
stability and reliability.
5.5 Middle Actors are Emerging
As the upsurge of prosumerism in residential areas is changing the demand-side of
the grid, new businesses are providing new offerings and services where top actors fail
to provide adequate solutions and support. The following sections present the gaps
middle actors are filling, and the new business models and principles they are bringing
to the power grid.
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5.5.1 Filling the Gap
Middle actors are either supporting prosumers directly, or assisting top actors to sup-
port prosumers, in order to achieve various goals. Such goals give value to different
stakeholders, e.g. maximize self-consumption for prosumers, and maintain grid stabil-
ity and reliability for grid operators and network companies. This section presents the
main issues middle actors are resolving to fill the gaps left by top electricity market
actors.
Maximize Self-Consumption
An essential reason behind installing micro-generation and using distributed storage
(e.g. home batteries, EVs) in residential dwellings is satisfying a desire for energy self-
consumption, and ideally maximizing it. As the executive of Company D explained,
prosumers ideally want to meet their demand using their local micro-generation to
avoid dealing with big energy providers which continuously increase tariffs and often
deliver poor services to their customers.
Maximizing prosumers’ self-consumption (or energy autarky, as the company ex-
ecutive prefers to call it) is one of the primary issues middle actors are addressing.
Company D, since its launch in 2010, has had the aim of maximizing prosumers’ en-
ergy autarky.
To achieve 100% autarky for prosumers, the company progressed through two
stages. Initially, the company sold battery systems to environmentally-conscious house-
holds with micro-generation. After a few years, even though the prices of distributed
resources started falling and the company sales doubled every year, the original ob-
jective to achieve 100% autarky for customers remained unsatisfied. The cause of this
and the way in which it was dealt with are elaborated as follows:
We have realized that the battery alone does not help the household be com-
pletely self-sufficient. At some point, any battery and PV system owner
will have some residual energy demand that he has to get from the grid.
This left the company vision unsatisfied. The autarky was not technically
100% achievable in that sense, so the idea was to find a way to get the
last couple of percent out of the hands of the conventional energy providers
to have 100% autarky for prosumers. That is when the virtual community
came into play, where the residual energy demand is now provided by other
prosumers (PV, wind, biogas, etc.) from the community (Company D).
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Because 100% autarky was not always attainable for prosumers with micro-generation
and distributed storage, the company leveraged a virtual community of prosumers to
maximize their self-consumption:
The idea is to exchange energy among community members, to achieve
energy autarky together. We provide a platform for prosumers to share
excess energy and get energy from the community in situations where they
are not able to provide it for themselves because of the fluctuating supply
and demand. Let us say that a prosumer’s annual energy demand is 5000
kWh. His degree of autarky is 80%, meaning that he is able to produce and
consume only 4000 kWh by himself, so he gets the remaining 1000 kWh
from the community instead of the grid (Company D).
Initially, this company set out to increase prosumers’ autarky via providing them
with battery systems to store surplus power; but since this offering failed to achieve
100% autarky for prosumers, a virtual community of prosumers was created. This
virtual community enables its members to exchange energy among themselves, and thus
maximize their energy autarky together and not be dependent on electricity providers.
In addition, Company G is working with a large real estate development company
in Germany which aims at having independent energy resources for their customers and
only using the power grid as a secondary source of supply. This real estate developer
is working with Company G, rather than a utility, to expand their services by getting
into PV production and battery storage, trading surplus energy and making that whole
system as autonomous as possible. Also, the executive from Company P sees the
company helping people become more energy self-sufficient and be in control of their
energy, by enabling them to heat water using solar PV instead of solar thermal which
can be inefficient if poorly insulated especially if there is a lack of skilled trades people.
Maintain Grid Stability and Reliability
As the numbers of prosumers connected to distribution networks grow, maintaining
grid stability and reliability becomes a concern to grid operators and distribution sys-
tem operators. The variability of intermittent energy resources can cause serious grid
stability and power quality issues due to frequency and voltage variations, e.g. damage
of grid equipment, thus requiring ongoing management to maintain stable and reliable
grid operations.
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During a joint project between the founders of Company C and network companies,
concerns arose over grid risks (e.g. frequency and voltage fluctuations causing equip-
ment damage [86, 87]) resulting from the growing numbers of prosumers on distribution
networks. The lack of utilities’ knowledge about prosumers’ demand and distributed
energy resources triggered the founders of company C to bring new battery storage
technology to market to bridge the gap between utilities and prosumers, as explained
below:
So they saw a way to bring to market a technology that would enable utilities
and prosumers to become aligned in how they were supplying and consum-
ing electricity. Where prosumers are putting electricity back onto the grid,
instead of damaging equipment, utilities are actually able to make use of
it in a productive way or rely on it somehow, whether to improve power
quality or relieve congestion in certain areas (Company C).
By storing and coordinating power flows from intermittent resources, the battery
storage technology developed by Company C can help prevent distribution network
stresses and distortions in power quality in distribution networks with large numbers
of prosumers.
Create Value from Smart Meter Data
Despite the abundance of money put into rolling out smart meters in many residential
areas, and the data produced from those meters, such data has been rarely analyzed
and utilized fully to create value and improve associated services. To boost research
and development around smart meter data analytics, the US Department of Energy
launched a grant project under the Arpa-E program. The founders of Company I
spotted this opportunity and got together to submit an entry to the project whose
objective is described by the company executive as follows:
The objective of the project was to extract more value from smart meters,
and more specifically to deliver a continuously updated forecast of a million
endpoints in less than 10 minutes (Company I).
The project was set to deliver continuous updates about the forecast loads and
power flows across local grids. As explained by the company executive, aside from
optimized billing there was hardly any value created from smart meter data, which
prompted this project. The founders customized the software they had previously
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developed to optimize the flow of electrons in an electronic chip in order to serve power
flow optimization in power grids. They saw an analogy in the flow of electrons in
electronic chips with that in power grids, and leveraged this analogy to start developing
offerings to smart homes with complex power flows.
Company J also set out to change the traditional, complicated and expensive ways
utilities use to monitor and analyze the electricity use of household appliances. The
company founders use high-speed high-precision data from smart meters to disaggre-
gate appliance power usage by type, time and quantity:
You can take this single stream of readings from the smart meter and run
some mathematical techniques through it to figure out what appliances were
being run and when, and how much each of those appliances was consuming
on a daily and monthly basis. Traditionally, if you wanted to do that, you
had to wire up your home with energy monitors in each of the plug points
and that became really tricky when looking at things like air conditioning
because they are typically not plugged into the wall but hardwired into the
distribution panel. So trying to monitor energy consumption in people’s
homes was very costly and very few people did it. Maybe a few techy people
who enjoy the challenge would give it a go, but to roll that out to customers
en masse would be very expensive and very complicated for utilities to do
(Company J).
By analyzing household smart meter data, the following can be identified: the
appliances being used, their power demand, and when they are being used. Such a
convenient and inexpensive approach to disaggregate household appliances proves to
be useful in the case of hardwired systems, such as air conditioners or heat pumps,
which consume large amounts of electricity and cannot be easily connected to energy
monitors or smart plugs (i.e. plugs that monitor electricity use of plugged appliances).
Leveraging advanced data analytics to create more value from smart meter data is
an essential step in developing customer-oriented solutions which benefit various smart
grid stakeholders (e.g. prosumers and network operators). Using smart meters with
distributed energy resources enables prosumers to get maximum benefits by making
informed decisions on how much power to buy or sell and when; additionally, it gives
more insight to network operators into prosumers’ load and supply patterns which can
drive optimal grid operations.
Furthermore, analyzing smart meter data by a middle actor can help create im-
provements or new business opportunities for another middle actor (e.g. a company
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providing data analytics can support a company providing communications or hard-
ware infrastructure to improve its offerings).
Enable Flexibility Management
Micro-generation from solar PV and wind power is intermittent and prosumers using
such intermittent supply can use flexibility management to optimize power flows with
batteries and household loads. Managing flexibility for prosumers is complicated, espe-
cially in light of varying technologies and household needs. Middle actors are developing
advanced solutions to address the mounting need for flexibility management.
Flexibility management was the main idea behind launching Company G. Before the
company was formed, part of its team was working on developing scenarios about smart
grid developments and how energy resources will evolve, while the other part of the
team was focusing on technologies for device connectivity and internet of things. Their
skills and experiences complemented each other and so they launched the company
to integrate technology from one side with business acumen from another side, as
described in the following quote:
This strategy person ran a couple of scenarios on how smart grids can
be built and how the energy would evolve. The finding was that all this
can be successful if we can get new real flexibility out of decentralized en-
ergy resources. So making consumers become prosumers, who are more
involved, and acting with a revised value proposition. In the meantime, my
colleagues and I were running a company which was doing IoT network
management. We connected multiple devices and participated in a couple
of research projects on smart homes and everything that was in the hype
in 2009. I was actively looking through my network and I connected with
this person and some others I knew. We had the technology but no business
acumen on what we can do, and they had good business value proposition
but no technology. That is how the two teams got together and started the
company (Company G).
The aforementioned examples illustrate ways in which middle actors fill the gaps
left by traditional electricity top players in accommodating prosumers. Generally,
middle actors develop new technologies, products, and services and facilitate enhanced
market conditions to better host emerging prosumers. The innovative business model
and cutting-edge technologies leveraged by middle actors, and their relatively smaller
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teams largely support their fast and energetic pace to keep up to date with the latest
industry and business trends, compared to slow top players.
5.5.2 Business Models
As presented in Chapter 3, Section 3.4.3, the traditional business model of top actors
is a corporate utility one relying on increasing units sold to customers – which does
not capture the emergence of prosumerism. As presented in the same section, liter-
ature on innovating business models in the electricity sector has focused on how to
market advanced smart grid and distributed energy technologies rather than how such
technologies impact electricity market actors and grid operations.
Middle actors use innovative business models to introduce advanced products and
services to the demand-side of the power grid. This section presents how the interviewed
companies are changing the way business is conducted in the presence of prosumerism.
The majority of the interviewed companies are new companies following a business-
to-business (B2B) model where they provide solutions directly to top actor businesses
(e.g. electric utilities, and energy service companies). In turn, those top actors then
present such solutions to prosumers. In this model, middle actors support top actors in
their efforts to provide advanced solutions to prosumers. The following are interview
excerpts illustrating how middle actors directly help top actors achieve their goals:
We provide the software backend to utilities, retailers, aggregators, and en-
ergy service companies, so that they can go ahead and achieve their objec-
tives (Company I)
Most of our engagements so far have been with utilities, energy retailers
and network providers. We have not gotten down to the prosumer market
at this point. We are a B2B company, so we sell solutions to businesses
(Company J).
We run demand response programs for utilities to help with thermal ca-
pacity problems for large aggregation programs. We help retailers curtail
load during demand response events, and we monetize the backup systems
of retailers or networks whenever there is value (Company F).
On the other hand, some companies follow a business-to-customer model, where
they present their offerings directly to prosumers. Those companies mainly provide
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their customers with products and services for storing energy, trading it within pro-
sumer collectives or selling it to the grid or on the electricity market. Examples include
Companies A, B, L, N and O.
5.5.3 Company Principles
As part of the discussion about company emergence, each executive was asked about the
main company principles that reflect its mission and values. Numerous principles were
mentioned, including reliability, transparency and sustainability. For one company, the
top priority is to meet reliability and safety standards, as quoted below:
The founders of the company were very connected to the utility industry so
their priority was and remains building a system that meets utility require-
ments from a safety and reliability perspective. That has been the leading
priority the entire time, and other things like intelligence and automation
come after that (Company C).
Transparency is another leading principle that is being practised by middle actors.
As mentioned in the following quotes, Companies A and B believe transparency is
a vital principle to be disseminated, not just with their customers, but within their
business and industry:
It is hard to do what we do because it is new to customers and it is quite
disruptive to the industry and we are playing against the big guys, so we
need to be brave. We believe in transparency. It is not just the product we
deliver to our customers. Across our business and within the industry, we
are trying to be transparent in what we think is the best (Company A).
Transparency has a lot to do with the pricing structure as well. It is a
transparent structure. The usage and supply charge transfer to the cus-
tomer. Again, separating the retailer cost into subscription fees is quite
transparent (Company B).
Sustainability is another important principle adopted by most companies. As pre-
sented in the following quote, although Company E takes a commercial focus to be
profitable, it takes a green focus as well to replace fossil-fuel based power plants with
the demand loads it is helping reduce:
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We have a commercial focus. We have to cover our costs and try to make
it as profitable as we can. But, we take a green focus because we firmly
believe if we take a load off, it replaces fossil fuels burnt in power stations
(Company E).
Companies D and L also value green clean energy; the executive from Company D
wants “clean energy for all”. Company I sees that having a clear environmental impact
is the result of providing flexibility features (e.g. enabling and managing elastic energy
demand) which helps bring more renewable resources into the power mix.
Company G, on the other hand, first had a strong green outlook to the world then
its perspective slightly changed, as elaborated below:
What we learned is that we started with a heavy greenish perspective to what
we want to do – better for the world and everybody! Then, we turned to do
the bottom line, which is how we can make money while still doing good to
customers. The investment of anyone whose objective is to be green has a
limit which depends on how rich you are. So we wanted to build software
elements that can be turned into a service value proposition that would be
more attractive and community oriented. We want to do things better to
reduce large investments on the centralized polluting power plants. Some-
how we will be good to the world and better at managing what is available
(Company G).
The company saw a limit to the amount of investment spent on being green, and
thus started focusing on a value proposition that is more attractive and community
oriented. This point takes us to the next principle that some middle actors are adopting,
which is being community-centric.
A good example of a company that is largely community-centric is Company O,
which is trying to move away from individual-based prosumerism towards building
prosumer communities. The following quote elaborates on this point:
Our key value is community. One of the problems we see at the moment in
solar PV is that you have got individuals. So far relatively wealthy people
are installing solar PV and seeing cost advantages to it, but that is really
individualized. So what is happening is that there is a disaggregation and
individualization of distributed energy and what we want to do is to use that
technology to build communities around it (Company O).
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Companies G and H also regard being community-centric as a key principle for
their companies, where they aim to address their needs of communities rather than the
wants.
Another key principle valued by Companies A, D, F and Q is innovation, especially
in providing out-of-the-box solutions to prosumers to help them overcome barriers to
their growth, and to make the electricity industry interesting in general.
Providing self-sufficiency in energy is another principle that was brought up by the
executives of Companies D and P, which they perceive as key to fulfilling the objective
of prosumers in relying less on electricity coming from the grid. Profitability is another
principle that was valued by Companies C, E, and I.
5.6 Innovative Solutions and Value Creation
A range of smart grid offerings is developed by middle actors to serve the needs of
prosumers and prosumer collectives, and add value to households and communities
as well as power grids. Based on interview findings, this section presents the trends
characterizing offerings and associated value creation for prosumers and collectives,
with a focus on enabling solutions for prosumer collectives.
5.6.1 Software versus Hardware
Amid transitioning to a smart grid, the focus in power grid infrastructure has been
moving from centralized mechanically-controlled systems towards more automated
software-controlled distributed infrastructure. Following the same trend, solutions tar-
geting the demand side are becoming largely software-based. Hardware-based systems
serving prosumers (e.g. PV panels and wind turbines) have largely matured during the
past decade, reaching high degrees of efficiency and system performance. Core innova-
tion in prosumer products currently lies in building flexible customer-centric software
systems that create value and make a difference in prosumers’ lives.
Most of the interviewed companies only develop software solutions, a few special-
ize in developing hardware products, while a few others develop integrated solutions
comprising hardware and software components. The move towards software solutions
stems from their flexibility, scalability and ease of deployment. Three executives used
the term hardware agnostic to describe their company solutions. As an executive of
one of the software providers puts it:
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We thought there was a great opportunity to build software for third parties
as opposed to following an integrated model, so we decided to go software
first and software only! And to be absolutely hardware agnostic, by support-
ing open protocols as well as doing our own integration for those pieces of
hardware that did not support open protocols (Company I).
Branching from the software solutions track, several companies tend to see them-
selves more as software providers providing cloud-based software-as-a-service, rather
than energy service providers. When asked to specify the specialization of his company,
one executive said:
We will not fit neatly into a single keyword. In this industry, the walls are
crumbling. It’s more and more about trying to sell software solutions to
other businesses (Company I).
The discussion then veered towards company competitors especially those big com-
panies providing aggregation services, where the executive discussed their struggle:
Some aggregators are struggling because the value they are offering is not
enough to justify their cost base. They need to maintain a high touch rela-
tionship with the utilities, then also good relationships with their customers,
plus they have their own hardware and software. That is a lot of weight to
carry and maintain, especially that their technologies are proprietary not
open source. Any guy who is going around offering energy services and
audits can use our software to do the exact same thing, and do whatever
else they are doing in terms of energy efficiency and embedded generation,
whatever. That is why this company is pushing on the software front these
days (Company I).
5.6.2 Enabling Solutions
Based on the interviews, middle actors provide products and services to prosumer
collectives principally in four areas, as presented below. Most companies specialize in




Products and services being developed for managing virtual power plants are rapidly
emerging globally and being supported by evolving middle actors. The majority of
interviewed companies (e.g. Companies C, D, F, G, H, I, L, M) are currently providing,
or developing, solutions for virtual power plants, whether as companies’ core products
and services or basic secondary offerings.
The following are quotes from company executives describing their virtual power
plant offerings:
We are a VPP company and we link prosumers and consumers all over
Europe. Our customers are small and medium scale, and our energy re-
sources are solar power, wind, biogas, and energy generators. We link and
aggregate electricity, and provide control for this energy (Company M).
We monitor and control electrical assets – we are really good in switching
stuff on and off! We have got a portfolio of VPP which allows electric util-
ities to roll our technology across their customers, where they bundle those
customers as part of network support or asset management tools (Company
F).
We are a software provider offering customized VPP cloud-based solutions
(Company I).
While those executives explicitly used the term VPP to describe their offerings,
other executives focused on the terms connectivity, control and optimization to label
their solutions which are essential functionalities of virtual power plants. The following
quotes illustrate those descriptions:
Our company develops software that can optimize energy usage of diverse
devices based on flexibility plans for energy usage patterns at households.
We are taking heat pumps, solar panels, battery storage, washing machines,
smart meters basically everything that can be communicating we want to
connect with. We are looking at two aspects: the external conditions like
weather, temperature, radiation, and so on, and the market aspect around
new energy trading trends over the next 24-36 hours. We put all that to-
gether and we shake it very strongly to give us a schedule that we can revise
and send to the devices which will act accordingly. That schedule is revised
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every 5-10 minutes, depending on customer choice, and we can extract flex-
ibility volumes that can be sold to the trading exchange (Company G).
We are basically a software company, but we have an embedded control unit
and a standard compliant physical interface to the network which enable
our software to connect various devices into one platform to get consistent
data. We can connect to solar inverters, battery management systems,
power meters, and load controllers. We connect directly to devices and can
remotely configure them, so we get much richer data than we would by just
using current transformers. We get a lot of access data, statuses and alerts,
temperatures, cell-level measurement from batteries, etc. (Company H).
This executive starts by describing how their software connects to physical devices
and what type of data is collected from those devices. Then, he elaborates on their
cloud-based software and the values it provides.
This all connects to a cloud platform, which is a decentralized computing
platform providing real-time data. We also provide a portal to end-users for
real-time analytics and control for individual units but also across groups
of units. This solution can be used by solar integrators to provide consis-
tent engagement with customers and by electricity retailers and commercial
facility manages to get reliable data and effective controls regardless of the
system they have (Company H).
Another solution enabling virtual power plants is that of Company D, which de-
scribes batteries as the control center of household energy. This company sells smart
plugs together with their batteries, and enables household energy activities based on
three priorities as described below:
The battery tells the smart plugs to activate in situations where there is
excess energy in the household. The top priority in a household is to sup-
ply household requirements, so appliances, plugs, etc. The next priority is
charging the battery, so it is full when the sun sets. The third priority is
supplying devices connected to smart plugs and those used for space and
water heating (e.g. heat pumps and heating rods) (Company D).
In addition to using excess energy to produce electricity, this company is inves-
tigating the revival of an existing technology, such as heating rods, where surplus
micro-generation can be used to smartly heat water as detailed below:
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We are looking into using excess energy for heating purposes in households.
You can put the heating rod in a water tank, and whenever there is excess
energy produced the rod will heat up your 300-litre water tank. This is not
a new idea heating rods have been used for ages. Now, we implement the
heating rod in the priority cascade, where the battery decides when to send
energy to the heating rod to heat water for the radiator, or for showers and
kitchens (Company D).
Company C provides an integrated hardware and software system that controls
virtual power plants for individual or collective prosumers, as described in the following
quote:
Our hardware system includes lithium ion batteries and electronic compo-
nents. This system integrates with rooftop solar PV, and connects to the
home and to the grid. The integrated system manages in real-time all those
power flows and reports real-time metrics about those flows. Our software
allows utilities to aggregate and control these individual battery systems and
get real-time information and visibility into the power flows in and out of
each battery and view aggregate metrics about the fleet of batteries (Com-
pany C).
Automated Demand Response
A number of the interviewed companies provide solutions that enable automated de-
mand response, including Companies D, E, F, I, J, M, N, P, and Q. For example,
Company J provides a set of tools to network companies to enable them to shave
demand in constrained areas by engaging residential customers in demand response
programs. More details on those tools are presented below:
We provide mobile apps to customers to monitor their home energy con-
sumption by appliance. We also give them a bullseye projection so they
know during the month if their bill is likely to be much higher than normal
so they can make some energy changes to bring it back in line (Company
J).
Providing customers with appliance-level energy usage can help them make more
informed decisions about lowering their home energy bill, and taking part in demand
response events rolled out by network companies. Additionally, Company J helps its
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customers compare their usage against similar households, and not only engages with
them through mobile apps but through emails, SMS and letters as well, as described
in the following quote:
Moreover, we give them neighbourhood comparisons, not only for their total
energy usage but also for appliance-level usage. For example, we would let
them know if they are using 50% more air conditioning compared to a group
of people living in similar sized homes with a similar number of occupants,
and in a similar climatic area. We also engage with customers through
emails, SMS and letters (Company J).
As described in an earlier section, Company J also helps its prosumers disaggregate
the amount of energy their households use from solar panels versus mains power.
While the solutions of Company J focus on household energy monitoring and cus-
tomer engagement to enable demand response, most solutions are motivated by au-
tomated controls in households. An example is Company I, which interconnects and
controls home energy devices (e.g. smart thermostats, smart water heaters, and bat-
teries) to help users change their energy usage during demand response events. Such
solutions enable demand flexibility for both prosumers and consumers by leveraging
connectivity, controls and communication technologies.
Company P provides a different type of automated control, by prioritizing water
heating using solar PV, then directing surplus solar power to be used in households or
fed into the grid based on prosumers’ choice.
As for Company F, it helps electric utilities and retailers run their demand response
programs by providing them with cloud-based automation platforms and customer-
specific applications on top of that to help manage their peak loads. Similarly, Com-
pany C provides electric utilities with an integrated software and hardware platform
to run their demand response programs. Rather than enabling behavioural demand
response by sending customers notifications to change their demand, Company C of-
fers a solution where customer loads are automatically fed with stored energy from
batteries during a demand response event. This takes place behind the scenes without
customers’ inputs; customers’ electricity needs are still being met, but from batteries
rather than the grid.
Company M, which mainly serves VPP, enables demand flexibility via sending its
customers a schedule with recommended time slots to use energy based on their his-
torical usage, their micro-generation source, and spot market electricity prices.
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Online Electricity Trading
Companies providing trading services to prosumers mainly conduct trades via online
peer-to-peer marketplaces or electricity market trades. Trading electricity through
online platforms (e.g. Companies L, N, and O) mainly adopts peer-to-peer trading
between prosumers and consumers sharing the same distribution network. The concept
of peer-to-peer trading has been gaining a lot of interest in the past few years, and
several companies are using it to enable prosumers to sell their electricity directly to
local consumers without needing third-party intermediaries. As the executives from
Companies L and O put it:
Our trading platform is increasing the likelihood of people’s benefits from
their rooftop PV installations. Our residential prosumers improve the eco-
nomic return of their investment in micro-generation by selling energy to
their neighbours of the distribution network at rates typically higher than
regulated pay-back rates you get from the retailer. There are also consumers
buying that excess at a rate less than the regulated residential energy tariffs.
One of our drivers is to help prosumers that can afford PV and storage but
are unfairly impacted by the dynamics of the network prices (Company L).
At the moment, if you have excess energy generated from PV, that energy
goes back to your energy retailer, and you have no choice or control over
when and or how that is distributed or who gets the benefit of that excess
energy. With our platform, you will be connected to a local consumer within
your neighbourhood or town, so it gives you more choice and flexibility over
what and when that energy goes to this consumer. This is a virtual connec-
tion. You cannot guarantee that a kilowatt generated goes to a specific per-
son; it is not a DHL package. Essentially, it is capacity produced matched
with capacity consumed (Company O).
By not having to sell electricity back to the grid (i.e. retailer), prosumers are not
governed by network tariffs and can choose which consumers to sell their electricity
to and at what prices. Such trading platforms enable flexible trading transactions
between local prosumers and consumers.
Although the term peer-to-peer is used by Companies L and N to describe the
essence of their trading platforms, the executive from Company O is against using this
term, describing it as a fashionable buzzword that is inaccurate as follows:
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Actually, we have banned the use of “peer-to-peer” within our company
because you cannot actually trade peer-to-peer kilowatts in a physical sense,
so we tend to think of it as a decentralized marketplace. Peer-to-peer has
become a fashionable buzzword for things and does not accurately describe
what we do. Some of the other players in this space around the world say
that they are the Airbnb or the Uber of Energy but that is not a true
description of the actual business model. We can think of this model as
providing a new tariff for trading electricity, and we put the user experience
as the over layer that allows the prosumer and consumer to locally connect
and have the experience that they are in the same community (Company
O).
Online electricity marketplaces largely leverage the peer-to-peer concept in trading,
but use different models and technologies to implement their platforms. For example,
Company D offers a virtual community where prosumers and consumers can exchange
electricity and collectively achieve energy autarky. The executive of Company D de-
scribes community benefits as follows:
You become a member of the community by paying a monthly fee of 19.99
Euros. As a community member, you get access to various offerings. One
of them is access to favourable electricity prices, and this is where the com-
munity energy exchange starts. You can buy a kWh for 23 cents, which
is 6 cents under the current market price of energy in Germany. Another
offering is a voucher code which allows you to get a discount of 1875 Euros
on your first battery, starting with the smallest unit of 2 kWh, and covering
all sizes (Company D).
Another example is Company L which uses block-chain technology to guarantee
safe and secure trading by coupling energy transactions, which track electricity from
production to consumption points, with financial transactions, where payments are
made from buyers (i.e. consumers) to sellers (i.e. prosumers).
On the other hand, the executive from Company I thinks that Company L is over-
investing in using block-chain technology in online electricity trading within a distri-
bution network:
You do not really need block-chain technology to trade electricity, because
you already have a meter there. Those people are definitely over-investing
and trying to short-circuit distribution companies (Company I).
107
As for trading electricity at the market-level, Company M delivers trading services
to prosumers, by aggregating their energy resources (e.g. solar PV, micro-wind and
biogas) and administering their spot market trades.
We also trade the energy under the spot market. We bundle and aggregate
energy, and also provide administration services to our clients. It is like
group management (Company M).
Company K, on the other hand, facilitates electricity export projects for prosumer
collectives by providing them with business planning and project management to help
them take their energy to the market.
Dynamic Electricity Pricing
As for electricity retailers providing dynamic tariffs, the two companies that have been
interviewed largely focus on enhancing customer energy experience and follow the same
business model where their retailer fees are fixed irrespective of customers’ energy use.
Unlike traditional retailers, they do not benefit as customers’ energy demand increases.
Yet, the two companies offer different tariff mechanisms. Company A, based in
New Zealand, passes wholesale market prices to customers in addition to transmission,
distribution, metering and tax charges. On the other hand, Company B, based in
Australia, passes to customers its expected cost-to-serve (i.e. cost covering business
activities and overhead for a customer account), which is a hedged cost that might
fluctuate during the day, so it is quite similar to a time-of-use tariff. In addition, Com-
pany B is more involved than Company A in trials looking into using new distributed
technologies in distribution networks. Company A is involved in a trial to install bat-
tery storage in households, and another one looking at reducing electricity network
constraints in particular sections of the grid by controlling batteries via a peer-to-peer
trading platform between prosumers and consumers.
Company A mainly sees itself as a platform and product company, but a retailer
at the same time. The company wanted to use digital technology to change energy
experience for customers, as described in the following quote:
When we started the company, we wanted to transform energy experience for
customers and we wanted to use technology to do that with digital business.
But we needed to sell it to someone, so we decided to sell it to ourselves. We
did not think that the big guys will buy our solution because it is disruptive
to them. We decided if we want to prove a value for the platform or products
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that we want to deliver, we need a retail business to do that. We got a retail
arm which is a traditional electricity retailer and everything that comes with
it (Company A).
As the company wanted to change customers’ energy experience and thought that
top electricity market players would not be interested in a disruptive business model
that uses digital technology, the company decided to start as a retail business to deliver
new experiences and products to customers.
Company A basically provides its customers with transparent prices reflecting
wholesale electricity market prices, and additional features to help them make informed
decisions around their household electricity demand. More on the digital platform dis-
playing dynamic prices is quoted below:
Through transparent electricity prices, customers get a sense of the price
signals and different prices at different times of the day. We provide our
customers with smart digital tools that allow them to have a choice. You
may choose to use the heater to heat your home no matter what the price
is, but you might choose a different price for using your dishwasher and
your washing machine. That smart digital platform is delivered on a web
app and a mobile app. They have information tools they can go to if they
want to use them (Company A).
While dynamic prices can be accessed at customers’ convenience when needed, via
a web or mobile app, Company A proactively delivers information to its customers
to keep them informed with more control over their demand for energy, as described
below:
We provide customers with proactive tools which tells them when certain
things happen, e.g. alerts for high prices. And rather than telling the cus-
tomer once a month what their bill is and often the customer is in shock,
we tell them every single day what their bill already is. This is our approach
to serve our customers and keep them informed (Company A).
On the other hand, Company B sees itself as a service provider with pricing struc-
tures that are resilient to a future full of distributed energy technologies; it does not
consider itself a commodity provider like traditional retailing businesses. This is further
elaborated as follows:
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In a future with lots of distributed energy resources, the retailer who makes
the money from a lot of consumption is not resilient to that sort of future.
Our pricing structure is different; it separates out the retailing cost into a
fixed fee. Regardless of how much the customer uses, we see the same profit
from the customer – we are no longer incentivized to make the customer
use as much energy as possible. Our incentive is much more aligned with
being a service company and doing what the customer wants. If that is to
help them reduce their energy use, then we will do that (Company B).
In addition to providing a dynamic pricing mechanisms, Company B develops a
portal where customers can login to see their energy usage data, to know what energy
they are using and the cost implication of their usage. They also offer more added value
to their customers like forecasting their usage patterns, working out their optimal solar
solution, and providing them with power saving tips.
Company B is also developing its portfolio of solar and battery products, as it sees
growth in this area, as quoted below:
We think that any business that needs to be a major player in distributed
energy needs to have a retail arm because it needs a retail relationship with
customers. You can effectively manage the whole customer energy experi-
ence, including solar, batteries, whatever. We want to be involved in the
whole relationship. In the background, we are working on solar and storage
products. We just had our first set of solar sales come through, which is
based on the analysis we got based on customer data and optimizing a so-
lution for them and going out and having a retailer solution, too. We are
looking to try to open up these value streams to customers and be one of
the first businesses engaging in fleet management for distributed generation
and storage (Company B).
5.6.3 Benefits to Prosumers and Collectives
When asked about the incentives their solutions provide to prosumers, company execu-
tives mentioned various incentives including being green and independent of big energy
retailers, earning and saving money, and accessing markets and electricity usage met-
rics. This section elaborates on prosumers’ incentives to use new emerging products to
meet their energy needs in households and communities.
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Be Green
Based on the interviews, early adopters of prosumerism have been largely motivated
by environmental concerns and being “green” through using local renewable micro-
generation to meet their demand for energy. Even as DER prices drop and prosumers
become increasingly motivated by monetary incentives, interviewees agreed that en-
vironmental motives remain an incentive for residential prosumers to use DER and
its associated solutions, and residential consumers to support prosumerism. As the
executive from Company N puts it:
People with solar panels are getting a financial incentive, and those buying
energy are supporting solar investment and that is key. They get to save
the polar bear! (Company N).
As electricity users become more aware of the impacts of climate change, they also
see value in knowing where their energy comes from (e.g. its carbon footprint), as
explained in the following quote:
Our customers do care about the price, system state and carbon emissions.
They find it appealing and easy to use our carbon emissions proposition,
which shows them the amount of carbon emissions that is produced in New
Zealand at any point in time. They see value from using it (Company A).
Maximize Self-consumption of Energy
One of the strongest incentives for prosumers to use new emerging solutions, such as
those provided by interviewed companies, is to maximize their self-consumption from
local micro-generation installed in their households and communities. This largely
stems from prosumers’ disappointment with top electricity sector players, especially
retailers with increasing energy prices and monopolizing activities, and prosumers’ need
to become more independent of those players. Especially as battery prices dropped,
prosumers became more incentivized to use battery storage to maximize their self-
consumption, and become “rebels” in breaking free from electricity sector monopolies.
The following quote by the executive from Company D sheds light on both afore-
mentioned incentives:
The incentives of early adopters were based on environmental concerns and
disappointments with the big energy companies who have been monopolizing
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the energy market with increasing prices. Storage systems increase the in-
dependence of prosumers who have a green attitude and those who are rebels
in the energy sector who say “hey, I do not want to be connected to the big
energy provider anymore” (Company D).
Another reason that motivates maximizing self-consumption is the drop in feed-in
tariffs in some countries, e.g. Germany. This regulatory change motivated prosumers
to use batteries in order to increase their self-consumption from local energy resources
and save money on buying electricity from the grid, rather than earn reduced money
from selling electricity to the grid. This is further explained in the quote below:
Until 2010, there has been an understanding, at least in the German market,
that if you buy a PV system, you get a high feed-in tariff from the govern-
ment so it is an investment that pays back in 10 years, and afterwards you
still get 30 Euro cents per kWh. It was a money generating rooftop. Then
the feed-in tariff dropped in 2011 to a level below the energy price, so you
got less for the feed-in than you pay to buy electricity from the grid. That
was the turning point for storage systems. They became attractive to exist-
ing and prospective PV owners because self-consumption was key to saving
money instead of earning it from the feed-in tariff (Company D).
Drops in feed-in tariffs transformed the concept of money generating solar rooftops
towards money saving batteries, where prosumers benefit from using electricity from
their local micro-generation rather than selling it to the grid.
Gain Financial Benefits
Two financial benefits stood out as motives for prosumers to use new solutions provided
by middle actors: benefiting from flat energy rates and accessing electricity markets.
Some companies, e.g. Companies G and D, provide new flat-rate services where
prosumers pay a fixed price for their electricity bill no matter how much energy they
use, and this rate remains fixed for years. This is not to be confused with flat electricity
tariffs offered by conventional electricity retailers. The following quote illustrates the
flat-rate service offered to prosumers by Company G:
The essence incentive would be the flat-rate service, so your bill today is
fixed for the next 20 years and you will not pay more. So, you are signing
a contract, getting a flat-rate guarantee, and also increasing the value of
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your home by adding equipment like PV and batteries. You are basically
investing and paying your investment through your energy bill (Company
G).
The idea is that the company installs a mix of rooftop solar, batteries and household
devices (e.g. heat pumps) in homes, together with a VPP control system that manages
power flows across this equipment. This investment is paid back by prosumers through
flat electricity rates over 20 years.
Company D offers a different model for flat rates for households that are members
of their virtual community and use up to 4250 kWh or up to 5500 kWh of electricity,
because those energy consumptions fall in the center of the average household energy
demand in Germany. As a minimum requirement to get this flat rate, those houses
need to have a minimum amount of kW peak PV and battery size installed. More
details on the flat rate offered by Company D are in the following quote:
Why do we do this? Because we know from the combination of a certain
size of PV system and battery storage system, there will be a certain amount
of energy independence. So, you will be able to provide up to 80% of your
energy requirements yourself. And we promise to pay the last 20-25% for
you. This offer is only available to members of our virtual community and
there is no additional cost besides the community membership fee (Company
D).
In this model for flat rates, the company promises to cover the expenses of addi-
tional energy requirements not met by the local energy resources of prosumers who are
members of the company’s virtual community. But how does the company manage to
cover those costs? This question is addressed in the following quote:
We earn money by helping stabilize the grid and pay for the flat rate offered
to community members. There is a problem in many grids that have added
renewable energy resources because of fluctuation issues. So at times, there
is a lot of energy floating in the power grid and the excess energy has to go
somewhere. In the electricity market in Germany, there is a platform where
network providers basically pay institutions to take excess energy from the
grid in order to stabilize it; it is a network stabilizer mechanism. We aggre-
gate the capacity of community batteries to form a VPP and use software to
digitally control and combine those batteries into one big battery. In times
when there is excess energy in the grid, we offer our VPP to take this energy
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and receive money for it and that is how we finance the flat rate (Company
D).
By aggregating and controlling prosumers’ batteries to receive excess energy that is
stressing the power grid, Company D generates revenue which is then used to finance
prosumers’ energy demand that is not covered by their local energy resources (around
20-25% of total household energy demand).
Another financial benefit motivating prosumers to leverage new solutions provided
by emerging middle actors is gaining access to electricity markets. Prosumers trad-
ing their surplus energy access the electricity market through services such as those
provided by Companies L, M, N, O. Prosumers aggregating resources for demand re-
sponse, on the other hand, benefit from associated returns on joining demand response
programs like those enabled by Companies C, E, F, H, and I.
The executive from Company K, which facilitates power export projects for pro-
sumer collectives, believes that members of collectives are incentivized and proud once
their export projects start making profits and creating value.
Benefit from Transparency
The benefit of accessing transparent electricity prices and real-time energy use analytics
is a strong incentive to prosumers and consumers alike to seek emerging energy demand
solutions. Companies like A and B offer dynamic electricity tariffs reflecting wholesale
market prices; those tariffs are transparently broken down for customers to understand
what they are paying for. Additionally, transparency is also achieved by tools that
help customers gain insight into their household energy usage.
As described in the following quote, the customers of Company A benefit from the
transparency in detailing electricity bill costs:
Our customers benefit from transparency; we show them the real cost. Our
customers get a bill every month, and we do a lovely little wack that breaks
up the bill and shows them exactly how much they are paying for generation,
transmission and distribution to get the electrons to their door. We also
show them the cost of the meter and our charges. There is a lot of benefit
that we talk a lot around price signals, so that our customers understand
how they are doing, how it is benefitting them over time, and how they can
improve if they want to benefit even further (Company A).
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In addition to accessing daily energy usage patterns via a mobile application or a
desktop dashboard, customers of Company A benefit from data mining for unfamiliar
usage patterns, as illustrated below:
We also mine for unusual patterns. There has been a number of stories
where customers have ended up with big bills and they do not understand
why. When you analyze these, you get things like a high load which is
absolutely constant, which indicates something like a hot water cylinder
that is on all the time (Company A).
On the other hand, Company D provides transparency to its customers by showing
them how much production is happening within the virtual community via an online
platform. As elaborated by the company executive below:
It is important to have transparency because we understand that the grid is
one big energy pool and there is difficulty to follow a certain electron from
a producer to a consumer. So we try to improve the situation by allowing
people to understand the production patterns in the community (Company
D).
These incentives gained by prosumers as a result of using solutions from interviewed
companies are very likely to be relevant to prosumer collectives. Environmental con-
cerns can especially motivate community-initiated prosumer collectives to form and
grow. Maximizing self-consumption of energy is a strong drive for prosumers to collec-
tively manage their energy supply and demand, to reduce demand uncertainties and
share supply resources among themselves.
Prosumer collectives can also be strongly driven by the financial benefits, e.g. gain-
ing market access, enabled by emerging solutions offered by new middle actors. Aggre-
gating resources (e.g. surplus energy or demand response) can strengthen the market
power of prosumers and result in additional monetary benefits for the prosumer collec-
tive.
5.6.4 Fairness
When asked about how their solutions are providing fairness, company executives had
a number of opinions and ideas around what fairness means for them and their compa-




Retailers offering dynamic prices largely believe they deliver fairness to their cus-
tomers via providing transparent pricing mechanisms that largely reflect wholesale
market prices, as opposed to the fixed rates of conventional retailers. Examples in-
clude Companies A and B, which break down the structure of their electricity bill
to show their customers how costs are distributed on generation, transmission, dis-
tribution, tax charges and company charges. This is highlighted by the executive of
Company A in the following quote:
Our model is actually fair. It is the true cost passing through to the cus-
tomer. There is no hiding anything. It is completely transparent. Our
model is the fairest way we can think of retailing by giving our customers
true appreciation of what is happening in the market in any point in time.
It gives them real choice and control (Company A).
Enable Electricity Market Access
For online electricity trading platforms, fairness lies in providing prosumers and col-
lectives with market access to sell their electricity to consumers who have freedom of
choice in shopping for their electricity from the sources they desire. The following
quote by the executive from Company N sheds light on this:
By having a marketplace that is over the top of the spot market and allowing
consumers to choose energy generated from prosumers’ solar power rather
than a retailer, then it is actually giving customers more choice and that is
extremely fair (Company N).
Such marketplaces are especially appealing to prosumers in regulatory environments
requiring them to sell surplus energy to retailers, as is the case in Australia, for example.
As prosumers sell their electricity directly to consumers at tariffs higher than retailers’
buy-back tariffs but typically lower than regulated residential electricity tariffs, they
monetize their investment in distributed generation and provide consumers with better
rates than conventional retailers.
The executive from Company L, which offers a block-chain based peer-to-peer elec-
tricity marketplace in Australia, assumed he is a prosumer to describe his point of view
on fairness as follows:
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If I am making investment in distributed generation, and I am able to realize
the full value of investment via online trading rather than being forced to
sell for a cheaper rate to the retailer, then this is absolute fairness in the
way prosumers monetize their investment (Company L).
As for providers of battery storage, they see their batteries as a fair alternative to
selling surplus energy to the grid at low tariffs. Until 2010 in Germany, prosumers with
solar PV received high feed-in tariffs they basically had money-generating rooftops. In
2011, feed-in tariffs dropped below retail electricity tariffs. Thus, selling energy to the
grid made less sense, and storage became a better option, as described by the executive
of Company D:
The drop in feed-in tariffs was the turning point for storage systems which
became more attractive to existing and prospective PV owners, because self-
consumption was key to saving money instead of earning money from the
feed-in tariff (Company D).
After the drop in feed-in tariffs, self-consumption made more sense to prosumers
than selling energy to the grid and losing the value of their investment. Providers of
batteries thus see their solutions delivering fairness to prosumers in cases of dropping
feed-in tariffs.
Develop Fair Mechanisms
Some companies use specific mechanisms to deploy fairness in their business model and
solutions. As an example, Company B, which already provides a transparent electricity
pricing structure, implements fairness further through avoiding cross subsidies and
paying prosumers fair feed-in tariffs, as elaborated below:
We do not cross subsidize high users with low users and with that respect I
think it is very fair. We also try to pay prosumers a fair price for the energy
they send back to the grid. I think in that respect, our pricing structure is
very fair, too (Company B).
The executive from Company C sees his company providing fairness by helping
prosumers use clean energy and reduce their electricity bills, and by providing utilities
with tools to help them address bigger questions, as elaborated below:
The storage assets we provide can defer the need for transmission and distri-
bution infrastructure upgrades by alleviating the amount of load that needs
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to be served. Utilities can avoid the cost of paying for energy, capacity
and equipment to serve peak load that would normally be spread across the
base rate. There are a lot of society benefits of DER. We are helping utili-
ties answer the bigger questions like what are the best rate structures to be
implemented? What's the fairest business model? How should the utility
structure its operations in a way that provides fair access to resources for
everyone? (Company C).
As discussed by this executive, fairness for Company C takes a more holistic view in
implementing fairness, where it sees itself as an agent enabling electric utilities address
questions about how they can use business models and financial structures to fairly
disseminate benefits, prices, and resources to the society.
To expand on this, the same executive also thinks that legalities need to be modified
to be fairer and take various technologies into account to create fair and safe markets
for prosumer technologies, as mentioned in the following quote:
You have old regulations that served their purpose very well. But there is
a system of laws that was developed at a certain time and place, and now
those laws have to be modified somewhat to make markets fair and include
the different technology capabilities available into account, and make fair
rules for participation. There is a lot of information out there, and there is
not one way to do things. So it is about creating a path for legal entities to
modify their laws to create a fair and safe market for prosumer technologies
(Company C).
Additionally, the services provided by Company K deliver fairness to prosumer
collectives, by supporting them in creating strong business models to compete with
electric utilities and share energy assets with them:
Fairness is the whole reason we are in this business. Why would energy
assets be in the hand of 6 big utility companies? It does not make sense.
We need to actually distribute these assets and the wealth generated by them
(Company K).
An interesting point about fairness was brought up by the executive from Company
I who thinks that Company L is being unfair by short-circuiting distribution networks
through its peer-to-peer block-chain based trading platform which enables electricity
trading within a distribution network. The following quote provides an elaborating on
this point:
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If you talk about fairness, then I think those people at [Company L] are not
really remunerating the distribution network because their idea is that they
would not pay for distribution, so I think there is a fairness issue here. I
believe you can optimize around the grid, but I believe this whole “let us
live without the grid thing” is silly. Honestly, the problems that [Company
L] is trying to address are at the macro-level and can be solved with a fair
feed-in tariff or a net-metering clause (Company I).
This point around unfairness to distribution networks is additionally pointed out
by the executive from Company Q, who thinks that it is unfair for prosumers using
solar PV to get discounts from distribution companies, as elaborated below:
Solar PV makes an impact on the local street distribution. If there is so
much congestion at the local level, then the network will require upgrading
at that street level. At that level, people using solar PV are creating cost on
the electricity delivery system. They want to get discount from us, but in
reality they should be paying us more (Company Q).
Both quotes highlight the point that fairness is not just about a specific metric or
feature to be implemented in this product or that service. It is a bigger issue that
needs to be holistically addressed across involved stakeholders, e.g. prosumers, electric
utilities, distribution networks, and regulatory bodies.
5.6.5 Flexibility
When asked about how their company solutions enable energy demand flexibility, exec-
utives had a number of interpretations for the word “flexibility” – which went beyond
demand flexibility which is explained in Section 2.5.2).
All executives affirmed that their company solutions provide flexibility in one way
or another. Some companies focus on one aspect of flexibility, e.g. demand flexibility
– where prosumers are flexible in changing their demand for energy. Other companies
interpret flexibility in a broader sense, e.g. providing flexible market access and trade
opportunities for prosumers to sell their surplus electricity at their own rates and times.
Based on the interviews, two main themes have been identified for enabling pro-
sumers to be more flexible: (1) incentivizing flexibility and (2) enabling flexibility. An
example of incentivizing flexibility is providing dynamic electricity prices that encour-
age customers to change their energy demand in return for monetary savings or use
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their stored energy instead of buying electricity from the power grid. On the other
hand, an example of enabling flexibility is offering advanced optimization and control
solutions that flexibly coordinate power flows between micro-generation, batteries, and
loads in prosumer collectives.
Incentivize Flexibility
Companies A and B are examples of companies that incentivize flexibility by provid-
ing pricing mechanisms that leverage dynamic tariffs in New Zealand and Australia,
respectively. In the case of Company A, customers are exposed to wholesale electric-
ity market prices, and provided with an online dashboard and a mobile application
to monitor forecasted half-hourly prices. Additionally, customers get tips for reducing
energy usage, and information about their potential savings compared to their previous
flat tariffs and to date with the company.
Providing dynamic tariffs to customers and engaging them using different tools can
help them make informed adjustments to be more flexible, e.g. by having their energy-
based activities around cheaper hours, or trading their surplus energy to others and
using their stored energy during peak hours.
The following quote elaborates on the responsiveness and savings of the customers
of Company A:
We provide a whole lot of tools to help our customers benchmark themselves
and do some behavioural changes that benefit them. Most of our customer
lifetime-to-date savings are around 20%, which is way above the 6-7% sav-
ings that have always been available by switching between flat-rate retailers.
We got some customers that are a little bit beyond 50% of their total bill;
they are people who are hosing it. They are really responsive to the price
and take advantage of it (Company A).
While achieving monetary savings is a common and strong incentive for being flex-
ible, executives have pointed out that environmental and social incentives are increas-
ingly motivating people to be flexible. For example, they note that some customers are
being flexible by changing their energy usage to coincide with the clean power gener-
ated from their solar rooftops, or pay more money to access clean electricity generated
from their local school.
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Enable Flexibility
As for enabling flexibility, companies have various notions. For several companies
(e.g. C, D, F, G, H and I), flexibility is enabled by optimally coordinating the power
flows between demand loads, micro-generation and batteries to achieve prosumers’
objectives. Other companies, such as L, M, N, and O, empower their prosumers with
flexibility by allowing them to trade surplus energy to other customers.
Additionally, demand flexibility can be enabled by providing appropriate engage-
ment tools and services for customers, as is the case for Company J, which offers
applications for household energy disaggregation and demand response management.
As shown, customer engagement is a common factor found in interviewees’ views on
both incentivizing and enabling flexibility, e.g. the various tools provided by Companies
A and J, respectively. Having more engaged customers creates opportunities around
integrating flexibility in their energy behaviours and practices. The next section is
dedicated to customer choice and engagement.
5.6.6 Customer Choice and Engagement
Although there was no direct interview question around customer choice and engage-
ment, a strong thread of engaging customers and giving them more choice was induced
especially from discussions about incentives, flexibility and fairness.
An example of a company that directly engages its customers through providing
them with more choice is Company A. In the mobile app of this company, one of the
tabs is called “Choice”. The company empowers its customers with more choice by
giving them real-time updates on their dynamic electricity prices, forecast price dips
and spikes, and carbon emissions associated with the electricity they use. Additionally,
the company provides its customers with data on their energy consumption patterns
and forecast bill. The following quote illustrates how dynamic price updates give
customers more choice:
Through transparent electricity prices, customers get a sense of the price
signals and different prices at different times of the day. We provide our
customers with smart digital tools that allow them to have a choice. You
may choose to use the heater to heat your home no matter what the price
is, but you might choose a different price for using your dishwasher and
your washing machine. That smart digital platform is delivered on a web
app and a mobile app (Company A).
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In other cases, a company enables top actors, e.g. electric utilities and retailers,
with customer engagement tools. An example is Company J, which develops tools
to monitor the usage of household appliances, and forecast electricity bills to alert
customers to make changes to their energy activities if needed. The following quote
elaborates how Company J engages residential customers to support them in making
informed decisions around their energy use:
We provide a number of things. We provide an application that runs on a
suite of media. So we provide mobile apps for customers to monitor their
energy consumption at home by appliance. We give them a bullseye projec-
tion so they know during the month if their bill is likely to be much higher
than normal so they can make some energy changes before the end of the
month to bring it back into line. We give them neighbourhood comparisons,
not only for their total energy usage but also energy usage by appliance mea-
sured. We would let them know for example if they are using 50% more air
conditioning compared to a group of people living in similar sized homes,
similar number of occupants, and a similar climatic area. We also engage
with customers through emails, SMS, and letters (Company J).
Company tools give additional insights to customers by comparing their total house-
hold and appliance-level energy usage against similar sized households with a similar
number of occupants and climatic area. The company does not only rely on mobile
applications, but also uses different channels to engage with customers, e.g. emails,
SMS and letters.
On the other hand, the executive from Company P highlighted that while it makes
sense to give customers more choice and control, it is important to consider the level
of control. As an example, the executive said that customers should not have to worry
about something like water heating by connecting or switching away the PV arrays
connected to the heater, and that they are unlikely to want that level of control.
This point was additionally emphasized by the executive from Company A, who
said that customers do not have to keep tracking half-hourly electricity prices to make
more informed decisions and save on their bills. As elaborated further, while 50%
of their customers do not engage heavily in price signals, they at least broadly know
what they prices might look like. Having information tools allows different levels and
engagement and more informed decisions, as highlighted in the quote below:
Customers got very good information tools that allow them to engage at
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different levels. You can watch it on your phone or your iPad; you can set
alerts. You do not have to keep an eye on what the prices are doing every
half an hour. They get a sense of what they are doing. A whole lot of tools
that help them benchmark and if they need to do some behavioural changes
that benefit them (Company A).
Not needing to track half-hourly prices was also brought up by the executive from
Company O. This executive emphasized that their platform allows prosumers to choose
how much energy they want to sell and when, and gives them price options to choose
from instead of having them monitor half-hourly prices and working out what price
they should sell their energy at. After discussing a range of products and services
provided by new middle actors to emerging prosumer households and communities,
the next section sheds light on an important matter, which is the customer feedback
those middle actors receive about their solutions.
5.6.7 Customer Feedback
One of the questions posed to interviewees was on the feedback their companies get
from customers. In this context, customers include both bottom actors (e.g. prosumers)
and top actors (e.g. electric utilities) using their solutions. Both positive and negative
feedbacks were discussed, as presented in this section.
Positive Feedback
A common feedback received by companies offering dynamic retailing and online elec-
tricity trading was that their customers (i.e. prosumers and consumers) felt highly
engaged, as illustrated by the following quotes:
They really like what we are doing. They are engaging. Our solutions may
appeal just to the geeks and greenies, but we are moving mainstream month
by month in terms of the profiles of our customers. We do know that a
lot of them are already engaged, they really like it, and they are asking for
new things and making suggestions on product enhancement. They are not
only engaged with the product we have done so far, but they started to think
about things we should do next (Company A).
We have got really great engagement from the communities that we have
dealt with. They are quite blown away that there is a potential for a local
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marketplace in the same way that some of us go to a local farmers market.
You could essentially have a local market for energy (Company O).
As customers become engaged with appealing products and associated services that
add value to the way they manage their energy supply and demand, they become keen
on sharing their time and feedback to improve current solutions and suggest new ones.
Enjoying good user experience is another positive feedback some companies have re-
ceived from their customers (i.e. prosumers and consumers). The executive from Com-
pany B says that feedback received via the company website indicates that customers
are highly impressed with its service and support team which helps them through their
journey with the company.
In addition, the executive from Company A stated that he is proud that the com-
pany topped customer satisfaction in its first year, 2015, with 96% which is reported
to be the highest in the industry based on a yearly customer survey undertaken by a
trusted and independent entity in New Zealand.
Some companies have been praised by customers (mainly businesses) for making
complex solutions seem easy. As highlighted by the executive from Company H, cus-
tomers like their simple solutions, which stem from the company's design philosophy of
simplifying the complexities of combinations of loads, batteries and solar PV. Similarly,
Company I receives positive feedback from customers (i.e. businesses) impressed with
the company's cloud-based compatible software and its fast deployment time in the
field.
Other companies have received positive feedback around their ability to enable pro-
sumers to be independent but able to share their energy, as elaborated in the following
quotes:
Customers appreciate that their investment is covered by the energy bill,
and that they can be autonomous from the network and able to co-finance
their independence (Company G).
People love the idea of the community; they really favour sharing their excess
energy rather than selling it to the grid (Company D).
Customers love the idea of being able to take control about owning the extra
capacity. We find a lot of prosumers excited about the concept of sharing
their energy. One may say “my mom is living down the road, with her
pension, she cannot afford to pay for PV, so Id like to gift her my energy
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just to help her out”. It is the whole idea of the sharing economy (Company
L).
Negative Feedback
The main negative criticism brought up during discussions about customer feedback
was that some products, e.g. batteries and associated VPP control systems, remain
relatively expensive. Based on the views of a couple of executives from Companies C
and P, such premium prices are the result of building high-end technologies to high
standards.
5.7 Future Insights
This section presents the future insights in this space, which include executives’ thoughts
on evolving company solutions, the futures of energy demand management and resi-
dential prosumer collectives, and the challenges ahead.
5.7.1 Evolve Current Solutions
Interviewed executives generally agreed that their companies are working hard and
smart to stay relevant, especially in the micro-generation and battery storage space
which is growing rapidly, by improving current offerings and developing innovative
ones. This is highlighted by the executive from Company I in the following quote:
I think it is about catching the wave that is coming. There are lots of ongoing
discussions on the distributed energy front and storage aggregation. It is a
binary thing, either you are in or out. We are trying our best to become
relevant in that space, and be the solution of choice for utilities and energy
service providers. It is a very liquid market, so it is important to get these
accounts early (Company I).
In such a competitive and rapidly growing market, it is crucial for middle actors to
acquire key customer accounts, whether prosumers and their collectives or top actors,
by continuously evolving their solutions to fit customer needs. Two trends have been
identified in evolving current company solutions, as presented below.
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Evolve Vertically
To stay up to date and maintain customer satisfaction, companies tend to evolve verti-
cally by integrating new features to their solutions, and enhancing the performance of
its existing technologies and platforms. This works to ensure that offered products and
services accommodate more customer choice and provide seamless user experience.
Company I, for example, is growing its current solution portfolio vertically at no
additional costs to customers by constantly adding new features to its software ap-
plications, and improving its forecasting algorithms. Additionally, as solar and wind
power is being deployed more aggressively around the grid, the company is looking at
making its flexibility management offerings more customizable to better cater for those
intermittent energy resources. Furthermore, the company is looking at improving its
user interface to make it more visual and intuitive.
Another example is Company C, which is integrating more flexibility around its
different inverter and battery options to better accommodate customer needs, and
adding more intelligence to its solutions to enable running different grid services across
hundreds of thousands of DER.
Providing real-time data analysis is another example of vertical enhancement that
some companies are investigating, as the case with Companies E and J. The executive
from Company J elaborates that as smart meters deliver more granular data, deploy-
ing real-time analytics in their existing solutions becomes essential to better predict
household usage for end-users:
I think the biggest improvement is going to come from smart meters getting
smarter. Right now in New Zealand and Victoria in Australia, data is
delivered to the retailer every 30 minutes, but they only get the data a day
late! So there is a real-time issue that the end-user can only see what they
did today tomorrow, with a granularity of 30 minutes. So as the data gets
delivered faster and faster, the biggest improvement will come from seeing
a lot more appliances in real-time. Our prediction of household appliance
usage varies given the granularity of the data (Company J).
Evolve Horizontally
Leveraging new technologies, diversifying their offerings and spreading geographically
to new markets enable companies to evolve horizontally. Examples include Company
M, which has extended its market in 2016 to Poland, Netherlands and Belgium, and
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Company D, which is looking at globally expanding its virtual community and using
block-chain technology to revolutionize its energy exchange transactions.
Additionally, due to policy changes that impacted the progress of several community
energy projects in the UK, Company K had to diversify its services to become active in
international fronts, by becoming involved in a number of solar PV projects in India,
Brazil, and Chile. On the other hand, Company D is diversifying its offerings beyond
batteries and moving more broadly towards providing smart home solutions:
We are becoming less of a battery storage solution provider, and more of a
smart home appliance provider. We are diversifying very quickly away from
the battery. It is still in the center, but it gets supplemented by all these
smart home products and services (Company D).
The company sees value in broadening the range of its solutions beyond battery-
focused products and moving towards smart connected appliances for households, e.g.
smart heaters, smart plugs, heating rods.
Having presented executives’ thoughts on how their companies are progressing their
products and services, their views on the future of energy demand management and
prosumer collectives are elaborated in the next two sections.
5.7.2 Future of Energy Demand Management
Interview discussions around the future of energy demand management put forward
various predictions. This section presents the main future trends they suggested re-
garding energy demand management.
From Demand Response to Flexibility Management
One of the strongest future trends anticipated for energy demand management is
the transition from conventional behavioural demand response programs towards the
broader concept of automated flexibility management of DER. This transition serves
the growing need to automate and optimize complex power flows between supply and
demand points especially in light of the increased penetration of DER.
Today, behavioural demand response is regarded as the cheapest and most efficient
practice where residential customers are sent notifications to reduce their energy use
during peak demand hours. However, with the rise in device connectivity, flexibility
management is gaining ground. This is elaborated by the executive from Company I
as follows:
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I think that today probably what makes more sense is these behavioural pro-
grams; they are the cheapest and most efficient thing you can probably do.
Now as appliances are gaining connectivity, it becomes very easy for people
to register those devices on flexibility programs. And the more connectivity
on the appliance front, the more software solutions that are going to be used
by energy service providers to aggregate that flexibility (Company I).
In addition to increased connectivity, the emergence of prosumers further under-
pins the necessity to move away from demand response towards managing DER, as
highlighted by the executive from Company F as follows:
The big shift in general is the move away from demand management and
response, and more towards distributed energy resource management (Com-
pany F).
Furthermore, the automated side of flexibility management has been elaborated in
the following quote by the executive from Company C:
As we move forward, the ideal for demand response is to have some sort of
combination of automated and behavioural changes. So, on the automated
side, we are feeding the customer loads with stored energy from the battery
during a demand response event. That happens behind the scenes without
the customer input because their electricity needs are still being met; it is
just that they are not being met by the grid but by the battery. Today,
we are taking an automated approach where the customers do not have to
do anything and they do not really notice any difference from a comfort
perspective because the battery is still providing them with what they need
while meeting the utility needs as well (Company C).
In automating flexibility management, it is important to maintain end-users’ com-
fort levels and cause minimal disruption to their energy activities; ideally, they should
not notice a difference.
From Capacity Provision to Power Quality
Another future trend going hand in hand with the move from behavioural demand
response towards flexibility management is moving the focus away from capacity pro-
vision and more towards power quality. Behavioural demand response basically frees
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capacity, and providing capacity has been a main concern for demand response ac-
tivities. However, as the focus shifts towards flexibly managing DER, power quality
will become a bigger concern for utilities and network operators, as the executive from
Company F anticipates:
It will not be about having one large customer at the end of the distribution
feeder, but about having and dealing with 400 small customers on the feeder.
It will be about power quality rather than capacity. People will no longer
say “I need to shave 1 MW off my peak”. It will be more like “I need to
shave 1 MW off my peak and coordinate these solar inverters and batteries
in order to deal with frequency issues here and voltage issues there”.
As DER increasingly penetrate the power grid, power quality issues arise, mainly
due to voltage fluctuations caused by power surges (e.g. switching on/off of equipment,
circuit overload).
From Centralized to Decentralized Power Grids
Another trend that is currently present but expected to grow further is the shift from
centralized towards decentralized grid architectures and resources, which is largely due
to the emergence of distributed energy technologies, as described by the executive from
Company O in the following quote:
Our electric grid is going back to the way that someone like Thomas Edison
first thought of local distribution networks where supply and control are
at a much more local level. In the 20th Century, when we wanted to get
electricity to everyone around the country, the sensible thing to do was to
build national grids. It was a wise investment. But the technologies that
have arrived mean that we are going to see that shift back to much more
local grids. The national grid itself will become much more of a big battery,
or a big backup for the local networks (Company O).
Additionally, the executive from Company D emphasizes the decentralization trend
of the power grid, saying that it costs less for the society:
I believe it will be further decentralized, because the cost for the society is
less than centralized systems (Company D).
The executive from Company A sees two schools of thought around the future of
power grids: one that is centrally managed and coordinated and another which is
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distributed and in the hands of the customers. He thinks that the latter model will
prevail.
A few executives think grid connections will become obsolete at some point and off-
grid systems will emerge. Nevertheless, most executives dismiss this idea and believe
that existing power grid connections will stay relevant but top electricity actors (e.g.
electric utilities and retailers) will experience major disruptions so as to accommodate
emergent prosumers.
5.7.3 Future of Residential Prosumer Collectives
This section presents the main themes highlighting the future of residential prosumer
collectives, as predicted by the interviewed executives.
More than Energy
While discussing prosumer collectives of the future, executives tended to look at the
big picture of how different elements of urban areas will eventually fit together, and not
just focus on groups of prosumer dwellings. This is illustrated in the following quotes
by the executives from Companies E and C, respectively.
It is not just about homes. It is about transportation, public buildings, and
schools. It is about doing things in a new way. People are working together
because they are realizing they can share their rooftop PV panels, or use
EV and e-bikes. That is where the social side is developing. The social
communities want this way of life (Company E).
The future of prosumer communities depends on a lot of things. It depends a
lot on the future of dwellings and housing, where prosumers and consumers
will be living, and what type of geography they will be dealing with. Are we
dealing with apartment buildings or remote housing communities and things
of that nature? (Company C)
Those executives think that the future of residential prosumer communities will
depend on a number of factors that need to be considered altogether, including energy,
housing options, transportation, geographies. Additionally, they see social communities
embracing a new lifestyle where they can use energy resources in new ways. It is more
than just energy; it is a mixture of energy, buildings, transport, community action, etc.
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Smarter and More Real-time Technologies
Executives see residential prosumer collectives of the future as a lot smarter and with
additional real-time capabilities and resiliency. The following quotes from the executive
from Companies E and L, respectively, illustrate such views:
The future is going to go into near or real-time. The metering using internet
of things (IoT) is now possible to make real-time response, but we have to get
the cost drivers and all the signals in place to make that doable and a lot of
that has to be automated. That is where you are going to need a lot of smart.
I do not call them home energy management systems because they are more
than that; they are home integration systems integrating homes together
into communities onto one sub-station and making sure it is integrated for
flexibility to different markets. The technology for all this exists but we just
need to make commercial sense out of it (Company E).
Those collectives will become more resilient to the impacts of weather and
climate change. The technology and distribution networks allow for such
dynamism to be optimized in an automated kind of way (Company L).
Executives believe that having more real-time and smarter features in residential
prosumer collectives is necessary and doable, but needs efforts to bring the different
pieces together and make commercial sense out of it. Prosumer collectives in the
future are expected to be resilient to weather hazards and climate change impacts, and
comprise communities that integrate homes together which then connect to markets.
More Battery Storage
Executives think that battery storage will gain even more interest and growth in future
prosumer collectives, especially as their prices are expected to drop and their efficiencies
improve. The following executive from Company J sees batteries as vital to both
prosumers and distribution companies:
As battery storage prices come down, you’ll see many more prosumers want-
ing them; but also distribution companies that are seeing all sorts of prob-
lems arising with more renewables coming online because they have to bal-
ance having intermittent renewable energy resources (Company J).
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As elaborated by this executive, batteries help mitigate the impacts of intermit-
tent renewable power by storing energy for use at later times, which can help flatten
residential evening peaks. Not only prosumers, but also distribution companies are
becoming increasingly interested in using battery storage.
EVs are also considered as grid-connected batteries, and the anticipated growing
interest in driving and sharing EVs has been highlighted by some executives, such as
that from Company E as elaborated in the following quote:
I think all of the intelligence is going to be around EV and EV charging.
That is a lifestyle rather than energy management. Your EV is going to
be your energy asset because that can fuel your house at night and keep the
lights on through high demand periods. We want cars to go electric or semi-
electric, and see how car shares will cut emissions. We want to understand
how prosumer collectives are building charging stations, solar panels, and
hydro and all that within their communities (Company E).
This executive was very enthusiastic towards EV and even talked about his own
EV and how he tracks its charging in real-time on his phone. From his point of
view, EVs are energy assets that are driven by lifestyle changes rather than energy
management activities. He supports EVs and car sharing, and is interested to see
how future prosumer collectives will integrate their various energy assets within their
communities.
Prosumers Becoming Paid Nodes
In the future, some executives see prosumers as nodes that are paid by distribution
companies for their location on the grid, as prosumer energy assets (e.g. batteries)
can help smooth evening peaks in residential areas and mitigate the intermittency of
certain resources (e.g. solar PV). The following two quotes from the executives from
Companies F and J illustrate this theme:
Individuals play a part in this by having a node at the end of a network
which is being paid for or funded by somebody else who can benefit from it.
Battery and solar providers knock on your door and say hi, I can fix some
solar panels and batteries and you will not have to pay for power delivery
again, are you OK with that? In the meantime, they are monetizing the
assets behind the meter while satisfying your requirements. So it will be
more about buying your location and existence on the grid (Company F).
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I have been talking to one of the main distribution companies in Auckland
and there is a lot of interest there; they are helping sponsor people putting
battery storage in so they can make use of that during evening peaks, when
people get back home, so they can use battery storage to smooth out those
peaks every day during those critical times (Company J).
Those executives see that prosumers can benefit from their location on the grid by
receiving money from top electricity actors (e.g. distribution companies) in return for
integrating batteries or solar panels, which can help in regulating power flows around
the grid during peak hours or power surges.
A Big Dynamic Prosumer Community
Overall, the future of residential prosumer collectives is expected to be highly dynamic
in various ways, as stated by some executives. In the following quote, the executive from
Company L believes that prosumer collectives will connect together more dynamically
to form larger communities, and that their operations will become non-linear and more
active and will be optimally managed in an automated manner:
Residential prosumer collectives will become smaller and more dynamically
connected to larger communities and larger sections of the network. Distri-
bution networks allow for dynamism to be optimized in an automated kind
of way, so the system will become far less linear and more dynamic in the
way it operates (Company L).
This executive sees prosumer collectives becoming smaller but connecting to larger
sections of the network to form bigger communities in a dynamic way. This point is
further highlighted by the executive from Company N as follows:
I see prosumer collectives emerging in more of a long term as one big pro-
sumer community rather than pockets of closed communities. It is like what
happened with the internet, which started with a small local academic net-
work and now we have a fully connected community rather than remaining
as pockets (Company N).
There is an analogy in what this executive sees happening to collectives with how
the internet evolved from a small local network into a big community that connects
everyone.
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Another executive sees dynamic changes in the regulatory frameworks of future
prosumer collectives especially with the evolution of related regulations around phas-
ing out fossil-fuel based power generation, and increasing renewables, and developing
behind-the-meter micro-generation technologies.
The Rise of Virtual Communities
While virtual prosumer communities are already a reality, e.g. those developed by Com-
panies D and G, they are expected to grow in the future. Virtual communities connect
prosumers and consumers, who might not be geographically co-located, together to
trade energy and engage around electricity as described below by the executive from
Company N:
By having the data we have and running a matching engine for trade, we
build leader boards and a virtual community of like-minded people who are
engaged on something that is mundane like electricity (Company N).
For an ordinary topic like electricity, having virtual communities encourages indi-
viduals to share their common interests in trading their surplus energy and discuss
electricity related topics. The executive from Company G thinks that the future will
comprise both physical and virtual communities to offer more energy independence to
end-users, as denoted in the quote below:
The future would be virtual and local communities that will offer more en-
ergy independence. In Germany, there are 800 communities that are man-
aging energy, so we are going to go into an evolution with those guys who
want to be independent and be more in control (Company G).
The executive also thinks that the same principles can be applied to both physical
and virtual communities, as follows:
The virtual community we are developing is Germany wide and is a vir-
tual community; the same principles can be applied to more geographically
located or limited communities (Company G).
This is further emphasized by the executive from Company H whose company pro-
vides a platform that can enable power flow optimization in both physical and virtual
communities. However, this executive currently sees constraints in Australia which
may hinder the development of virtual communities and how they knit their virtual
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groups and provide energy trading, virtual net metering, or virtual power purchase
agreements.
On the other hand, the executive from Company O sees trading, whether in virtual
or physical communities, as nevertheless a virtual connection, as elaborated below:
This is a virtual connection. You cannot guarantee that a kilowatt generated
goes to a specific person; it is not a DHL package. Essentially, it is matching
generated capacity with consumed capacity. Actually, we have banned the
use of peer-to-peer within our company because you cannot actually peer-to-
peer kilowatts in a physical sense, so we tend to think of it as a decentralized
marketplace (Company O).
Because the path a specific amount of power takes based on trading transactions
cannot be guaranteed, this executive thinks that trading generally is a virtual connec-
tion irrelevant of how the community is.
5.7.4 Future Challenges
Despite the increasing interest in and the growth of residential prosumer collectives, a
number of challenges face those collectives and associated stakeholders, e.g. electricity
retailers, distribution companies, and solution providers. This section details those
challenges.
Understanding the Big Picture
When asked about the challenges facing collectives of residential prosumers, a number
of executives mentioned that one of the biggest challenges is the lack of a holistic under-
standing needed to put together the different pieces comprising collective prosumerism.
This is elaborated by the executive from Company E as follows:
It is hard to put together. No one fully understands how to do it. The big
picture in New Zealand is “lifestyle”, how all this can come together. If you
do all this, you will have minimum emissions and the security of supply and
minimum costs as well (Company E).
This executive sees it as hard to put together the different pieces of prosumer
collectives and realizes a lack of a full understanding around this matter. This challenge
is further emphasized by the executive from Company N, who sees a need for more
collaboration between the different involved parties to achieve their shared vision:
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I think the biggest challenge will be getting different parts of the industry to
work together when they all have different incentives. There is probably a lot
of different parties with a similar vision about the future and that probably
needs to have more collaboration. Getting people to work together is the
biggest challenge (Company N).
As the executive from Company O thinks, the lack of holistic understanding and
integrated collaboration is due to the resistance to change exercised by some electricity
sector stakeholders. He thinks that those stakeholders should be brought around to
the idea that they need to change and adapt to the rapid emergence of prosumerism.
This need for having collaborating stakeholders is further emphasized by the executive
from Company C, as follows:
We are still not seeing this on a large scale, not because technology does not
exist but because a number of different stakeholders including utilities and
regulators have to come together to understand what the capabilities of the
technology are, how to use it, and how to make it standard across multiple
types of solutions and competing solution providers (Company C).
The challenge to develop this inclusive grasp of the various components of residential
prosumer collectives is further emphasized by the executive from Company P, as quoted
below:
Many people do not understand how the many different pieces of the power
system need to be put together to work. We have never had this situation
before. But, now we are starting to get emerging distributed generation
from household to household, and we need to make sure people have reliable
electricity. If the internet goes down, a few people get really upset. But
when electricity goes down, it is a completely different story (Company P).
It is a steep but necessary learning curve for prosumerism stakeholders to collab-
oratively develop a holistic understanding of the various components needed to well
establish residential prosumer collectives. As indicated in the previous quote, electric-
ity outages are critical, so it is important to properly manage the new situation where
emerging distributed generation resources are added to households.
If we look from the perspective of energy storage, cooperation between prosumerism
stakeholders is a challenge, as electricity cannot be stored in large amounts easily. This
is elaborated in the following quote by the executive from Company Q:
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Cooperation between different parties is a challenge. Electricity cannot be
stored easily. If you have a big enough battery, you would not need a net-
work, would you?! In reality, you cannot really store enough to meet ev-
eryone’s load at peak time and seasonally because you use more in winter,
while a technology like solar PV provides more in summer. Because you
have got this storage problem, coordination is the hard part (Company Q).
Developing Scalable Business Models
Another challenge that stood out during interview discussions was that of developing
business models to scale residential prosumer collectives beyond sporadic communities
and pilot projects. As one of the executives described it:
I think the biggest missing part is the right business model that gives every-
body the right incentive to make it happen. The technology is there, the will
is there, maybe economics are not quite there in some cases. But there is
no clear business model to get all parties to collaborate (Company N).
As pointed out in the previous challenge around the lack of a holistic understand-
ing, various stakeholders need to collaborate in developing the growth of collective
prosumerism for households. However, some executives do not see a clear business
model yet that governs such collaborations, as previously quoted by the executive from
Company N, and further emphasized by that of Company F:
The reality is that the economics at the moment are heavily weighted towards
larger producers and consumers. That is because the cost of automating a
kW is much cheaper when you do it at the large scale than a small scale.
There is no reason why it should not be 3 times the volume it is now. It has
to speed up enormously. We need to go there quicker. We see that shift;
it gets cheaper all the time. But we have not seen a standalone residential
business case which stacked up yet (Company F).
This executive thinks that the volumes at which residential prosumers aggregate
need to scale up rapidly to build a strong business case for residential prosumer col-
lectives. He further contrasts commercial and industrial prosumers versus residential
ones, as follows:
The household is much more expensive and risky to engage with because
you need to explain what it is, convince them, sign a legal agreement, install
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kits, and then you get the biggest battery system of 10 kWh. Whereas with
commercial and industrial prosumers, they know what they are doing and
motivated by the economics. It is almost as expensive to install and you have
got 250 kWh. You can aggregate 6 and get 1.5 MW instead of aggregating
150 small systems. A kW is a kW; it does not matter where it is coming
from. From a cloud automation perspective, whether it is a mega or a kilo,
you move the decimal place; it makes zero difference. What matters is the
economics. It is not to say people will not do very good at it but retailers
should (Company F).
Residential prosumer collectives remain small-scale in contrast with commercial and
industrial prosumers which aggregate at much bigger scales. With respect to software
and automation, controlling a kW or a MW makes no difference. However, from an
economic point of view, the stronger business model tilts towards serving large-scale
prosumers rather than residential ones. In addition to the issue around lack of scale,
one executive pointed out a limitation around residential loads, as follows:
We enable plug and play connectivity and control with solar inverters and
battery systems, and then add loads. But the main limitation is that there
are not many loads to control in residential settings at the moment (Com-
pany H).
While distributed energy resources and electric appliances can be modularly added
to households as negative and positive loads, respectively, they remain limited. This
limitation in controllable loads thus plays a role in encumbering the development of a
viable and scalable business case for residential prosumer collectives.
Furthermore, the executive from Company H thinks that allocating network charges
in virtual net metering or local energy trading is a problem which affects developing
an economic business model for prosumers, as elaborated in the following quote:
One would expect that local energy traders would pay lower network charges
because they are a small part of the network. But at the moment, the rules
do not clarify how one can calculate that local component, and it is left
to negotiation with the networks which will not negotiate. There are rule
changes currently in play, which would hope to make network changes at a
local level more transparent, and that will open the door for at least more
economic models (Company H).
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Transparent allocation of network charges is thus another component to be carefully
studied in the challenging process of building strong and economic business models for
residential prosumer collectives, especially those with local trading platforms.
Enabling Adequate Regulations
The issue around regulations supporting electricity pricing and market participation
has been highlighted as another challenge facing residential prosumer collectives. Sev-
eral executives think that current regulatory frameworks are inadequate for fairly ac-
commodating large numbers of prosumers beyond pilot projects, and see a need for
fairer and more organized regulations to enforce market transformation for prosumers.
The executive from Company C believes it is important to implement a dynamic
rate for residential customers on a large scale as opposed to a pilot program, and have
laws that enable aggregated distributed energy resources to participate in an organized
market. The executive adds an elaboration in the case of the United States, as an
advanced economy, as follows:
In the United States, what you have is old regulations that served their pur-
pose very well. But that is a system of laws that was developed at a certain
place and now they have to be modified somewhat to fair markets and rules
for participation, and include the different technology capabilities available
into law. I think this is a big challenge. There is a lot of information out
there and there is not one way to do things, so it is about creating a path
for legal entities to modify their laws to create a fair and safe market for
prosumer technologies (Company C).
It is challenging yet crucial to transform current regulations such that fair rules
govern market participation and different technology capabilities for prosumers, espe-
cially in a developed country like the US. On the other hand, this executive thinks
that the challenge is different for developing countries, where arguments exist about
the centralized utilities that do not serve electricity to end-users. He thinks that op-
portunities in developing countries do not revolve around changing the existing grid,
but rather around how to create a paradigm of electricity and power access that has
never been available.
The challenge around advancing regulations to support prosumers is further high-
lighted by the executive from Company A in the following quote:
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I think regulation is naturally going to have to change to support innovation
and choice for customers. Arguably, there is an element of regulation right
now that restricts the viability of prosumers and community groups. That
is going to have to evolve and change (Company A).
The lack of adequate regulations supporting prosumerism is challenging, as it re-
stricts the feasibility of individual and collective prosumers. It further restricts new
value streams in the form of products and services from reaching prosumers, as elabo-
rated by the executives from Companies B and D in the following quote:
I think the main barrier is the regulatory framework, which is not set up to
provide value streams to prosumers for the assets they install in their houses
to manage their load, produce or store electricity, or move load around in
time and those sort of things. Once a regulatory framework is set up, and
this indeed will happen, then some of the barriers will start to fall away
(Company B).
Legislation is the challenge! The technology and innovation are faster than
the response of the political realm. I know a lot of energy startups in Berlin
that have great energy services which cannot be offered today because the
regulations do not allow such services. In our case, we are pushing products
and services that cannot be applied in some cases due to limitations in
regulations. But we have expectations, in terms of weeks or months, after
which we can expect to see changes in regulations (Company D).
It is thus important to update existing regulations or develop new regulations that
take prosumers into account, especially with respect to their assets, market partic-
ipation, and technology solutions. To add to the conversation, the executive from
Company K also believes that the main challenge facing this field is policy:
It is a policy question above all. You need a government which accepts that
we must experiment, because we are at a point where to create new things
you have to give them some breathing space and some financial resources to
be able to try at something new that cannot on its own emerge in a market
setting. They need some buffer time (Company K).
The executive elaborates, saying that governments and politicians need to lift
bottom-up efforts of prosumer collectives and provide them with time and resources to
encourage broader engagement:
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But most politicians do not think that way. And in a setting like that, you
will simply refer to very centralized large-scale generation and there will be
a limited engagement of citizens in energy generation and management in
general. People love the community energy idea, but they just do not know
how to make it happen and it is a policy matter. You compare different
countries with different levels of civic engagement in energy generation, e.g.
compare Denmark or the UK to New Zealand, and you will see that it is all
about top down reaching down to bottom up, listening to them and giving
them time and resources for broader engagement in this type of activity
(Company K).
Regulations and policies governing the setup and development of prosumer collec-
tives present a challenge to the emergence of such collectives; they can either boost
growth, or postpone and in some cases completely hinder future expansions. For pro-
sumer collectives to grow, they thus need to be supported by a set of policy tools that
provide appropriate incentives, market access, technology solutions, and engagement
to involved stakeholders.
Creating Flexibility
One of the challenges brought forward by interviewed executives was the challenge of
enabling flexibility. The executive from Company M describes this challenge as follows:
We think that flexibility is the greatest challenge and the biggest asset in the
new electricity market of the future. We really focus to protect flexibility
potentials (Company M).
For the executive from Company N, they wish to have customers think about flex-
ibility, as elaborated in the following quote:
We have a long-term view to get customers to think about flexibility and
make decisions that will benefit them. First, we got to get them engaged.
We are phase one of how to build products that get people to care about
when they use electricity (Company N).
Managing Social Risks
Some executives pointed out the social risks that may challenge the growth of prosumer
collectives. The executive from Company H sees a challenge in dealing with marginal-
ized end-users who are unable to create strong prosumer collectives, as follows:
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We need to be mindful of the social risks that marginalize those who are
unable to provide more powerful groupings of prosumers. For example, on
the coast in Australia, we would find the cost of rural electrification, espe-
cially in remote communities, much more expensive. We would find a shift
in people's expectations because as you go more decentralized people expect
that it is more user pays. But how do we make sure people that have trouble
paying can still pay? (Company H).
The same executive adds another factor which may trigger social risks – cross-
subsidies, as follows:
People forget that rural electrification got subsidized by urban networks, and
if we start having micro-grids and reduce network charges coming from those
groups, then we may have social and economic issues emerging (Company
H).
The executive is concerned about those who are less well off, and thinks such cross-
subsidies may result in social and economic issues.
This is additionally emphasized by the executive from Company Q, who believes
that better cost-reflective electricity pricing provided to residential prosumers may
cause a real problem because some individuals who have no interest in prosumer tech-
nologies and are less likely to afford it may end up paying more. The following quote
elaborates this point further:
The real problem is that some of those customers that will pay more are the
less likely to afford to pay more. Customers with the cheapest appliances
tend to have the worst load factor and the biggest impact on our costs. You
can go and buy 2 kW heaters for $13.9 each, plug in three of them, and
you will use a lot more power at our peak than you would if you had a
$5000 heat pump. Customers who have low capital cost heating, or those
who are in rental properties with poor insulation, no double glazing, and
no flexibility around work hours some of those customers will automatically
end up paying more if we introduce cost-reflective pricing trying to help the
rich guy with his solar (Company Q).
If electricity prices are made more cost-reflective in order to provide alternatives to
electricity customers to become prosumers, this may cause repercussions where those
who cannot afford higher electricity prices may end up paying more.
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5.8 Summary
This chapter addressed the third research question in this thesis, which focused on how
middle actors are shaping new solutions for residential prosumer collectives and what
implications this poses for dynamic demand response practices. This research question
helps address the overarching question posed by this thesis, around how smart grid
opportunities can be used to provide dynamic demand response for residential prosumer
collectives.
The work presented in this chapter comprises the social stream of this research, for
which data was collected via semi-structured interviews with executives in businesses
providing current or potential solutions enabling dynamic demand response. Inter-
view findings showed that a growing body of new businesses is developing a range of
prosumer-oriented solutions targeting individual prosumers as well as collectives.
Based on literature and further underpinned by interview findings, top actors (e.g.
network operators, distribution companies) are often not taking a proactive role in
catering for the growing needs of prosumers and collectives. This gap resulted in the
emergence of middle actors, which work with top actors and directly with bottom actors
to overcome barriers and enable new solutions to meet the needs of prosumerism and
collectivism.
Interview findings have shown that many new businesses focus on providing so-
lutions that (1) maximize energy self-consumption for prosumers and collectives, (2)
maintain grid reliability, (3) create value from smart meter data, and (4) enable flexi-
bility management.
Middle actors are adopting new business models to introduce advanced products and
services to residential prosumers. Most of the interviewed companies use a business-to-
business model, where they directly serve top actors, which in turn serve prosumers. A
few of the companies though follow a business-to-customer model, where they directly
serve prosumers and consumers.
Middle actors adopt several principles based on which they align their business
priorities and strategies, including meeting reliability and safety standards, integrating
transparency with customers and within business processes, adopting sustainability
practices, being community-centric, adopting innovation, and attaining profitability.
Based on the interviews, solutions provided by middle actors are largely software-
based, which reflects increased flexibility, scalability, and ease of deployment in terms of
serving the changing needs of prosumers. Middle actors are providing solutions in four
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main areas: (1) virtual power plant, (2) automated demand response, (3) dynamic
electricity pricing, and (4) online electricity trading. As for how the companies are
evolving their current solutions, two trends have been identified: (1) evolving vertically
(e.g. by integrating new features and enhancing solution performance), and (2) evolving
horizontally (e.g. by leveraging new technologies, diversifying offerings, and spreading
to new geographies).
Interview findings have demonstrated that smart grid offerings provided by mid-
dle actors provide prosumers and collectives with several benefits, including becoming
green, maximizing self-consumption of energy, gaining financial benefits, and benefit-
ting from transparency.
Regarding fairness, executives see it as a topic that needs to be addressed holisti-
cally, not just through a specific feature in offerings, where their products are providing
fairness through offering transparency to prosumers, enabling them to access electric-
ity markets, and developing fair pricing and legislation mechanisms. As for flexibility,
company executives interpreted the word in different ways, where businesses either
incentivize flexibility or enable it.
Based on the interviews, there was a strong trend around company efforts to en-
gage customers and provide them with more choices. Some companies directly engage
with their customers by offering them additional analytics that improve their decision-
making, while other companies enable top actors with customer engagement tools to
boost the added value they provide to customers.
Interviewed executives forecast that the future of energy demand management will
move from demand response to flexibility management, from capacity provision to
power quality, and from centralized to decentralized power grids.
Future residential prosumer collectives are forecast to be affected by a number of
factors, including energy resources, housing options, geographies, transport, and com-
munity actions. In general, executives agreed that adopting prosumerism in residential
collectives is not just about managing energy; it is about embracing a new lifestyle and
dealing with energy in new ways.
Future collectives are expected to integrate smarter and more real-time technologies,
and more battery storage, and prosumers are expected to become paid nodes where they
benefit from their location on the grid by receiving incentives in return for integrating
distributed energy resources that help regulate power flows during peak hours or power
surges.
A few executives see future residential prosumer collectives connecting to larger
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sections of the network to eventually form one big prosumer community, while other
executives expect virtual communities, which virtually connect prosumers and con-
sumers that are not geographically co-located, to grow. A future where both physical
and virtual communities co-exist has been also forecast.
Executives expect future challenges around gaining a holistic understanding of how
prosumer collectives in residential areas function, and coordinating efforts between
involved stakeholders developing and growing such collectives. Other challenges in-
clude developing business models to scale residential prosumer collectives beyond pilot
projects, and enabling adequate regulatory frameworks to support their growth.
Other executives underpinned challenges around managing social risks associated
with collective prosumerism, especially around dealing with marginalized end-users,
who are unable to provide demand flexibility or create and participate in strong pro-
sumer collectives, and may end up paying more due to inefficient cross-subsidies.
As identified in the literature review and further investigated in this chapter, fair-
ness is a key factor to be considered in dynamic demand response solutions targeting
collectives. The next chapter addresses the fourth and last research question of this
thesis, which focuses on how to incorporate fairness in dynamic demand response so-





Research Question 4 – How can fairness be fostered in dynamic demand
response for residential collectives?
6.1 Introduction
In prosumer collectives, resources, benefits (and often penalties), and processes are
shared among stakeholders (prosumers, distribution company, electricity market, etc.).
Considerations around procedural and distributive fairness, which have been presented
in Section 3.4.2, are crucial in planning and assessing the processes and outcomes of
energy transitions relating to such collective settings [29].
Distributive fairness tends to be more technical than procedural fairness, as it
involves distributing quantities rather than qualities. Thus, to address the fourth
research question and craft this thesis to contribute to socio-technical literature on
prosumer collectives, I focus on investigating distributive fairness.
Based on interview findings, distributive fairness is implemented by middle actors
in various ways (see Section 5.6.4). In this chapter, I build on literature and interview
findings and investigate (1) how to fairly distribute the revenue of a prosumer collec-
tive, from selling electricity to the grid, among its prosumers, and (2) how to fairly
allocate loss of utility associated with dynamic demand response among households in
a collective.
I present two mechanisms, in the form of software algorithms, to implement those
fairness measures, which can be integrated into middle actors’ software offerings. The
fair share allocator targets prosumer collectives, where it is used to distribute the
revenue of the collective, from selling electricity to the grid/market, among prosumers
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based on their contribution in exporting a pre-agreed amount of electricity. The loss
of utlity allocator targets consumer collectives, and aims to trade off the minimum
total loss of utility experienced by consumer households in order to achieve as much
fairness as possible in distributing loss of utility among a collective of customers. Both
algorithms can be customized to target prosumer as well as consumer collectives.
The algorithms assume that households have smart meters, are connected to the
same low-voltage distribution network, but are not physically connected to each other.
There is no information sharing between households, and thus privacy issues (e.g.
exposing meter data to others) are not a concern. The households assumed herein may
not necessarily communicate directly to negotiate forming a coalition, which highlights
the importance of a middle actor to coordinate interactions. That middle actor may
incorporate the proposed software algorithms in its offerings to residential collectives.
Data, such as smart meter data and records of revenue from selling electricity or
providing demand response resources, is shared with the actor responsible for admin-
istering electricity sales or demand response for the collectives (a top actor such as a
distribution company, a middle actor representing the collective, etc.). Based on the
activity undertaken by the collective, binding agreements are put in place and agreed
upon between involved stakeholders.
For the fair share allocator, I assume that prosumer households are equipped with
rooftop PV that takes up between 20-30 m2 of the rooftop surface of each house, and
generate 2-4 kW of solar electricity per house [302]. I also assume that the households
each have a battery with a 13.5 kWh capacity. Such prosumer households are be-
tween 25 and 50% energy self-sufficient, can have up to 18 hours of continuous backup
power stored in their battery [303], and are assumed to be selling 50% of their so-
lar electricity to the grid. Those assumptions build upon realistic calculations for a
collective comprising average one-family prosumer households, and are only used to
evaluate the software algorithm developed. Changing those assumptions will change
the inputs to the fair share allocator; however, the allocator will still work in a less
uniform environment.
For the loss of utility allocator, I assume that appliances in consumer households
are participating in a 1-hour demand response event, where appliances automatically
shed based on smart grid controls (e.g. heat pumps, which approximately use 1.5 kW
on average, shed during the demand response event).
In general, prosumers in a collective do not have to contribute to every event the
collective is a part of, e.g. one prosumer may contribute to exporting electricity from
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the collective to the grid one day, while the next day they may have a big event at
home and so need to import some battery stored electricity from their neighbour to
cover their demand. Only those prosumers contributing to an event will get a share
based on the output of the algorithms developed herein.
The fair share and loss of utility allocators are concerned with distributing shares
and loss of utility, respectively, among members of a collective, not forming collec-
tives (i.e. coalition formation). Other algorithms can be developed to form coalitions
achieving dynamic internal objectives for the collective (e.g. meeting the energy needs
of its prosumers) as well as external obligations (e.g. exporting a certain amount of
electricity to the grid).
Novelty in this chapter includes: (1) developing a software algorithm which ap-
proximates the fair distribution of a collective’s revenue (e.g. from selling electricity)
among its prosumers, with high accuracy and reasonable time and memory resources
for a collective comprising 400 households; (2) developing a software algorithm which
trades off minimum total loss of utility, experienced by a collective of households due
to a dynamic demand response event, with fairness in allocating loss of utility among
households.
Before discussing the details of those two mechanisms, it is important to first un-
derstand the concepts involved in their development. The next section provides an
overview of those concepts.
6.2 Background
6.2.1 The Notion of Fairness
As presented in Section 3.4.2, energy justice combines aspects from distributive as well
as procedural justice [30]. Distributive justice involves the distribution of outcomes,
such as fair distribution of energy costs, while procedural justice deals with processes,
such as equitable access to information [29, 30, 250, 251]. Both aspects can help in
understanding and assessing the outcomes and processes of prosumer collectives [29].
Fairness influences the behaviour of people in many domains, and can be opera-
tionalized in socio-technical settings to help build trust and transparency among in-
volved stakeholders. Issues around fairness and equity largely shape the social accep-
tance of prosumer collectives [31, 32]. In competitive electricity markets, considering
concepts such as fairness plays a role in the acceptance of energy saving and manage-
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ment policies [304].
Prior to discussing how fairness can be implemented in dynamic demand response
in residential collectives, cooperative game theory and weighted voting games are first
introduced.
6.2.2 Cooperative Game Theory and Weighted Voting Games
Game theory is the study of strategic situations where several decision-makers, also
known as players, have decisions that impact one another [299]. It provides a conceptual
and formal analytical framework for studying the interactions between those players
[300]. Game theory is divided into two branches: non-cooperative and cooperative.
Non-cooperative game theory focuses on individual players, while cooperative game
theory is concerned with coalitions (groups of households, etc.). Cooperative game
theory offers solution concepts with desirable properties (e.g. fairness) which are used in
many applications today. A solution concept predicts the result of a game by describing
the strategies to be adopted by its players [300, 305].
Joint decision-making and cooperation are important aspects to consider when
studying the interactions between players in a cooperative game. Players may have
varying preferences, and thus need to agree on a common plan among themselves, and
using a voting procedure is one of the possible approaches to agree on such a plan [305].
In a voting procedure, treating all players as equals may not be appropriate as
some players may contribute more resources or be more important to the coalition
than others [305]. Weighted voting games are used to address this issue, where each
player is assigned a non-negative weight and either votes in favour of or against a
certain decision (this is analogous to being part of a coalition or not).
If the votes in favour of a decision are equal to or greater than a specific quota, then
the decision is agreed on [306], and the players in favour of this decision comprise the
winning coalition. Although the weight of a player models his relative importance, the
influence of a player on a coalition may not be directly proportional to his weight. The
quota of a weighted voting game may require that all players are involved to achiev a
winning coalition, meaning that each player can individually go against the decision
[305]. For example, to achieve a winning coalition where the quota is 10, player 1 can
contribute 9, and player 2 can contribute 1, but then they are both equally important
to be part of the coalition to win and either can go against the decision.
In a cooperative game, the characteristic function is used to define the value of a
coalition of players N = {1, . . . , n}. Equation 6.1 denotes this as a function v : 2N →
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{0, 1}1 in a weighted voting game for coalition S ⊆ N having weights w = {w1, . . . , wn}
and a winning quota q. The total weights of a winning coalition (or sub-coalition) (i.e.






i∈S wi ≥ q
0 otherwise
(6.1)
6.3 The Shapley Value
The Shapley value – a solution concept from cooperative game theory – provides a
conceptual basis for splitting a reward (or penalty, resource, etc.), among players of a
game into fair and unique shares [301]. In particular, the Shapley value is useful in
super-additive environments2, where it is more beneficial to form bigger coalitions and
where ultimately a grand coalition forms [308].
As this research focuses on collectives of households, then forming bigger coalitions
within the context of such collectives does not incur additional costs in infrastructure
expansions. In other words, having bigger coalitions can provide benefits to such collec-
tives (e.g. aggregate trades of locally produced energy, or demand response resources)
without needing extra investments.
6.3.1 Axioms of Fairness
Given a characteristic function v and a set of players N , the Shapley value, Shj (N, v)
for each player i, provides a “fair” reward (or penalty) distribution as it satisfies the
four axioms of fairness given below. The Shapley value has been proved to be the
unique payoff or worth vector that is symmetric, efficient, additive, and assigns zero to
a null player [309].
• Symmetry: players with equal contributions are rewarded equally: for coalition
S not containing players i and j, if v (S ∪ {i}) = v (S ∪ {j}), then Shi (N, v) =
Shj (N, v).
12N is the set of all subsets of N, including the empty set and N itself.
2Superadditivity means that two mutually exclusive coalitions can earn at least as much payoff by
joining efforts as they can individually, which means the coalitions are better off if they merge into one.
Superadditivity can be denoted as follows for coalitions A and B: if A∩B = φ, v(A∪B) ≥ v(A)+v(B)
[307].
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• Efficiency: the total reward given to players is divided among them and has no
remainder:
∑
i∈N Shi (N, v) = v (N).
• Additivity: if two games are added, then the total reward assigned to them is
the sum of the reward assigned to each game separately: if v and w are the char-
acteristic functions of two games, then Shi (N, v + w) = Shi (N, v) + Shi (N,w).
• Null Player: players not contributing to the worth of a game receive no reward:
for player i, for every coalition S not containing i, if v (S) = v (S ∪ {i}) then
Shi (N, v) = 0.
6.3.2 Formulation
Let us consider a cooperative game (N, v) with characteristic function v, where v :
2N → R and v (∅) = 0 for a finite set of players N . Equation 6.2 denotes the Shapley
value of player i, Shi (N, v) (abbreviated as Shi(v) or Shi throughout this chapter)
– which can be considered the customer’s weight in the game. When player i joins
coalition S, which is a subset of the grand coalition N , their marginal contribution is
denoted by v (S ∪ {i})− v (S). The Shapley value, Shi (N, v), is the average marginal
contribution of player i across all possible coalition permutations 3.





[v (S∪{i})− v (S)] (6.2)
6.3.3 Computation Methods
Computing the Shapley value theoretically has been widely investigated, and precise
solutions have been computed for various games, including the voting game, the airport
game, and the operations research game [301]. Nevertheless, for a weighted voting
game, the computation of the Shapley value has an exponential time complexity as it
is NP-hard [311]. Unless P = NP 4, it can be proven that the Shapley value cannot be
approximated using a polynomial-time algorithm [313].
3Permutation is an arrangement of a set of elements in a linear order, which needs to consider all
possible orders in which players might join the coalition, and where the number of permutations for
a set of n elements is denoted by n! [310].
4P is the class of problems that can be solved in polynomial time, while NP is the class of problems
for which solutions can be verified in polynomial time [312]. The question of whether P = NP is an
open problem, but most computer scientists believe that P 6= NP .
152
In the literature, various methods have been proposed for computing the exact
Shapley value for weighted voting games of different coalition sizes (e.g. the Mann and
Shapley generating function method [314], Conitzer and Sandholm’s method [315], and
Ieong and Shoham’s method [316]).
The last two methods involve encoding the characteristic function in a specific form,
which is only efficient if represented in a succinct manner. Due to the NP-completeness5
of computing the Shapley value for weighted voting games, this succinct encoding does
not generally exist for this class of games. For example, the characteristic function in
the method of Conitzer and Sandholm [317] requires decomposition in a way that is not
applicable in this research. In this thesis, the first two exact methods are investigated,
namely direct enumeration, and the Mann and Shapley generation function method.
For an approximate solution of the Shapley value, a number of estimation methods
have been proposed. Monte Carlo simulations have been used by Mann and Shapley
[318] to estimate the Shapley value from permutations of a coalition that are randomly
sampled. Despite having linear-time complexity, this method lacks details on the sam-
pling technique required, thus limiting its effectiveness [319]. Multi-linear extension
and random permutation are two additional approximation methods with linear-time
complexity, proposed by Owen [320], and Zlotkin and Rosenschein [321], respectively.
However, multi-linear extension has a large approximation error, and random permu-
tation is expected to have a high average error as it randomly chooses only a single
permutation.
In this research, the linear-time approximation method proposed by Fatima et al.
[319], and the stratified sampling method proposed by Maleki et al. [322] are chosen
for approximating the Shapley value.
Direct Enumeration
Directly enumerating the Shapley value is a simple method suitable when there are a
small number of players, and is defined by the mathematical formula in Equation 6.2.
Nevertheless, using this method for games with large numbers of players is infeasible




for N players). Direct
enumeration is used to benchmark the accuracy of other computation methods.
5If a problem is NP-hard and NP, then it is NP-complete, which means that although it can be
verified in polynomial time, it is believed to not have an efficient solution in polynomial time[312].
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Mann and Shapley Generating Function Method
This exact method is based on the generating function method proposed by Mann
and Shapley [314] and is specific to weighted voting games. The memory usage of
this method is intensive, and its time complexity is given by O (CN2), where C is the
number of possible vote totals [323]. In games where players have similar weights, C
is N + 1, whereas in games where all players have different weights, C is 2N . Using
this method is recommended for large coalition sizes if the majority of players have the
same weights [319].
In 1730, generating functions were introduced by Abraham de Moivre [324] to solve
the linear recurrence problem6. Generating functions can take various forms. An ordi-
nary generating function generates the values of interest ci1,...,in for some combinatorial
problem, and involves defining functions as a potentially infinite sum of monomials
over a set of variables xi, i.e. terms of the form ci1,...,inx
i1
1 . . . , x
in
n .
For a weighted voting game of N players, assume that the voting strengths, the
total number of votes and the least number of votes required by a winning coalition
(the quota) are denoted by (w1, w2, ..., wN), w; and q, respectively. For player i, we
define cjk as the number of ways k players, other than player i, can have a sum of j










The generating function g(x, y), suggested by David Cantor to compute coefficients
cjk of Equation 6.3, is given by Equation 6.4 [314]. This is a polynomial in x and y whose
coefficients of xjyk are the values cjk. Multiplying g(x, y) = (1 + x
w1y) . . . (1 + xwNy)
out for any j and k, we get cjk copies of the monomial x







(1 + xwiy) (6.4)
Note that as the weights wi appear in Equation 6.4 as exponents of x, the Mann
and Shapley generating function method requires integers rather than real numbers as
weights, thus inputs to this algorithm are discretized.
6In a linear recurrence, each term in a sequence of values can be defined as a linear function of
earlier terms of the sequence [325].
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Linear-time Approximation
One of the most efficient linear-time methods used to approximate the Shapley value is
the multi-linear extension method proposed by Owen [320]. Nevertheless, this method
does not often provide a satisfactory approximation error for weighted voting games
[319]. Fatima et al. [319] thus proposed a new algorithm that has a lower approximation
error than Owen's.
Assume that w1, w2, ... , wX is a random sample of size X drawn from a distribution
with a mean of µ and a variance of ν. The mean of this sample has a normal distribution
N with a mean of µ and a variance of ν/X. This rule is used by the linear-time
approximation algorithm to find the normal probability distribution, mean, and error
(i.e. ν
X
) in the estimated weight of a random coalition of size X. The linear-time
approximation of the Shapley value of player i in a weighted voting game with N






Ai (X − 1) (6.5)
For player i, the approximate marginal contribution to a random coalition of size X
is denoted by Ai(X), where 1 ≤ X ≤ N ; it is the area under the curve defined by the
estimated normal distribution, N (µ, ν
X
), in the interval [a, b], where a = (q−wi)/X, b =
(q− ε)/X, q is the demand that needs to be curtailed, and ε denotes an infinitesimally
small quantity. In this work, the value of ε used is 10−5; however, other values may be
used as differences in results are negligible based on the evaluations conducted herein.
Stratified Sampling
Castro et al. [301] have developed a polynomial-time algorithm called ApproShapley to
approximate the Shapley value for a large class of games. Nevertheless, this algorithm
has an approximation error bound based on the Central Limit Theorem, making it
an asymptotic bound. In other words, the bound only holds as the number of drawn
samples increases to infinity. Thus, if a finite number of samples is drawn, an error is
introduced [322], or perhaps the error can exceed this bound.
To address this drawback, Maleki et al. [322] proposed an algorithm that uses strat-
ified random sampling to compute an estimation of the Shapley value. Their proposed
algorithm assembles a player's marginal contributions into strata (i.e. homogeneous
subpopulations) based on coalition size. The results of this algorithm become more
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precise compared to random sampling when the samples in each stratum are closer to
each other in value and the differences between strata are greater.
This algorithm has a theoretical bound on the estimation error, given a confidence
threshold, provided that the characteristic function has lower and upper bounds rep-
resented by linear functions of the coalition size. This is a valuable attribute. O'Brien
[81] also proposed a method to estimate the Shapley value based on stratified sampling.
However, the difference is that O'Brien's algorithm estimates the standard deviations
of the strata using reinforcement learning, and includes a constraint to guarantee that
the estimated values satisfy the efficiency property of the Shapley value. To limit the
scope of computation techniques investigated here, only the algorithm proposed by
Maleki et al. [322] is investigated.
Equation 6.6 defines the estimation error bound of the stratified sampling algo-
rithm, where φ and φ̂ denote the exact and estimated Shapley values, respectively.
Additionally, d = 2 (b− a) such that ∀S ⊆ N , a|S| ≤ v (S) ≤ b|S|, according to the











Equation 6.7 defines the least sample size m required to approximate the Shapley
value using stratified sampling given a confidence threshold δ. Here, ε is a desired lower
bound on the estimation error with a probability of (1 − δ), and r denotes the range










This estimation is very efficient, notably when m is sufficiently large compared to
the number of players N . If the error bound of this estimation is compared to that of
random sampling, it can be shown that the error of the latter is significantly higher




The following two sections present two mechanisms developed to leverage the Shap-
ley value to implement fairness in demand response in residential collectives: the fair
share allocator and the loss of utility allocator.
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6.4 Fair Share Allocator
In this section, a fair share allocator is developed to fairly distribute the revenue
achieved by a collective of prosumers, from selling a pre-agreed amount of electricity
to the grid, among prosumers based on their contribution to that amount of electricity.
The Shapley value is leveraged to allocate fair shares using exact and approximate
computations methods discussed in Section 6.3.3.
6.4.1 Overview and Formulation
A collective of N prosumers with multi-site distributed energy resources may collabo-
rate in exporting a specific amount of electricity to the grid to generate income. This
income is then fairly distributed among participating prosumers, based on their contri-
bution in achieving that amount of electricity. The Shapley value can be used to fairly
allocate generated income among contributing prosumers.
The problem of fairly distributing rewards, penalties, or resources, among a coalition
of households can be considered a weighted voting game, similar to the one defined in
Equation 6.1. The characteristic function v, denoted by Equation 6.8, describes the
worth of coalition S ⊆ N = {1, . . . , n} prosumers having weights w = {w1, . . . , wn}
corresponding to the amount of electricity they each export, and a winning quota E
representing the amount of electricity to be exported.
To achieve a winning coalition, the aggregate power to be exported by the prosumers
of coalition S (or a sub-coalition), represented by their weights, must at least meet the
pre-agreed amount of electricity, E. In this case, the winning coalition collectively





i∈S wi ≥ E
0 otherwise
(6.8)
The focus herein is on a single winning coalition. Dealing with multiple winning coali-
tions is not covered in the scope of this research.
6.4.2 Evaluation Scenarios
To evaluate the fair share allocator, two scenarios are used. In the first scenario,
the accuracy of the Shapley value computation using the approximation methods is
determined for a coalition of 10 prosumers aggregating at least 25 kW of electricity in
exchange for a collective reward of 10 units.
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In the second scenario, the scalability of the following three methods is investi-
gated: the Mann and Shapley generating function method, linear-time approximation,
and stratified sampling. The scalability here focuses on the computation time and
the memory use of those methods for coalition sizes ranging between 100 and 1000
prosumers with increments of 100. Coalition sizes at this scale are often reasonable
to create a prosumer collective that exports electricity to the grid/market (e.g. a vir-
tual power plant), or a consumer collective that aggregates demand response resources
[326, 327].
In both scenarios, samples of prosumer power production are generated from a
generalized Pareto distribution, as this distribution provides a realistic representation
of a power production curve (i.e. small power production are common for prosumers
at this scale, while it is rare to have large power production by such prosumers).
To compute the Shapley value, MATLAB (R2011a) was used on an Intel-i5 CPU
with a 64-bit Windows 7 operating system and 8GB RAM7. Simulations were run
10 times for each computation method – and average results are reported. Power
productions are discretized for the evaluations of the three methods because the weights
of the Mann and Shapley generating function method can only be whole numbers8.
For the stratified sampling method, based on the characteristic function given by
Equation 6.8, the value (b− a) used in Equation 6.6 is equal to R (as a = 0 and b = R),
and thus d = 2R. Similarly, the value of r used in Equation 6.7, which denotes the
range of the marginal contributions of prosumers, is chosen to be R.
6.4.3 Results
To ensure the Shapley value is computed with a relatively high accuracy while main-
taining fairness in distributing reward among prosumers of a collective, it is important
that approximation computation methods used have a low approximation error.
For the first evaluation scenario, Figure 6.1 illustrates the fair compensations dis-
tributed among the coalition of prosumers as computed exactly using direct enumera-
tion (on the x-axis) against that approximated using stratified sampling and linear-time
approximation (on the y-axis). Upper and lower dashed lines indicate errors of +10%
7The Mann and Shapley method was implemented using convolution of full and sparse matri-
ces, sparse matrices are used to reduce memory usage because they store zero-valued elements more
efficiently than full matrices.
8It seems likely that this type of discretization would be commonly acceptable by prosumers in a
similar way to billing mobile phone calls in minutes or mobile data usage in megabytes.
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and −10% of the exact compensation, respectively. As shown, approximations using
the stratified sampling method lie closer to exact results represented by the solid line
at 45 degrees, which indicates that stratified sampling provides more accurate results
than linear-time approximation.
Figure 6.2 illustrates the differences between the values approximated using strat-
ified sampling and those using linear-time approximation, which range between 0.23
and −0.12. The figure highlights the range of differences between the two approxi-
mation methods, and indicates that values approximated using linear approximation
are predominantly lower than those using stratified sampling, which may result in
underestimating fair shares.
As the Shapley values approximated using stratified sampling have values that are
closer to directly enumerated values and not underestimated, the stratified sampling
































Stratified Sampling Linear Approximation
Figure 6.1: Exact prosumer compensation computed using direct enu-
meration (x-axis) against that approximated using stratified sampling
and linear approximation (y-axis)
For the second evaluation scenario, Figure 6.3 shows the computation (CPU) time


























Figure 6.2: Difference between prosumer compensation approximated
using stratified sampling and that using linear approximation
As illustrated, the fastest method in terms of computation time is the linear-time
approximation method, whereas the stratified sampling method appears to have a
polynomial execution time.
Computing the Shapley value using the Mann and Shapley generating function
method with sparse matrices (referred to as GF(S) in Figure 6.3) has an exponential
time complexity in terms of the number of prosumers, due to prosumers’ weight di-
versity which can increase the possible vote totals up to 2N ; however, it tends to be
usable (i.e. has practical computation time and memory usage) up to a coalition size
of 400 prosumers.
Using the same method with full matrices (i.e. non-sparse matrices, referred to as
GF(NS) in Figure 6.3), results in an abrupt rise in computation (which appears to be
exponential), therefore no computations have been conducted using non-sparse matri-
ces for coalition sizes beyond N = 300. Full matrices are therefore not recommended
for use in the Mann and Shapley generating function method for computing the Shapley
value.
Figure 6.4 shows that the linear-time approximation method uses the least amount
of allocated memory, while that used by the stratified sampling method is reasonable.
The memory usage of the Mann and Shapley generating function method, using sparse
matrices, rises rapidly, illustrating the main disadvantage of this method.
6.4.4 Discussion
Prosumer compensation is one important aspect of prosumer collectives exporting elec-


























Stratified Sampling Linear Approximation GF(S) GF(NS)
Figure 6.3: The CPU time taken to compute the Shapley value using
the three algorithms for coalition sizes between 100 and 1000
Shapley value to fairly distribute the reward gained from contributing in aggregating
a specific amount of electricity, to be exported from the collective. Three methods
for computing the Shapley value were compared: the Mann and Shapley generating
function, linear-time approximation, and stratified sampling, and their accuracy, com-
putation time and dynamic memory allocation were investigated.
The Mann and Shapley generating function method offers an exact computation
for the Shapley value, where fairness and accuracy of compensation are guaranteed for
customers. However, this computation method uses huge memory resources, and thus
is best suited for coalition sizes up to 400 prosumers. For larger coalition sizes, an
approximation method which has an error bound, e.g. stratified sampling [322], can be
used to compute the Shapley value. This method gives a better approximation for the
Shapley value than that of linear-time approximation, which enables the prosumers to
be fairly rewarded within a predictable bound.
As discussed in Section 6.1, it is assumed that prosumer households using this al-































Stratified Sampling Linear Approximation Generating Function
Figure 6.4: The total amount of memory dynamically allocated by
MATLAB to each Shapley value computation method for coalition
sizes between 100 and 500 prosumers
their solar electricity to the grid/market. A recent study in the UK monitored and
analyzed one-minute electricity data for 302 households with PV generation partici-
pating in a smart grid demonstration project in the UK. The study found that energy
self-consumption is 45% for these households. However, as these households have high
gross electricity demand and high day-time consumption, self-consumption in this case
can be appropriately reflected by 37.3% for average UK households with PV generation
[328].
For a coalition of 400 prosumers, if 200 prosumers have 2 kW solar panels, and the
other 200 have 4 kW solar panels, then such a coalition can export at least 600 kW
of solar electricity in an hour of sunshine. This is a realistic amount of electricity, for
both energy or reserve market power commitments, based on three virtual power plant
projects in the US [326].
Having a collective of 400 prosumers is realistic for creating a virtual power plant.
The electric utility, Eneco, in the Netherlands, has plans to convince 400 prosumers to
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join Crowdnett, a virtual power plant aiming at “borrowing” up to 30% of prosumers’
power capacity, and replacing physical backup power plants [329, 330].
Beside being used for prosumer collectives, this fair share allocator can be used to
fairly distribute compensation among consumers comprising a collective participating
in demand response events. If each consumer in a coalition of 400 sheds their heat
pump, or equivalent electricity usage, during a 1-hour demand response event, 600 kW
can be shed, which is quite reasonable for partaking in demand response provision in
residential areas (some demand response administrators require at least 100 kW to be
reduced [327]) [256].
In prosumer collectives, unfairness may seem more likely to deter the adoption
of collectivism rather than prosumerism. For example, a prosumer collective – with
distributed solar PV on each of its prosumer’s rooftop – is operating in a jurisdiction
where the feed-in tariff used to be generous, and the objective of this prosumer collective
used to revenue creation from exporting its electricity to the grid. Regulations changed
and the feed-in tariff became not as “fair” as it used to be, as prosumers do not see
themselves compensated fairly for exporting their collective’s electricity and, in turn,
for the investment they have made in their DER. Prosumers of the collective do not
find benefit in exporting electricity to the grid anymore, and instead prefer to become
energy self-sufficient by consuming their own energy internally in the collective, instead
of exporting it. A few of the prosumers do not see benefit in being in the collective
anymore, because the return on investment on their DER has decreased, and so drop
out of the collective and rely on energy from their DER and the grid. The collective
sees a need for buying batteries to maximize their energy self-sufficiency and takes a
decision to buy batteries. A number of prosumers see benefit in joining the collective
then, especially after their retailer increased electricity tariffs – which they find is
“unfair”, and so they become part of the collective to benefit from covering unmet
demand from other prosumers rather than the grid.
Having said that, the extent of how unfairness issues may deter collectivism or
prosumerism is highly dependent on the context surrounding prosumer collectives and
is not discussed within the scope of this thesis.
6.5 Loss of Utility Allocator
This section presents a loss of utility allocator to fairly distribute the loss of utility
resulting from DR participation among a collective of customers. Optimizations and
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Shapley value computations are leveraged with the aim of trading off the minimum
total loss of utility experienced by customers to adjust fairness in distributing loss of
utility among a collective of customers.
6.5.1 Overview and Formulation
When it comes to energy use, residential electricity users have varying norms, be-
haviours, flexibility, availability and enabling technologies, which in turn shape the
utilities their households benefit from as a result of using energy. Additionally, the
willingness of such users to change their energy use varies, as changing energy activi-
ties in households may result in loss of utility for household inhabitants.
Typically, in DR practices targeting industrial and commercial users, such users
choose the amount of demand they are willing to reduce, as their energy loads are
largely predictable and they mostly rely on backup generators to provide power supply
during DR events.
On the other hand, residential users have power loads that are dynamic, and they
may not have a full understanding of how their households use energy and how much
power load they can reduce during DR events. Therefore, it makes sense for an ag-
gregator (or another middle actor) to allocate loss of utility to residential users based
on their household energy usage, grid status and DR event specifics, and the metrics
they have agreed on upon initially signing up to a DR program (e.g. availability). This
not only helps set appropriate levels of power reduction for households, but also helps
middle actors decide whether the power reduction quota of a specific DR event is met
and whether additional or fewer DR resources are required.
In addition, it would be regarded as unfair to simply allocate equal power demand
reductions that achieve the power reduction quota required during the DR event among
residential customers, as their energy needs and flexibility to change demand patterns
greatly vary. Thus, it is vital to allocate loss of utility among a coalition of households
in a fair way.
Two works investigate the application of fairness to loss of utility in demand re-
sponse practices. The work of Koutitas [259] proposes two algorithms for scheduling
energy using round-robin and priority-based scheduling to quantify loss of utility and
achieve fairness. The work of Pournaras et al. [260] demonstrates that it is possible
to quantify and control fairness in demand planning, and provides empirical evidence
that unfairness associated with loss of utility varies seasonally and is correlated with
the demand levels of end-users. The authors in that work also show that high levels
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of unfairness can result from trying to adjust loads in an optimum way by reducing,
shifting, or shedding them. Thus, considering trading off optimality for fairness is
important.
This trade-off has not been previously addressed. Thus, this work proposes an
algorithm that trades off the minimum total loss of utility experienced by residential
electricity users in order to achieve a degree of fairness in distributing loss of utility
among those users.
A fair solution, where electricity users receive fair allocations, may not necessarily
be achieved by allocations made through computing the minimum total loss of utility.
A trade-off between optimality and fairness is thus needed to allocate loss of utility in
a fair manner among a collective of end-users providing DR resources. The aim of the
algorithm proposed herein is to achieve a sub-optimal solution, in terms of the total
loss of utility, that allocates loss of utility as fairly as possible amongst a collective of
electricity users. This algorithm comprises three steps:
• Compute the minimum total loss of utility that achieves the power demand re-
duction quota
• Fairly allocate the minimum total loss of utility among a collective of users (sub-
ject to capacity constraints)
• Minimally reallocate to achieve a new distribution of loss of utility among users
if fair allocations of the minimum total loss of utility do not meet the demand
reduction quota
Compute the Minimum Total Loss of Utility
This first step computes the minimum total loss of utility affecting a collective of users
(whether prosumers or consumers) and achieving the quota of the power demand (i.e.
hourly energy use) to be reduced during a DR event. An optimization is used to
benchmark the minimum amount of utility needed to reduce power demand by the
requested amount. Note that a collective-wide optimization approach can produce an
unfair solution, which drives the need for the second step of the algorithm. Figure 6.5
illustrates the first step of the algorithm in the power and utility spaces.
The behaviour of electricity users tends to conform to the law of diminishing
marginal utility, where the utility of a user tends to follow a strictly concave and
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Figure 6.5: Step 1 – computing the minimum loss of utility in the
power and utility spaces subject to constraints on mi
choose plans that match their valuation. Thus, electricity pricing can be used here as
a proxy for utility. The scope of this work does not include utility functions negotiated
among a collective of users (where users agree together on a shared utility function that
reflects their electricity use), or provided by aggregators (where an aggregator assigns
a utility function to characterize the electricity use of the collective of users).
In a DR event, the aggregator typically targets electricity users that have a high
potential of jointly reducing the required quota of power reduction. Selecting those
users can depend on various factors including availability, energy use preferences (e.g.
preferred time of use, and appliance use to shed/shift), history of participation in DR
events, grid status signals, and event requirements.
In this optimization problem, the objective function is given by Equation 6.9. As-
suming that N customers have been chosen to reduce power by a quota Qreq, we denote
the coalition of chosen customers by C = {c1, ..., cN}. For customer ci:
• the baseload (i.e. non-flexible load not to be shifted or shed) is denoted by bi,
and is selected based on the historical data of customers’ smart meters
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• the forecast power use without DR is denoted by pi, and is selected based on the
historical data of customers’ smart meters
• the utility function is denoted by ui, which depends on the service to be curtailed
(i.e. electricity), where electricity price is taken as a proxy for utility and thus the
utility function represents the customers’ electricity price function (which maps
from power use to price)
• the resulting power demand (after demand reduction) of each customer during
the event is denoted by the decision variable mi
• the minimum total loss of utility experienced by customers during the DR event





(ui (pi)− ui (mi)) (6.9)
The following three equations denote the optimization constraints. In Equation 6.10,
mi denotes the power demand expected from a customer during the DR event, and if
the customer is actually reducing power use then this value is constrained to be less
than the forecast power demand without DR: pi. The lower limit of the resulting power
demand, mi, of this customer is defined by the baseload bi to ensure power reduction
does not affect essential loads (i.e. non-flexible loads) needed by customers.
In Equation 6.11, the power reduced by a customer during the DR event is given
by pi −mi, and has an upper bound set by the maximum approved power reduction
set by customer i, which is denoted by rmaxi. Upon joining a DR program, each
customer is assigned an initial maximum power reduction rmaxi based on agreement
with the aggregator. After multiple participations, the value of rmaxi is expected to
be reassessed so as to provide realistic data for customers’ participation.
In Equation 6.12, the total power reduction achieved by a collective of customers
is constrained to equal the power reduction quota Qreq, and this reflects that the
required power reduction quota needs to be achieved by the collective of customers
(i.e. DR resources).
bi < mi < pi ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} (6.10)






Based on the objective function and optimization constraints, this optimization
problem is convex and can be solved using convex optimization techniques [331]. The
minimum value of the objective function LOUmin given by Equation 6.9 is used to
benchmark the loss of utility quota to be distributed fairly amongst the coalition of
customers in the two other steps of the algorithm.
Fairly Allocate the Minimum Total Loss of Utility
The second step of the algorithm determines the fair share of power reduction to be
allocated to each customer during a DR event. This step involves working in two
spaces: utility and power. The data dealt with in the utility space relates to the
benefits that customers gain from using electricity. In the power space, data represents
power demand and reduction. Figure 6.6 illustrates the second step of the algorithm
in the power and utility spaces.
To compute the fair allocations of power demand reduction for each customer par-
ticipating in the DR event, the Shapley value is used to fairly distribute the minimum
total loss of utility computed in the previous step of the algorithm, LOUmin, among
customers in a collective. Firstly, the Shapley value is computed in the utility space.
Secondly, values resulting from this computation are mapped back to the power space
to determine the corresponding, yet not final, fair power demand reduction assigned
to each customer.
Distributing the minimum total loss of utility, LOUmin, fairly among a collective
of customers can be considered as a weighted voting game in the utility space, where
LOUmin is utilized as the winning quota and the value to be distributed among cus-
tomers. Each customer’s weight in this game, denoted by wi, indicates their agreed
maximum possible loss of utility i.
As discussed in Section 6.3.3, computing the Shapley value has an exponential
time complexity, and several methods have been proposed to compute its value within
reasonable timeframes. The algorithm proposed herein uses the Mann and Shapley
generating function method to compute the Shapley value. Although this method is
memory-intensive, and has a time complexity that tends to be exponential for large
coalitions of players, it has an appropriate computation time for a DR setting including
up to 400 customers (as presented in Section 6.4.3).
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Figure 6.6: Step 2 – fairly allocating the minimum total loss of utility
in the power and utility spaces
Equation 6.13 defines the weight wi of customer i in the weighted voting game,
which is assumed to be equal to the customer's maximum possible loss of utility during
the DR event. This equality ensures that the maximum shares of customers from
discomfort resulting from a DR event are taken into account, in the form of each
customer's weight, when accumulating the loss of utility experienced by the collective.
This helps leverage maximum benefits from each customer’s flexibility (i.e. flexible
loads the customer has agreed to reduce), by globally optimizing and aggregating their
maximum possible loss of utility in order to reach the required quota LOUmin of this
weighted voting game. It also ensures that the weight of each customer is linked to
the upper bound of demand reduction they have agreed to reduce (without affecting
non-flexible base loads).
The customer weight, wi, equals the difference between the customer’s utility when
using forecast power without DR and that after reducing forecast power by the maxi-
mum power demand reduction agreed to by the customer, rmaxi. Equation 6.14 defines
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the characteristic function of the game, v.





i∈S wi ≥ LOUmin
0 otherwise
(6.14)
The Shapley value uses customer weight wi (i.e. maximum possible loss of util-
ity during the DR event) to divide the minimum total loss of utility LOUmin among
customers. Note that the efficiency property of the Shapley value, presented in Sec-
tion 6.3.1, guarantees that
∑
wi = LOUmin. To determine fair shares in terms of
power, the Shapley value in the utility space is mapped to the power space, as shown
in Equation 6.15 where the output denotes customers’ fair, yet not final, shares of
power demand reduction, denoted by fi.
fi = pi − u−1i (ui (pi)− Shi) (6.15)
If the total power demand reduction,
∑n
i=1 fi, fails to achieve the power reduction
quota, Qreq, an adjustment of the power demand reduction is needed to achieve the
quota. This failure to achieve the quota may be the result of the non-linear relationship
between power and utility, where each customer may have a different utility function,
and the loss of utility distributed among a collective of customers may not add up
to the power reduction quota requested from the collective when mapped from utility
space to power space and summed.
In addition, in some cases, the Shapley value of a customer (i.e. average marginal
contribution made to achieve the minimum total loss of utility LOUmin) may be equal
to the Shapley value of other customers with higher weights. Assuming a game where
players’ weights are 3, 4 and 5, and the winning quota is 10, it is only possible to reach
the quota if all players contribute, leading to equal Shapley values of 10/3. A corollary
of this in the utility space is that the customer’s fair proportion of loss of utility (i.e.
the Shapley value Shi) can exceed the customer’s relative weight wi. This can have
an effect in the power space where a fair power reduction fi exceeds some customers’
upper bound on power reduction, rmaxi, because the weight of the customer, wi, is
derived from this upper bound.
The next step of the proposed algorithm addresses these issues, and ensures that
the power reduction quota is met and customers’ upper bounds on power reduction are
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not exceeded.
Optimize to Match Required Quota
The third step of the proposed algorithm adjusts the loss of utility, through an opti-
mization, to ensure it meets the requested demand reduction quota and does not result
in power reductions that exceed those agreed to by customers. Failure to achieve this
quota may be due to the non-linear relationship between power and utility, or equal
Shapley values for customers with different weights. Figure 6.7 illustrates the third
step in the power and utility spaces.
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Figure 6.7: Step 3 – optimizing to match the required quota in the
power and utility spaces
This optimization problem aims at minimizing the sum of the differences between
customers’ loss of utility corresponding to fairly allotted power reductions, denoted by
u (fi), and those achieving the quota under an adjusted allocation, denoted by u (xi).
In the objective function, defined by Equation 6.16, the values fi and xi correspond to
the fair power reduction (resulting from Step 2) and the final power reduction (to be
produced by Step 3) for customer i, respectively. This optimization solves for the final
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power reduction, xi, which satisfies the demand reduction quota Qreq, lies between the





(ui (fi)− ui (xi)) (6.16)
The following four equations define the optimization constraints. Equation 6.17
defines the power demand after reducing the final allocation xi, pi − xi, whose value
must lie between the baseload bi and the forecast load pi. Equation 6.19 indicates
that the value of xi must be positive and either equal to or less than the maximum
power reduction rmaxi. Equation 6.18 makes sure that xi does not exceed fi, as some
allocations might have exceeded the rmaxi constraint
Equation 6.20 shows that the total power reduction distributed by this step of the
algorithm to the coalition of customers must be equal to the requested quota Qreq.
bi < pi − xi < pi ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} (6.17)
xi < fi (6.18)





This optimization problem is convex and can be solved using convex optimization
techniques [331], in a similar manner to the optimization presented in Section 6.5.1.
6.5.2 Evaluation Scenarios
This section includes the evaluation scenario and data chosen to test the proposed
algorithm for the loss of utility allocator. Let us assume a smart power grid infrastruc-
ture where two-way communication between grid stakeholders is available and smart
meters are used. Customers choose electricity pricing plans that best fit their utility
function. We consider a DR event that is sent out by a grid operator via an aggregator
to a coalition of customers to reduce power use during a specific period of time.
The inputs to the algorithm are typically gathered from four sources, the grid
operator, the distribution system operator (DSO), the aggregator and the customer,
as follows:
172
• The grid operator requests a specific quota Qreq of power demand reduction from
an aggregator based on grid status and the grid area covered by the aggrega-
tor. Depending on the requested quota, the aggregator can target one collective
of customers or more. For simplicity, only one customer collective is targeted
here, where the aggregator requests a power reduction quota of Qreq from that
collective.
• The DSO collects customers’ smart meter data and upon getting customer con-
sent the DSO provides smart meter data to the aggregator which can disaggregate
and analyze data to produce customer forecast power demand pi and baseload
demand bi.
• The aggregator has a range of customer details including customer preferences,
availability, pricing plans, history of DR participation, etc. Depending on the
specifics of the DR event, the aggregator can use such customer details as inputs
or constraints to the proposed algorithm to allocate power demand reduction to
the target collective of customers.
• The customer provides the aggregator with information such as preferences of
appliance usage, and the maximum power demand reduction allowed rmaxi.
Initially, this value can be set, for example, to the Wattage of a certain appliance
the customer is willing to shed during the DR event, then data can be refined
after a number of participations by the customer.
Three utility functions are considered in this evaluation, based on three electricity
price plans [332]. For example, for customer i, with a forecast power demand denoted
by pi, the utility function ui is given by 0.22 pi
0.5, 0.25 pi
0.4, or 0.28 pi
0.5. For the sake
of evaluation, we randomly generate data for the baseload bi, forecast power demand pi,
and maximum demand reduction rmaxi, based on realistic data available in references
354–356 for an average single-family household with appliances.
The fair loss of utility allocator was implemented using MATLAB, and the op-
timization problem was modelled using YALMIP9 and solved using the IBM ILOG
CPLEX Optimizer. An Intel-i5 CPU with a 64-bit Windows 7 and 8GB RAM was
used to run the computations.
The evaluation scenario for the algorithm involves an aggregator achieving the re-
quested demand reduction quota Qreq by targeting a collective of residential customers
9YALMIP is an open-source optimization modelling language that integrates with MATLAB [333].
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sharing the same low-voltage distribution network. For simplicity, the algorithm was
run for a 1-hour DR event for a collective of 150 customers collectively reducing their
aggregate power demand by 150 kW. This evaluation illustrates how the final power
demand allocated by the algorithm compared to the forecast, minimum and fair power
demands.
6.5.3 Results
The run time of the evaluation scenario (including the computations of the Shapley
value using the Mann and Shapley generating function method) was 75.3 seconds.
The following three figures illustrate the deviations between the final allocated power
demand and the forecast, minimum, and fair power demand, respectively.
The forecast and final power demands of customers in the coalition are shown in
Figure 6.8. The solid diagonal line indicates two identical values, whereas the dashed
lines denote points on deviations (+/- 10 and 20%). Points below the solid line indicate
that all customers will be reducing their power demand. Most power reductions are
around 25% of the forecast power, and a few customers reduce up to 53%.
The range of customers’ power demand reductions is between 0.5 to 2 kW, where 42
customers each reduce between 0.5 and 1 kW. In practical terms, this can be a customer
delaying washing clothes, or having his freezer/fridge cycled by the aggregator. Then,
89 customers each reduce between 1 and 1.5 kW by, e.g., reducing the thermostat of
their heat pump, or rescheduling the dishwasher to off-peak periods. The remaining
19 consumers each reduce between 1.5 and 2 kW, perhaps by delaying their cooking
or shedding the air conditioner. More power demand reduction can be achieved by
controlling water heating and clothes drying.
Figure 6.9 illustrates the minimum power demand10 resulting from computing the
minimum total loss of utility in the first step of the algorithm) versus the final power
demand, where the values for 92 customers overlap or are within 1% of the solid line,
which indicates that minimum and final demands are quite similar. Nevertheless, 58
customers have more varying results, with 34 of them having differences that range
between 1.8 kW less and 0.1 kW more than the final demand, and 24 have differences
between 0.1 and 1.5 kW more than the final demand. This indicates that around 39%
of the customers in the evaluation scenario have final power demand that differs from
10The term minimum power demand is not used to refer to minimum values, as wi values are not
guaranteed to give minimum demand, but is used to to refer to the power demand values computed































Figure 6.8: The forecast versus final power demand of each consumer
in a coalition of 150 consumers
minimum demand.
Figure 6.10 illustrates that the final power demand is less than the fair power
demand, which implies greater loss of utility is observed than in the case of using the
minimum total loss of utility optimization.
6.5.4 Discussion
The utility that residential customers get from using electricity varies greatly due to a
number of factors, e.g. energy practices, household appliances, and customer flexibility.
Thus, equally allocating power demand reductions among customers would be regarded
as unfair, because utility specifics need to be taken into account while allocating such
reductions. As trying to collectively minimize the loss of utility experienced by a
collective of customers participating in a DR event achieves a fair distribution but may
breach rmaxi constraints, an algorithm is proposed to trade off optimality and try to
achieve fairness by taking the utilities of customers into consideration when allocating































Figure 6.9: The minimum versus final power demand of each con-
sumer in a coalition of 150 consumers
Participating customers may act strategically by changing their actual power use
(and thus the maximum power reduction rmaxi) over a period of time and thus pro-
vide false power demand profiles. Nevertheless, the aggregator can detect cheating
customers by matching rmaxi with actual power use data over time. Otherwise, the
aggregator can reward customer flexibility by paying each participant in the DR event a
fixed fee based on the difference between his baseload bi and maximum power reduction
rmaxi; however, this is not addressed here.
In this setting, practical issues prevent problems with coalition stability, as the
aggregator considers only the grand coalition of a set of customers participating in a
DR event, and deals individually with those customers, not members of subcoalitions.
In addition, there is no realistic option for a residential customer to defect from the
grand coalition, especially during a single DR event, as grid operators require bulk
power reductions. Thus, having a customer directly sell DR resources to the grid
































Figure 6.10: The fair versus final power demand of each consumer in
a coalition of 150 consumers
To compute fair allocations, the Shapley value is used because it is beneficial in the
case of super-additive environments where forming large coalitions has benefits and
adding customers does not significantly require additional costs.
At the end of the second step of the algorithm, fairly allocated loss of utility is
mapped from the utility space to the power space in order to ensure that the power
reduction requested from the coalition is met. Because resulting fair power reductions
might not necessarily meet the power reduction quota or respect the maximum power
reduction allowed by each customer, a third step is needed in the algorithm to guarantee
that constraints are met.
The third step of the algorithm comprises an optimization to determine a new set
of final power demand reductions that meets and respects the power reduction quota,
customers’ maximum allowed power reductions, and constraints of the DR event and
the customer coalition. The target of this step is to minimize the total difference
between the fair and final loss of utility across all customers. An optimization is
used rather than another round of fair allocations in order to avoid adding to the
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computation time, as fast response time is highly desired for DR applications.
Additionally, comparing the minimum power demand resulting from the first step
of the algorithm with the final power demand resulting from this step indicates that
around 39% of the customers in the scenario have final power demand that differ from
minimum demand, which supports the assumption that the minimum total loss of
utility (computed in the first step of the algorithm) does not necessarily yield fair
allocation.
6.6 Summary
In this chapter, two mechanisms have been developed to enable fairness in dynamic de-
mand response practices targeting residential collectives, both prosumers or consumers.
The first mechanism – the fair share allocator – uses the Shapley value, which is a
solution concept in cooperative game theory, to fairly distribute the collective’s revenue
from exporting electricity to the grid/market among its prosumers. This mechanism is
modelled as a weighted voting game, where prosumers’ weights reflect their electricity
contribution in achieving the electricity quota to be exported from the collective.
Four methods for computing the Shapley value for weighted voting games have
been investigated in terms of their accuracy, computation time and memory use. Two
of the methods, namely direct enumeration and the Mann and Shapley generation
function method, provide exact results, while the stratified sampling and linear-time
approximation methods provide approximate results.
The stratified sampling method provides more accurate results than linear-time
approximation for computing the Shapley value in the fair share allocator, while the
fastest method in terms of computation time is the linear-time approximation method.
Nevertheless, using the Mann and Shapley generating function method with sparse
matrices was found to have appropriate computation time up to a collective size of 400
customers.
To put this to scale, for a collective of 400 prosumers, if 200 prosumers have 2 kW
solar panels while the remaining 200 have 4 kW of solar panels, and the households
export at least 50% of their solar electricity, then the collective exports at least 600
kW of solar electricity in an hour of sunshine. Based on existing and planned virtual
power plant projects, this is a realistic amount of electricity for both energy and reserve
market power commitments, and also a reasonable size for a prosumer collective.
If the fair share allocator is customized to compensate residential consumers partic-
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ipating in demand response events, if each consumer in a collective of 400 sheds their
heat pump, or equivalent demand, during a 1-hour event, then 600 kW are shed, which
is reasonable demand response activities in residential areas.
As for allocated memory usage, the linear-time approximation method uses the
least memory in the fair share allocator, while that used by the stratified sampling
method is realistic. However, the memory usage of the Mann and Shapley generating
function method grows rapidly and is thus the main disadvantage of this method.
The second mechanism – the loss of utility allocator – also uses the Shapley value
to fairly distribute loss of utility associated with demand response practices among
a collective of consumers, as equally allocating power demand reductions among cus-
tomers may not necessarily be fair. This mechanism trades off optimality, in terms of
minimum total loss of utility, with the aim of achieving as much fairness as possible.
This mechanism assumes that users want to experience the least loss of utility possible
during DR events, as changing their normal demand patterns may cause inconvenience.
The mechanism comprises three steps: (1) computing the minimum total loss of util-
ity that achieves the power demand reduction quota, (2) fairly allocating the minimum
total loss of utility among a collective of users, and (3) reallocating new distributions
of loss of utility among users if fair allocations of the minimum total loss of utility do
not meet the demand reduction quota when mapped back to power and adjusted for
maximum participation constraints.
Results of a sample scenario show that 39% of customers were allocated a final
power demand that differs from their minimum power demand, thus supporting the
assumption that the minimum total loss of utility does not necessarily yield fair allo-
cation.
Those two mechanisms may both be incorporated into the software offerings pro-
vided by middle actors to residential collectives, and may be customized to target both
prosumer as well as consumer collectives. Such software mechanisms around distribu-
tive fairness can help build trust and transparency between stakeholders involved in





This chapter weaves findings from this research with literature findings, and intertwines
research findings together, to highlight linkages, identify novelty, and provide future
recommendations.
7.1 Overview
Power grids today are becoming more digitized, decentralized and decarbonized, where
they are increasingly integrating new information, communication and distributed en-
ergy technologies, and becoming smart grids. The traditional power grid model where
electricity is generated in centralized plants then transmitted and distributed to end-
users is changing, where end-users are uptaking micro-generation to produce their own
electricity mainly due to their rising affordability. More recently, groups of households
started coming together to form prosumer collectives whose complex socio-technical
interactions are requiring more dynamic demand response approaches for managing
energy, and creating value for the collective and involved stakeholders.
Smart grid technologies and capabilities have the potential to enable innovative
products and services to manage the sophisticated flows of power, data, and money
among prosumers in a collective, and between collectives and the grid. Such capa-
bilities include balancing intermittent supply with variable demand across prosumer
households, maximizing value creation arising from collective prosumerism (e.g. selling
electricity to the grid), and incorporating social notions that are essential in socio-
technical contexts (e.g. fairness).
Most electricity system incumbents (i.e. top actors) do not provide dynamic de-
mand response solutions for prosumer collectives. Nonetheless, new businesses (i.e.
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middle actors) are leveraging this opportunity to create innovative offerings which en-
able prosumer collectives to manage and value energy in new ways.
This thesis provides novelty in investigating how smart grid opportunities can be
leveraged to improve demand response practices for residential prosumer collectives,
by exploring new emerging businesses, their innovative smart grid offerings, how this
implicates dynamic demand response, and how to incorporate fairness in such offerings
based on its notion from literature and interview findings.
To conduct this investigation, the thesis posed four research questions:
• RQ 1 – What is the current status of energy demand management and what new
opportunities exist?
• RQ 2 – How do new opportunities offered by the smart grid support the emergence
of residential prosumer collectives?
• RQ 3 – How are middle actors shaping smart grid offerings, and what are the
implications for dynamic demand response in residential prosumer collectives?
• RQ 4 – How can fairness be fostered in dynamic demand response for residential
collectives?
The first two research questions have been addressed through reviewing literature
from academic publications, industry studies, and project reports, on current energy
demand management practices, and how smart grid opportunities are generally sup-
porting the rise of residential prosumer collectives. This literature review has identified
the lack of enabling solutions from top actors in the electricity system, the rise of new
businesses, middle actors, which are developing smart grid offerings for residential pro-
sumer collectives, and the need to consider fairness and demand flexibility aspects in
dynamic demand response for such collectives.
The third question investigated how new businesses are shaping smart grid solu-
tions and how this implicates dynamic demand response, by gathering qualitative data
from semi-structured interviews with executives from new businesses with current or
potential solutions for dynamic demand response for prosumer collectives.
The fourth question explored how to foster fairness in software solutions enabling
dynamic demand response for collectives of households, by interpreting the notion of
fairness based on literature and interview findings, and using qualitative data (smart
meter data, electricity tariffs, etc.) to do so.
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7.2 Findings and Discussion
In this section, I discuss the main findings of the research, highlight how they link to
the literature, and intertwine findings from the social and technical work streams of
this thesis. Section 7.3 lists the points of novelty, where I am contributing to extend
the literature, and Section 7.4 presents future recommendations on how this research
can be used and by who.
7.2.1 Smart Grids
Based on literature review and further underpinned by research findings, smart grids
host various technologies and features, which can significantly evolve current demand
response practices to become more dynamic and suitable for the changing energy land-
scape in general, and the rise of prosumer collectives in particular.
Interview findings have shown that dynamic demand response solutions, being in-
creasingly developed by new businesses for prosumer collectives, offer various benefits
to power grids, prosumers and collectives, and the wider society, including:
• Greater resilience for power grid systems and operations, which can enhance grid
reliability and stability
• Improved utilization of power grid assets, which can help with the transition to-
wards decentralized power grids and cancel or postpone building large generation
power plants
• Enhanced data-driven decision-making in power grids and prosumer collectives,
which supports value creation from smart grid data
• Stronger market access and business models for prosumer collectives, which boosts
their position to sell or trade electricity, or provide demand response resources
• Greater autonomy for prosumer collectives, where they can rely on energy self-
consumption and be more independent of the grid
• Enhanced options for prosumer engagement, choice and control
• Increased use of renewable energy technologies, which contribute to various en-
vironmental and societal benefits for the wider society
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7.2.2 Prosumers and their Collectives
The literature review and interview findings confirm that the rapid emergence of pro-
sumers and the growing phenomenon of prosumer collectives are both strong trends in
the transition of power grids from centralized load-following to decentralized supply-
following. Such trends are indicators of how the energy landscape is changing, and how
energy end-users’ characteristics, activities, and objectives are becoming multi-faceted.
Such complex changes are triggering the adoption of interdisciplinary research, as lever-
aged herein, and the creation of innovative smart grid offerings and new business cases.
Individual Prosumers
Although the concept of prosumerism, which was first introduced in the 1980s and
expanded in 2008, revolves around value creation, my findings have concluded that
current definitions of energy prosumer in the literature focus on energy and who is
using it (i.e. whether it is self-consumed or shared with others), rather than value
creation around this energy, which limits prosumerism in a way.
Literature review and research findings have shown that an energy prosumer can
create value by totally using, totally exporting, or both using and exporting energy,
which contrasts with existing definitions describing the prosumer as someone that is
primarily exporting surplus energy. Prosumers have various objectives; they may have
become prosumers, in the first place, for financial benefits rather than to achieve energy
self-sufficiency. Such findings indicate that, in all cases, prosumers add to the electricity
mix of the grid, irrespective of who is consuming that electricity, and creating value
around energy in new ways (selling electricity, storing energy, etc.). This, in turn,
informs the development of smart grid offerings targeting prosumerism, and highlights
how they can be shaped to create benefits for prosumers, the grid, and other involved
stakeholders.
To make individual prosumerism more encompassing of value creation, I proposed
a new definition for an energy prosumer, as follows:
An energy prosumer produces energy and can totally or partially consume,
sell, store or trade this energy.
Interview findings have especially highlighted the value creation issue, where some
executives think future prosumers may become paid nodes by receiving incentives in
return for their location on the grid and the benefits they can help others (grid opera-
tors, distribution companies, etc.) achieve. Such findings should ideally trigger middle
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actors to develop businesses models and innovative offerings for prosumerism in a way
that incorporates value creation for and by prosumers.
Literature and interview findings have underlined that macro- and micro-scale eco-
nomics, policies and regulations play a core role in shaping the constraints of prosumers’
objectives. Today, a prosumer may use electricity or store it; tomorrow, they may sell
it to the grid or to a consumer. Therefore, when developing smart grid offerings for
prosumers, careful consideration should be given to the wider economic and regulatory
context where such offerings are to be deployed, to guarantee their acceptance and
successful adoption.
Based on interview insights, smart grid offerings enabling dynamic demand response
for individual prosumers include battery storage, distributed energy control and op-
timization, automated demand response, energy disaggregation, dynamic electricity
pricing, and online electricity trading.
Prosumer Collectives
Based on literature review, I proposed the following definition to describe a prosumer
collective,
A prosumer collective comprises a group of consumers producing and/or
storing electricity through multi- or focal-site distributed energy resources,
and leveraging information and communication technologies to create value
for the collective and its external stakeholders.
I have concluded that this definition is inclusive of the various initiating entities
and configurations of prosumer collectives. This term neither links the definition to
a “community”, because not all collectives are community-based, nor restricts it to a
specific grid structure (e.g. micro-grid). In a similar way to the definition I proposed
for a prosumer, this definition builds on the concept of value creation, where prosumer
collectives can potentially benefit “everyone”, which should ideally push the creation
of more collective-driven smart grid products and services.
Building on this definition, it is important to reiterate that a prosumer refers to each
member of a prosumer collective, regardless of whether this member is individually con-
sidered a prosumer. This is especially applicable to focal-site collectives (e.g. Hepburn
Wind). Underlining this point may promote the concept of collective prosumerism, by
making it easier for households to join a prosumer collective, as they do not necessarily
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need to have their own distributed energy resources to be part of a collective, but can
alternatively support shared energy assets, e.g. technically, or financially.
Furthermore, the proposed definition broadens the opportunities for creating value
for a collective. For instance, this definition does not limit value creation in a prosumer
collective to exporting surplus energy to external entities, as certain collectives may be
essentially financially-driven. In fact, one of the executives pointed out that their com-
pany dominantly works with prosumer collectives selling their electricity production to
the grid rather than those self-consuming it. Such findings can trigger new businesses
to look beyond the energy self-sufficiency issue of prosumer collectives, and address a
wider set of objectives for those collectives.
In the interviews, most executives used the words community and micro-grid to refer
to what I define as a prosumer collective. I link this back to the early development
of prosumer collectives, which were often initiated by grassroots community efforts,
and to commercial micro-grids, which integrate various forms of distributed energy
resources and operate in island-mode in case of grid emergencies. This indicates that
new businesses are working across a range of offerings for prosumer collectives, and are
not limited to specific physical configurations.
Based on the literature, drivers of forming prosumer collectives include future proof-
ing and creating relevant actors in a world powered by renewable energy. One of the
executives described this meaning, in a way, by saying that their business is “building
a leader board of like-minded people who are engaged on something that is mundane
like electricity”. Interview findings further support this point, where executives see
prosumer collectives relevant in a future where the uptake of distributed renewables is
rising and where resiliency to climate change impacts is essential. Such findings sup-
port middle actors’ business cases and their efforts to advance the state of prosumer
collectives and associated smart grid offerings, and underpins their role in catalyzing
energy transformations.
While the desire to live green by using renewable energy is one of the key drivers of
individual and collective prosumerism, interview findings indicate that this desire goes
beyond electricity usage to include transportation, public buildings, geographies and
community action. One of the executives summarized it by saying that “it is about
doing things in a new way”. This emphasizes the need to build collaborations around
products and services pertaining to energy, in order to create a holistic view of the
wider society.
The literature shows evidence that power grids in many countries are becoming
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smart(er). By using interview findings to relate to this, executives think that enabling
technologies for prosumer collectives are available, and expect future collectives to use
more real-time technologies and generally become smarter; nonetheless, executives also
think that the future is more about cost drivers rather than technology. This triggers
the urgency to bring economic analysis into this socio-technical context, especially
around developing products and services, as cost is expected to play a key role in
driving the future growth of prosumer collectives.
Literature and interview findings highlight the rise in integrating batteries in house-
holds, and link it to the fall in battery prices. While the literature focuses on prosumers’
benefits arising from using distributed storage, executives highlighted how batteries im-
plicitly benefit distribution companies, by helping mitigate the impacts of intermittent
micro-generation on distribution networks. This is one way of emphasizing that value
creation from smart grid offerings for prosumer collectives goes beyond individual pro-
sumers and collectives, to benefit top actors (e.g. distribution companies). This also
draws attention to the integral role of batteries in dynamic demand response, where
they enhance the potential for creating flexible demand, notably in case of intermittent
micro-generation.
Based on literature findings and analyzing example prosumer collectives, solar PV,
wind turbines, biogas plants, and solar thermal panels are the main technologies be-
ing used for distributed generation in prosumer collectives. Yet, in the interviews,
executives rarely mentioned solutions around solar thermal panels. In fact, one of the
companies has developed a solution to heat water using solar PV rather than solar ther-
mal because of its inefficiencies if poorly insulated. This focus on electricity-generating
solar can be attributed to the rise in electrification, e.g. rise in the uptake of heat
pumps as a heating/cooling source, rather than non-electricity based heating. In fact,
this focus can further support the rise in electrification identified in the literature,
especially as the adoption of prosumer collectives grows.
7.2.3 Top Actors
The literature review has shown that the majority of top actors (grid operators, dis-
tribution companies, etc.) lack the pace and/or the capacity to innovate dynamic
demand response offerings for prosumers and collectives. This was confirmed by inter-
view findings, where executives think that one of the factors triggering their companies
to launch was to fill the gaps left by top actors in catering for prosumerism in general.
This emphasizes that there is a gap left by top actors, and middle actors are emerging
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to elevate the capabilities of top actors to develop smart grid offerings that improve
demand response practices to cater for the needs of prosumer collectives.
Executives have generally linked the tardiness of most top actors to a lack of knowl-
edge and appropriate pricing mechanisms, slow markets and processes, and caution
around revenue generation. This finding can serve as a guidance to top actors, so
that once they experience such issues, they should seek support from middle actors to
enhance their capabilities in addressing the needs of prosumer collectives.
The executive from the only top actor interviewed, a distribution company, has
exemplified the voice of a slow top actor. This executive forecasted that prosumers
will grow, whether top actors like it or not, and that top actors have to adapt, which
reflects a passive role reacting to change rather than a proactive role catalyzing this
change.
7.2.4 Middle Actors
In this thesis, the term “middle actors” is used to refer to businesses facilitating the
interactions between rapidly rising bottom actors (i.e. prosumer collectives) and slow-
moving top actors (electric utilities, grid operators, etc.). Middle actors developing
state-of-the-art smart grid offerings to prosumers and collectives are emerging so rapidly
that very limited literature exists on this topic.
Interview findings have demonstrated that middle actors have mostly emerged to fill
the gap left by those top actors failing to meet the needs of prosumers and collectives
while maintaining reliable and stable power grids. Middle actors mainly add value
by developing offerings, mostly software-based, for prosumer collectives to maximize
energy self-consumption, maintain grid reliability, create value from smart grid data,
and enable flexibility management.
Based on their dates of establishment, middle actors have mostly launched their
businesses during the past few years. In seeking to find well-established businesses with
new offerings for prosumers and collectives – so as to interview their executives – very
few companies have been found to fit this category. This was further underlined by
interview findings, which have shown that very few innovative solutions are being built
by well-established companies with existing offerings for traditional demand response.
With regards to evolving their solutions, interview findings have shown that some
companies evolve vertically, by adding new features to their solutions and enhancing
their existing offerings, while others try to diversify their offerings horizontally by
expanding their geographies, markets, and technologies. This finding can guide the
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growth of businesses developing dynamic demand response solutions, by providing
various options for enhancing their offerings and presence.
7.2.5 Dynamic Demand Response Solutions
Based on literature review, I identified five categories of solutions with potential for
enabling dynamic demand response for prosumer collectives, as follows: (1) virtual
power plant, (2) technology for optimized resource use, (3) dynamic electricity pricing,
(4) peer-to-peer transactions within a community, and (5) aggregation.
Based on the interviews, I identified four categories of solutions, namely (1) virtual
power plant, (2) automated demand response, (3) dynamic electricity pricing, and
(4) online electricity trading, as described below. Those four categories have been
distinguished based on terminology used by interviewees, the way they categorize their
companies’ offerings, and considerations around what is included under each category
of solutions (e.g. aggregation is being currently considered as part of virtual power
plant operations).
• Virtual Power Plant – Monitor and control various micro-generation, storage and
flexible load devices (e.g. solar PV inverters, battery management systems, and
load controllers) based on the demand flexibility plans of households, grid condi-
tions, external conditions (e.g. temperature and humidity), and market conditions
around energy trading in order to optimize power flows or trade energy.
• Automated Demand Response – Monitor and control various household appli-
ances and storage devices (e.g. smart thermostats and home batteries) based on
a preprogrammed demand reduction plan, demand response event specifics, and
grid conditions in order to automatically change demand during an event (also
applies to consumer households).
• Online Electricity Trading – Provide online trading services that allow prosumers
to sell their electricity to consumers on the same distribution network or to the
power grid, and enable consumers to shop for their energy.
• Dynamic Electricity Pricing – Provide retailing services, where electricity is sold
at wholesale electricity market prices or dynamic tariffs (e.g. expected cost-to-
service tariffs) in addition to fixed retailer costs, to consumers who want to benefit
from cheaper rates at off-peak hours and prosumers who want to store cheap
electricity in their batteries.
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Solutions around virtual power plants and dynamic electricity pricing have been
identified in both the literature and interview findings. Aggregation has been identified
in the interviews as part of virtual power plant operations, and is thus not currently
considered a separate category of solutions.
Based on the interviews, technologies for optimized resource use primarily achieve
automated demand response. As for peer-to-peer transactions within a community, this
categorization is very specific, and thus not descriptive enough for electricity trades
in prosumer collectives. Therefore, building on interview insights, the term online
electricity trading has been chosen instead, to provide a broader description, which
can be within the collective or between the collective and external entities.
Those various categories of dynamic demand response solutions are all leveraging
smart grid technologies and features, in one way or another, to evolve the demand
response concept, enhance its practices, and make it accommodating for prosumerism
and collectivism. This, in turn, helps address the overarching research aim of this
thesis, around how new opportunities made possible by the smart grid can be used
to improve the status of demand response for prosumer collectives, while benefiting
end-users and power grids. Demand response is evolving and branching into a number
of dynamic demand response offerings, which are motivated by a range of drivers and
are creating various benefits.
7.2.6 Demand Flexibility
Interview findings have shown that companies interpret the word “flexibility” in various
ways that go beyond demand flexibility, and thus two streams of smart grid solutions
relating to flexibility have been identified, solutions (1) incentivizing flexibility (using
dynamic pricing, etc.), and others (2) enabling flexibility (using smart controls, etc.).
Dynamic demand response approaches are thus expanding beyond demand flexibility,
to address a wider range of interpretations for flexibility.
In the literature review, I pointed out that the current definition of demand response
needs to be stretched to accommodate energy transformations at the demand-side of
the grid, and proposed the term “dynamic demand response” to describe the new
approaches being developed for managing energy in prosumer collectives. Neverthe-
less, most executives used the term “flexibility management” to refer to the new and
improved version of demand response that relates to enabling flexible demand.
In the literature, demand response and distributed storage are generally identified
as two separate ways of creating demand flexibility. Interview findings, however, have
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reflected that distributed storage is an integral part of smart grid offerings. Thus,
dynamic demand response includes distributed storage at its core.
7.2.7 Fairness
The literature review has underlined that failure to develop fairness and equity in
prosumer collectives may result in a lack of their social acceptance, and that exploring
procedural and distributive fairness in such collectives can help in understanding and
evaluating their processes and outcomes.
Investigating the example prosumer collectives, presented in Section 3.3.6, has
specifically identified the importance of tackling issues such as fair distribution of fees,
benefits and flexibility, in order to support the growth and acceptance of prosumer
collectives.
Very little literature exists around fairness for prosumer collectives and in dynamic
demand response settings, where fairness is often poorly formulated and/or explained,
and only comprises part of research investigations.
The concept of “fairness” has been discussed with company executives, and findings
show that it is a very important aspect that is highly valued by companies, and is
integrated in different forms in their solutions. The responses have generally indicated
that companies see fairness as an issue that needs to be holistically addressed across
involved stakeholders, rather than be focused on a specific feature in a product or
service. Considering social concepts, such as fairness, in such smart grid solutions is
thus happening, and it is recommended to be holistically addressed rather than be
implemented in silo features.
Fairness for some companies is implemented by providing transparency through
dynamic electricity prices which reflect wholesale electricity spot prices. For other
companies, fairness lies in providing market access to prosumer collectives, in a sim-
ilar way to traditional generators, to sell their electricity to the grid or large-scale
consumers, or in enabling trading among prosumers and consumers in a collective. Ex-
ecutives also see fairness being implemented via providing freedom for both prosumers
and consumers to choose who to sell and buy electricity to and from, respectively,
which is actually being offered by a few online trading platforms. Reflecting on this,
it is important to clarify that choice in this case is just in terms of transactions rather
than actual physical electrons moving from a prosumer to a consumer.
By linking those findings to the literature, such forms of fairness yield procedural
justice in enhancing the outcome of decision-making processes made by bottom actors,
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where aspects like transparent access to information, the right to participate, and
freedom of choice are supported.
As for fairness in the form of distributive justice, some executives see their com-
panies delivering fairness by empowering prosumers and collectives to partition energy
assets and associated financial benefits with big electric utilities, e.g. by exporting their
electricity to the market and create a market share for themselves, instead of the dom-
inance of big utilities. Other companies focus on fairly distributing benefits among
stakeholders involved in prosumer collectives. As for battery system providers, they
see their batteries contributing to fairness in the case of low feed-in tariffs, as they help
prosumers fairly distribute the value of their investment instead of having to opt-in to
revenue from low tariffs.
The two software algorithms developed in the technical stream have built on the
perceptions induced from the interviews about what fairness means for middle actors.
The first algorithm, the fair share allocator, can help a prosumer collective selling
its electricity to share its income fairly among its prosumers. This algorithm can be
modified to suit consumers and distribute compensation among those collaborating to
reduce demand during a demand response event. The second algorithm, the loss of
utility allocator, can help households collectively reducing demand by assigning fair
allocations of loss of utility, associated with demand response, among those house-
holds. This algorithm can be modified to distribute loss of utility among prosumers
(equipped with separate units of micro-generation) contributing to electricity exported
by a collective.
Both algorithms can be integrated into software solutions provided by emerging
businesses to top actors, to create fairness-driven offerings that attract both pro-
sumers and consumers and promote collective action. Those algorithms approximate
fair shares, using the Shapley value, for a collective comprising up to 400 households
with high accuracy, while using appropriate time and memory resources.
7.2.8 Business Models and Regulations
Although business models of middle actors and associated regulatory frameworks en-
abling prosumer and collectives have been briefly touched upon throughout this thesis,
delving into details pertaining to both topics was not intended to be part of this re-
search. Interviews have been conducted with companies operating across different
jurisdictions and regulatory contexts, and no specific countries or markets were dis-
cussed in details. Interviewees have not been directly asked neither about the details
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of their business models nor about regulatory contexts impacting their offerings.
Nevertheless, interview findings have highlighted situations where regulations have
impacted both prosumerism and collectivism. For example, the drop in feed-in tariffs
in 2011 in Germany has motivated prosumers to use batteries to increase their self-
consumption from their rooftop solar panels and save money on buying electricity
from the grid, rather than earn reduced money from selling electricity to the grid. In
Germany, network providers pay entities (e.g. middle actors) to take excess energy from
the grid in order to stabilize it, and such middle actors may use this money to cover the
expenses needed by the prosumers they serve to achieve 100% energy self-sufficiency.
I concluded that middle actors are basically moving away from the traditional cor-
porate model of electric utilities, and adopting new business models for value creation.
The majority of middle actors today rely on a business-to-business model, where they
provide solutions to top actors, which then serve bottom actors. This finding overlaps
with the literature review, which indicated that although most top actors are not up
to speed with adequately offering innovative solutions to collectives, those top actors
that are up to speed are doing so in collaboration with middle actors.
Interviews have shown that only a few companies rely on a business-to-customer
model in which they directly serve bottom actors. This may be due to the nature of
products and services provided by those middle actors. However, this may stem from
the absence of proactive top actors, which create opportunities for middle actors to
shadow the role of top actors, especially in deregulated markets promoting competition,
while providing innovative offerings as well.
7.3 Novelty
The literature studying the transition to more decentralized energy systems mainly
takes a technocratic approach around how and where to integrate distributed energy
resources into existing infrastructure while maintaining grid reliability. Social studies
on decentralized energy systems focus on their influence on end-user behaviour and
their spatio-temporal diffusion, while socio-technical literature on the same topic is
limited. The ways in which socially-conscious technology solutions can be shaped to
support the integration of distributed energy resources is often overlooked, while the
actors developing such solutions are under-investigated.
This research provides novelty by interweaving social and technical knowledge from
literature to develop new interpretations for the complex interactions arising in resi-
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dential prosumer collectives and the innovation leveraged in dynamic demand response,
and to create new socio-technical knowledge around those interpretations.
This research extends the literature by:
• Investigating the role of new businesses (middle actors) in facilitating the interac-
tions between electricity system incumbents (top actors) and residential prosumer
collectives (bottom actors), and the value they create
• Exploring how advanced technologies in information, communication, and dis-
tributed energy are disrupting traditional demand response and creating a new
wave of dynamic demand response offerings
• Identifying four categories of dynamic demand response solutions: virtual power
plants, automated demand response, online electricity trading, and dynamic elec-
tricity pricing
• Extending the socio-technical literature around what fairness means for middle
actors, and how fairness is reflected in smart grid offerings for prosumer collectives
• Proposing a definition for a prosumer collective, and a new definition for an
energy prosumer, where both definitions revolve around value creation rather
than specifics of physical configurations or objectives
• Approximating the Shapley value, which determines the unique and fair share of
each player in a coalition, based on their average marginal contribution, with high
accuracy and reasonable time and memory resources for a collective comprising
400 players
• Developing a software algorithm which approximates the fair distribution of a
collective’s revenue (from selling electricity) among its prosumers
• Developing a software algorithm which trades off minimum total loss of utility,
experienced by a collective of households in a dynamic demand response event,
with fairness in allocating loss of utility among those households
7.4 Future Work
Interview findings have shown that the future of energy demand management is fore-
cast to focus on flexibility management, power quality enhancement and developing
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decentralized power grids, while residential prosumer collectives are expected to inte-
grate more battery storage and real-time intelligent technologies, and be both physical
and virtual.
As for the challenges facing the development of prosumers and collectives, they are
expected to revolve around creating flexibility, coordinating between involved stake-
holders, developing scalable business models and adequate regulatory frameworks, and
managing social risks. Based on those findings, I conclude that future research around
dynamic demand response for prosumer collectives needs to focus on four topics, as
follows:
• Creating effective coordination between stakeholders involved in prosumer col-
lectives, to holistically tackle the multi-faceted problems facing collectives that
go beyond socio-technical energy research (e.g. economic topics)
• Developing scalable business models for those regulatory contexts supporting the
emergence of prosumers and collectives, while mitigating associated social risks
• Investigating virtual prosumer collectives to identify their benefits and challenges
• Creating regulatory frameworks that support the growth of prosumer collectives
in contexts lacking support for collective prosumerism and associated interactions
My findings can inform the decision-making of middle actors around innovating
socio-technical products and services enabling energy management for prosumer col-
lectives. Such findings can trigger further research by interdisciplinary teams, or shape
product roadmaps for new businesses developing user-centric offerings for dynamic de-
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This appendix includes demand response mechanisms based on their objectives at
three power grid levels [22]: (1) system operation, (2) generation, transmission, and
distribution, and (3) retail, for industrial, commercial and residential customers. Tables
A.1–A.9 include each objective and its explanation, example mechanisms and their
characteristics, and example programs.
Table A.1: Providing power capacity
Objective – Capacity provision
Overview – The GO uses DR resources to provide power capacity to the grid in case of a system-
wide peak load. This DR mechanism aims to (1) reduce the generation capacity requirements of
the power grid, (2) reduce the dependence on generation expansions to meet future peak demand,
(3) ensure a medium to long term balance between electricity supply and demand, and (4) cut the
costs required to meet forecast demand [37, 100, 334].
Mechanism explained – In this DR mechanism, auctions take place, where bidders (i.e. DRP
participants) commit to reduce demand during a future peak (e.g. a peak occuring in the window
of three years ahead [335]) in exchange for incentives [22].
Response speed – Few minutes - few hours [22].
Response duration – Few minutes - several hours [22].
Correlation with renewables – Low (or inverse in the case of renewables, which can act as a
competitor to DRP participants by introducing additional power supply instead of reducing power
demand) [22, 335].
Example program – The capacity provision market, called Reliability Pricing Model, imple-
mented by the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland Interconnection (PJM) [335], a world leader
in grid operations and competitive wholesale markets in the US [336], is an example program
targeting large-scale customers [337].
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Table A.2: Enhancing system reliability
Objective – System reliability enhancement
Overview – The GO uses DR resources to enhance power systems reliability, by maintaining
and improving the balance between electricity supply and demand in case of system contingencies
(e.g. the occurrence of a blackout where power plants fail to cover demand loads) [38]. Due to the
flexibility, fast response and lower costs of deploying DR over operating electricity generation units,
it is preferred by GOs for enhancing system reliability. [22]. In such mechanisms, the GO sends
DR requests to DR administrators willing to change electricity use, based on agreed constraints,
and DR administrators are compensated in return [22].
Example mechanisms
• Direct load control
• Interruptible load
• Frequency regulation
• Frequency-controlled load shedding
• Ancillary service market participation
Mechanism explained – In direct load control, the GO controls certain loads at the consumer’s
premises, especially small flexible loads that can be easily aggregated (e.g. heaters, air conditioners,
refrigerators, and water heaters) [338]. Such direct controls, which are sent by the GO via a special
direct load control device installed at the consumer's side, can take different forms, e.g. load cycling,
load limiting, or operation point control [339].
Response speed – Few seconds - few hours [22, 101].
Response duration – Few minutes - several hours [92, 340].
Correlation with renewables – Low - high [22].
Example program – Hydro Quebec, which oversees all power grid operations and services in
Quebec, has an interruptible load program available to its large scale customers who can reduce
at least 3000 kW of load upon request [341].
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Table A.3: Enhancing market efficiency
Objective – Market efficiency enhancement
Overview – Where system reliability and fast response times are not major concerns, the GO uses
DR to provide flexible energy consumption and more economic system operation [247]. This DR
mechanism helps maintain efficient electricity spot prices, guarantees long-term demand flexibility,
and is suitable for loads able to withstand long curtailment periods [22].
Example mechanism – Demand bidding/buyback.
Mechanism explained – This DR mechanism is triggered by price signals, where the GO provides
incentives to DRP participants whose demand reduction bids in the electricity market can reduce
spot prices [342].
Response speed – Few minutes - few hours [22].
Response duration – Several hours [22].
Correlation with renewables – Medium [22].
Example program – The DR program implemented by the National Electricity Market of Sin-
gapore enables consumers to receive incentives when they reduce loads by at least 100 kW per half
hour, directly or indirectly (i.e. via an aggregator) [343]. Typical loads include non-critical produc-
tion equipment and HVAC systems. Consumers can alternatively use on-site backup generators,
instead of electricity coming from the grid, to enable load flexibility [343].
Table A.4: Balancing generation with load
Objective – Load Shaping
Overview – In order to have more controllability and dispatchability over generation resources,
especially intermittent renewable ones, electricity generators leverage demand flexibility enabled
by DR, where demand is changed to match available supply, to meet their supply obligations
towards demand loads [35, 102]. This mechanism is still uncommon, as generation entities do
not frequently deal directly with loads [22]. Additionally, there remains a need to enhance the
flexibility of demand loads to optimally match intermittent generation, by integrating advanced
energy storage and control systems [35, 102]. Thus, this mechanism is yet to undergo improvements
enabled by the new technologies continuously being rolled out in the power grid.
Response speed – Few minutes - few hours [104].
Response duration – Few minutes - few hours [104].
Correlation with renewables – Very high [35, 102].
Example program – In Japan, a power producer and supplier (PPS) only manages generation
facilities, without network transmission or distribution ownership, and provides electricity directly
to any large-scale consumer buying at least 50 kW of electricity. A PPS contracts directly with
customers, and sends them DR requests to reshape the load if generation imbalance occurs [22, 103].
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Table A.5: Managing congestion at the transmission level
Objective – Congestion management
Overview – Increasing electricity demand, especially in areas with weak network connections and
an aging grid infrastructure, causes congestions in grid transmission. To avoid such congestions, the
transmission operator uses DR as a proven solution to congestion mitigation, instead of investing
in infrastructure upgrades [105, 106]. Through an auction mechanism, DRP participants in a
zone with a congestion problem offer demand flexibility to transmission operators in return for
incentives [344]. Note that this concept is similar to capacity provision; however, DR implemented
by congestion management solely targets transmission network congestions.
Response speed – Few hours - several hours [107].
Response duration – Few hours [107].
Correlation with renewables – Medium [22].
Example program – The distribution Load Relief Program developed by Con Edison, one of the
largest US energy companies operating in metropolitan New York, offers incentives to customers
who reduce demand upon request. In this program, which has a 2-hour or less notification period,
customers receive payments for the load they actually reduce in addition to a fixed monthly pay-
ment based on the energy they pledged to reduce. For example, in network locations with a higher
priority for DR, a customer receives $15 per kW per month and $1 for each kWh reduced during a
DR event. All other customers receive $6 per kW per month and $1 for each kWh reduced during a
DR event. A customer able to reduce at least 50 kW can apply directly to Con Edison; otherwise,
participation is via an aggregator [107]. The Commercial System Relief Program, also developed
by Con Edison, has a 21 hour notification period and offers customers $10 per kW per month and
$1 for each kWh reduced during a DR event [107].
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Table A.6: Enhancing system reliability at the distribution level
Objective – System reliability enhancement
Overview – Ripple control is a common form of direct load control used by distributors to enhance
system reliability by reducing peak loads through operating night storage heaters and hot water
cylinders during off-peak hours [101, 108]. This DR mechanism is commonly used in the UK,
Germany, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand. It involves superimposing a higher frequency
signal using a ripple injection device, over the standard frequency signal. This higher frequency
signal is received by a ripple receiver at the customers side, and as a result, the meter relay switches
off during peak hours then back on again during off-peak hours [101, 108, 109].
Response speed – Few seconds [108].
Response duration – Few hours - several hours [108].
Correlation with renewables – Low - high [22].
Example program – Ripple control was introduced in New Zealand in 1949 [109] and has been
in operation since then as the main DR tool used by distributors. As a result of ripple control, a
5-10% reduction in peak demand, corresponding to 30-60 MW, can be reached [101].
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Table A.7: Enhancing electricity procurement at the retail level
Objective – Procurement enhancement
Overview – The electricity retailer may encounter a deficit in supplying power to its loads, due to
sudden changes in load patterns or an error in forecasting demand. In this case, the retailer would
need to buy electricity from spot markets with highly fluctuating prices, which may negatively
impact its revenues. To avoid losses, retailers use DR to change demand patterns, and thus
minimize the costs of electricity procurement [56, 113, 114].
Example mechanisms
• Incentive-based interruptible load
• Price-based interruptible load
Mechanism explained – Interruptible load is load available for automatic demand reduction
using frequency controlled relays [101]. In exchange for demand reduction, customers with large
loads typically receive incentives in the form of pro rata or fixed payments (incentive-based DR)
([115], and those with smaller loads receive discounted prices (i.e. price-based DR) [345].
Response speed – Few seconds - few minutes [101, 346].
Response duration – Few minutes - few hours [101, 346].
Correlation with renewables – Low [22].
Example program – The DemandSMART Interruptible load program in New Zealand is an
example program which rewards commercial and industrial businesses with incentives in return for
providing interruptible loads, e.g. refrigeration compressors, HVAC systems, and electric furnaces.
The program runs in weekdays, between 7 am and 8 pm, where customers receive 2 hours advance
notice for DR events that typically last 24 hours. This program is provided by EnerNOC, a
leading provider of energy management software, in partnership with Genesis Energy, which offers
electricity generation and retailing services in NZ. EnerNOC automatically aggregates interruptible
loads for customers [347, 348].
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Table A.8: Providing power capacity at the retail level
Objective – Capacity provision
Overview – In certain markets, an electricity retailer needs to secure a specific level of power
capacity based on the peak loads it serves, and if it surpasses this level, penalties are imposed. To
optimally manage power capacity, retailers use DR to reduce peaks (i.e. the capacity level needing
to be secured), and to guarantee that this level is not surpassed to avoid penalties [22, 110].
Response speed – Few minutes - few hours [111, 337].
Response duration – Few minutes - few hours [111, 337].
Correlation with renewables – Low [22].
Example program – The capacity market developed by PJM allows curtailment service providers
(i.e. aggregators) to bid DR capacity on behalf of retail customers who receive incentives in ex-
change for reducing demand [112, 337].
Table A.9: Shaping demand load at the retail level
Objective – Load shaping
Overview – This DR mechanism can be used by retailers to leverage consumers’ demand flexibility
in order to shape retailers’ load [22, 349, 350], with the objective of increasing its profits [351]. The
triggers of this mechanism are either dynamic price signals or incentives, where consumers' loads
are shifted from on-peak to off-peak periods with cheaper prices or to certain periods as requested
by the retailer. The use of this mechanism is scarce as DR has a limited ability to maintain load
increases [22]; however, innovative approaches are underway to optimally shape demand profiles
especially with the proliferation of distributed local generation and storage technologies [350, 352].
Response speed – Few minutes - few hours [104].
Response duration – Few minutes - few hours [104].
Correlation with renewables – Very high [35].
Example program – Although DR can help a retailer reshape their load to cut down on required
generation capacity and cost, it inherits risks which can affect the retailer’s profitability [353]. Few
studies have been conducted on this type of DR mechanism; one study has shown that a retailer
using DR to shape their load can reduce cost volatility by more than 7%, peak costs by more than





Story of Company – To learn about the company and the participant
• Can you please introduce yourself and tell us about your background?
• Can you tell us the story of the company and what it does?
• What are your responsibilities within the company?
Value to Society – To learn about the values provided by the company
• What are the products and/or services provided by the company?
• What are the values of the company?
Enabling Prosumer Collectives – To understand how company solutions
enable demand flexibility and fairness, and learn about prosumer collectives
the company is involved with
• How do the solutions provided by the company enable energy demand flexibility?
• Are these solutions currently used by any individual prosumers?
• If yes, can you tell us more about this?
• If no, are there future plans to target prosumers?
• Are these solutions currently used by any residential prosumer collectives?
• If yes, can you tell us more about this?
• If no, are there future plans for involvement in prosumer collectives?
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• What incentives do end-users receive for using the solutions you provide?
• Do these solutions provide fairness (e.g. fair billing or pricing, fair distribution
of incentives, fair allocation of demand flexibility)?
• If yes, how?
• If no, how do you see them providing fairness?
• Can you tell us more about some of the feedback you receive from your customers?
Future Vision – To understand how company solutions are evolving and
learn about the future challenges facing energy demand management and
prosumer collectives
• What can be improved in the current solutions you provide?
• How do you see the solutions provided by the company evolving?
• How do you see the future of energy demand management in general?
• How do you see the future of residential prosumer collectives?
• What do you think the main challenges will be in providing energy management
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Staff Research    Names  
Student Research         Names   
Level of Study (e.g. PhD, Masters, Hons)    
 
 External Research/  Names 
Collaboration 
  Institute/Company 
 
6. When will recruitment and data collection commence? 






Y Dr. Rebecca Ford 
 






When will data collection be completed? 
Data collection will be completed by 10 November 2016. 
7. Brief description in lay terms of the aim of the project, and outline of the research 
questions that will be answered (approx. 200 words): 
The transition from centralized power grids to more decentralized microgrids, which integrate 
distributed energy generation and storage, is changing where and how electricity is produced, 
consumed, and managed. Energy consumers are becoming prosumers who can locally produce energy 
to meet their demand, and importantly, can sell, store or trade their surplus energy. Globally, prosumers 
are interacting with others in their vicinity, selling or sharing surplus energy with each other, and 
forming prosumer collectives. However most renewable generation (e.g. solar PV and micro-wind) 
used by prosumer collectives provide intermittent energy supply. In order to optimise the use of locally 
generated energy within prosumer collectives’ microgrids, and to optimally manage the relationship 
with the wider energy system, there is a need for demand flexibility in prosumer communities.  
In this project, we aim to investigate how demand flexibility can be achieved in residential prosumer 
communities, and how prosumers can be rewarded for being flexible. Additionally, we are interested 
in learning more about how to allocate demand flexibility and prosumer rewards in a fair way that 
encourages prosumers to have flexible energy demand.  
We will conduct interviews with a number of companies with an existing or potential role in enabling 
energy demand to be managed in flexible ways. We aim to learn more about the companies, their 
solutions, and their values. Additionally, we aim to understand how their solutions enable energy 
demand management and achieve fairness in distributing flexibility and incentives. Finally, we aim to 
get an insight into the prospect plans of the companies, energy demand management in general, and 
their perspectives on the future challenges facing prosumer communities.    
 
8. Brief description of the method. Include a description of who the participants are, how the 
participants will be recruited, and what they will be asked to do and how the data will be used 
and stored:- 
 
The participants will be members (e.g. founders, chief executives, senior employees) of companies 
with existing or potential products or services in five areas that can enable demand flexibility and 
associated incentives: dynamic electricity pricing, technologies for optimized resource use, peer-to-
peer transactions within a community, virtual power plants, and aggregators.  






Between 5 and 10 businesses will be recruited based on their existing or potential role in developing 
products or services for flexibly managing energy demand in prosumer communities, and in order to 
represent the five areas listed above. 
Each participant will be asked to have an interview in person where possible, or an individual 
phone/Skype interview if a face to face interview is not possible. Each participant will be asked to 
answer questions about their company, and its solutions and values; the ways in which the company’s 
solutions can enable energy demand flexibility and fairness; and their personal views on how they see 
the future unfolding for the solutions they provide, energy demand management and prosumer 
communities.  
All interviews will be recorded in audio format, with explicit permission provided by participants. 
Before starting the interview, participants will be asked to sign a consent form for in-person interviews, 
or agree to the terms laid out in the consent form for phone/Skype interviews. 
Personal data will be stored securely such that only staff members involved in the project will be able 
to gain access to it. Any personal information will be destroyed immediately at the end of the project, 
except that, as required by the University's research policy, any raw data on which the results of the 
project depend will be retained in secure storage for at least five years, after which it will be destroyed. 
Where data is used in communications and publications, every attempt will be made to preserve the 
participants’ anonymity. 
9. Disclose and discuss any potential problems: (For example: medical/legal problems, issues 
with disclosure, conflict of interest, safety of the researcher, etc) 
We are not aware of any potential problems. All respondents are invited to participate in advance and 
will be able to withdraw from the research at any point without any disadvantage to themselves.  
An information sheet and consent form will be sent to each participant prior to the interview. A draft 
letter that will explain the nature of the project, the participants’ commitments and ability to withdraw 
is attached to this application 
 
*Applicant's Signature:      
Name (please print): Janet Stephenson 
 






Date:  9 July 2016 
*The signatory should be the staff member detailed at Question 1. 
Signature of **Head of Department:  
 
Name of HOD (please print):  Caroline Orchiston (Deputy Director, Centre for Sustainability)under 
delegated authority from HOD Geog. 
Date: 26.7.16 
**Where the Head of Department is also the Applicant, then an appropriate senior staff 
member must sign on behalf of the Department or School. 
Departmental approval:  I have read this application and believe it to be valid research and ethically 
sound.  I approve the research design.  The research proposed in this application is compatible 
with the University of Otago policies and I give my approval and consent for the application to 
be forwarded to the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee (to be reported to the next 
meeting). 
ACTION TAKEN 
 Approved by HOD Approved by Departmental Ethics Committee 
 Referred to UO Human Ethics Committee 
 
IMPORTANT NOTE: As soon as this proposal has been considered and approved at departmental level, the 
completed form, together with copies of any Information Sheet, Consent Form, recruitment advertisement 
for participants, and survey or questionnaire should be forwarded to the Manager, Academic Committees 
or the Academic Committees Administrator, Academic Committees, Rooms G22, or G26, Ground Floor, 
















Business Involvement in Energy Management for Prosumer 
Communities  
INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS  
Thank you for showing an interest in this project. Please read this information sheet carefully before 
deciding whether or not to participate. If you decide to participate we thank you. If you decide not to 
take part there will be no disadvantage to you and we thank you for considering our request. 
What is the aim of this project? 
We are interested in how new businesses are emerging to improve the management of electricity 
generated by prosumers (households that both produce and consumer electricity). In particular, we are 
interested in how new business models are seeking to cater for prosumer communities, where residents 
in a neighbourhood may seek to collectively manage their surplus electricity so as to optimise its use.     
What types of participants are being sought? 
We are interested in talking with members (e.g. founders, chief executives, senior employees) of 
companies with existing or potential products or services that can enable solutions that help achieve 
flexibility in energy demand and fair allocation of benefits.  
What will participants be asked to do? 
Should you agree to take part in the project, you will be asked to participate in a face-to-face or 
phone/Skype interview. You will be asked questions about your company, its solutions and values; the 
ways in which your company’s solutions can enable end-users to use energy in flexible ways and be 
rewarded accordingly; your thoughts on how such solutions disseminate fairness in allocating 
flexibility and rewards to end-users; any residential prosumer communities you are, or may be, 






involved with; and your personal views on how you see the future unfolding for the solutions your 
company provides, energy demand management and prosumer communities.  
Please be aware that you may decide not to take part in the project without any disadvantage to yourself 
at any time. 
What data or information will be collected and what use will be made of it? 
The results of the interviews will be used to write up some case studies outlining the market players 
enabling flexible energy demand in residential prosumer communities. Where data from the interviews 
is used, every attempt will be made to preserve the company and participants’ anonymity. 
Data will be stored securely such that only researchers involved in the project will be able to gain access 
to it. At the end of the project any personal information will be destroyed immediately except that, as 
required by the University’s research policy, any raw data on which the results of the project depend 
will be retained in secure storage for at least five years. 
What data or information will be collected and what use will be made of it? 
You may withdraw from participation in the project at any time and without any disadvantage to 
yourself.  
What if participants have any question? 
If you have any questions about our project, either now or in the future, please feel free to contact:- 
Salma Bakr, PhD Candidate 
Centre for Sustainability 
University of Otago 
Email: salma.bakr@postgrad.otago.ac.nz 
Phone: +64212941112 
Dr. Janet Stephenson 
Centre for Sustainability 




This study has been approved by the Department stated above. However, if you have any concerns about 
the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee 
through the Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph 03 479-8256). Any issues you raise will be 
treated in confidence and investigated and you will be informed of the outcome. 
 










CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPANTS  
 
I have read the Information Sheet concerning this project and understand what it is about. All 
my questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I understand that I am free to request 
further information at any stage. 
I know that:- 
1. My participation in the project is entirely voluntary; 
 
2. I am free to withdraw from the project at any time without any disadvantage; 
 
3. Personal identifying information will be destroyed at the conclusion of the project but any 
raw data on which the results of the project depend will be retained in secure storage for at 
least five years; 
 
4. The results of the project may be published and will be available in the University of Otago 
Library (Dunedin, New Zealand) but every attempt will be made to preserve my 
anonymity.   
 
I agree to take part in this project and confirm that I am over 18 years of age. 
 
 
.............................................................................   ............................... 
       (Signature of participant)     (Date) 
 
............................................................................. 






The following sections include my PhD publications and presentations to date. Publi-
cations in progress are not included.
Publications
• S. Bakr, S. Cranefield, Using the Shapley Value for Fair Consumer Compensation
in Energy Demand Response Programs: Comparing Algorithms, in: Proceedings
of the IEEE International Conference on Green Computing and Communications
(GreenCom), 2015
• S. Bakr, S. Cranefield, R. Ford, A Fair and Profit-Optimal Consumer Compensa-
tion Structure for Load Curtailment Programs in Smart Grids, in: Proceedings
of the International Workshop on Demand Response, Co-located with the ACM
e-Energy Conference, 2014
• S. Bakr, S. Cranefield, Optimizing Shiftable Appliance Schedules Across Residen-
tial Neighbourhoods for Lower Energy Costs and Fair Billing, in: Proceedings
of the Second Australasian Workshop on Collaborative Agents - Research and
Development (CARE 2013), volume 1098, CEUR Workshop Proceedings, 2013,
pp. 45–52
Presentations
• IEEE International Conference on Green Computing and Communications 2015,
Sydney, Australia – Using the Shapley Value for Fair Consumer Compensation
in Energy Demand Response Programs: Comparing Algorithms
243
• Groningen Energy Summer School 2014, Groningen, Netherlands – Smart Community-
Level Energy Management for the Residential Sector
• International Workshop on Demand Response 2014, Cambridge, United King-
dom – A Fair and Profit-Optimal Consumer Compensation Structure for Load
Curtailment Programs in Smart Grids
• National Energy Research Institute Conference 2014, Wellington, New Zealand
– Optimizing Shiftable Appliance Schedules Across Residential Neighbourhoods
for Lower Energy Costs and Fair Billing
• Second Australasian Workshop on Collaborative Agents 2013, Dunedin, New
Zealand – Optimizing Shiftable Appliance Schedules Across Residential Neigh-
bourhoods for Lower Energy Costs and Fair Billing
• Otago Energy Research Center Symposium 2013, Dunedin, New Zealand – Op-
timizing Household Appliances for Lower Energy Costs and Fair Billing
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